Product of the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(RAN)
POLICE
ec.europa.eu/ran
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17/11/2022
CONCLUSION PAPER
RAN POL “The challenges of anti-authorities extremism for police”
23-24 June 2022, Copenhagen, Denmark
The challenges of anti-authorities
extremism for police
Key outcomes
On 23 and 24 June 2022, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Police and law enforcement Working Group
(POL) organised a meeting for a group of experts with experience and expertise in recent violent protests and anti-
authorities extremism
1
. Through presentations and panel and group discussions, participants from different Member
States shared their experiences and views on this burning and relatively new topic. In almost all countries, the
COVID demonstrations were huge and sometimes even with violent outbursts. Police are confronted with not only
legitimate protest against specific measures but also a variety of anti-authorities sentiments and conspiracy
narratives. Most police were confronted with protest movements displaying a variety of ideological factions and even
people without a clear ideological goal or agenda. There were some familiar faces but many new protesters and
organisers also took part. The risk is that ideology-driven extremists, from violent right-wing extremism and
anarchism, are instigating, hijacking and abusing the protest of citizens who have the fullest right to protest and
express their anger and criticism. The following key outcomes were identified in the meeting:
• Anti-authorities extremism is a new hybrid form of extremism that is different from the “original” or classic
forms of extremism. Police in many countries are challenged by new forms of protesting, new protesters, and
more violence and intimidation targeted against authorities and institutions. Targets range from politicians and
governments to the health sector, scientists, journalists and police. The meeting’s participants saw huge
similarities in these new challenges for European police.
• There is a need to better understand this “blurry” and hybrid anti-authorities extremism. Sometimes it is not
clear what the ideology or the political demands are. We need to better look at who is protesting and
demonstrating, and who is not. We need to better understand what the drivers and triggers are and what role
the social media play. And who is paying, facilitating and organising?
• Facilitating citizens in using their democratic right to protest is a task for police in democracies. Dealing with
illegal extremist elements and influences interfering with citizens protesting can be seen as protecting protest
and citizens in open societies.
• Especially in times of surging distrust in authorities, police should be perceived by the public as professional
and neutral. This also requires differentiating the approaches of specific individuals, organisations, and
segments of protest and mass demonstrations.
1
Different terms are used to describe this phenomenon: anti-authority, anti-government, anti-establishment and anti-system
extremism. They are all about the same. Since this is for police, the working group choose to use anti-authorities extremism.
CONCLUSION PAPER
The challenges of anti-authorities extremism for police
Page 2 of 5
Product of the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(RAN)
This paper presents the main conclusions of two days of presentations and lively group discussions. Since this was
the first time RAN POL had a meeting on the complex phenomenon of mass protest in combination with anti-
authorities sentiments and extremists, a large portion of the first day was spent on sharing experiences and
understanding variety in the phenomenon. On the second day, the group drafted lessons and recommendations.
Highlights of the discussion
The different faces and targets of anti-authorities extremism and protest
An assessment among the participants of the different Member States showed that the evolving phenomenon of
anti-authorities extremism is manifesting itself in several ways.
• “Police for freedom” and
veterans and other military
are showing up, sometimes
in mash-ups of real and
made-up uniforms, and
pretending to defend the
protesters against the
government and police.
• Squares fill with
demonstrators, ranging from
right-wing and autonomous
and anarchist to “yogi”,
desperate bar owners and
angry ordinary citizens. The
protest crowds are
fragmented and transversal
because there is a wide
range of grievances.
• Criticism against anti-COVID
measures and anti-authority
sentiments are sometimes
also present among police
personnel. This creates
confusing and unwanted
interactions with
demonstrators.
• There are legitimate protests
but the underlying
extremism could be
anti-Semitic or xenophobic.
• A lot of doxing and online intimidation of researchers, medical staff, politicians and police officers.
• Targets: An unknown perpetrator attacked the house of the commander of state security with gas bombs.
• Sometimes the anti-authorities extremists are armed and dangerous: The “Reichsburger” (meaning
sovereign citizens) are denying state authority. This dangerous group was already in existence but is now
triggered by the anti-COVID-measures movement.
• There seems to be a lot of copying from the United States and Canadian way of campaigning and
protesting. Trump and MAGA (Make America Great Again) signs are being used and international support
is being exchanged.
Anti-authorities extremism, what is it?
Based on discussions on Dr Francesco Marone’s presentation:
• All types of violent extremism promote radical change and are
targeting authorities like politicians and state institutions. So
does the new hybrid anti-authorities extremism.
• The first step of anti-authorities extremism is a deep-seated
distrust in public authorities. This, in combination with crises
that call for tough government policies, creates a potential
breeding ground for recruitment and mobilisation.
• Radical conspiracy theories (QAnon, Great Replacement, Great
Reset) exacerbate attitudes of generalised distrust in public
authorities, with narratives of hidden elites playing dirty games.
These are facilitated by social media.
• Conspiracy narratives tend to flourish in a complex world where
citizens may feel they are losing their grip on their lives and
that their voice is not heard.
• In small sectors of the population generalised distrust may turn
into delegitimation of public authorities. Delegitimation can
lead to active hostility and, in extreme cases, even to violence.
• Anti-authorities extremism can combine with traditional types
of violent extremism, even encouraging unusual convergences;
as an alternative, it may remain without a clear ideological
articulation.
CONCLUSION PAPER
The challenges of anti-authorities extremism for police
Page 3 of 5
Product of the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(RAN)
• The main binding narratives for the anti-authorities extremists are the Great Reset (anti-World Economic
Forum), QAnon (elites sexually exploiting and murdering children), and to a lesser extent the Great
Replacement (a hidden plan of “the elite” intending to replace the population with immigrants).
• In cases where police used violence, and sometimes acted in an unfortunate or unprofessional way,
members of the public or citizen journalists filmed it and put it online, sometimes out of context, leading
to new angry protests, hostility against police, and even doxing and intimidation of individual police
officers.
COVID as the game-changer
• In many countries the level of anti-authority sentiments and extremism accelerated in the COVID
protests, but it seems to influence other societal protests. The participants expressed that both the
sentiments and the way of mobilising and demonstrating are changing and they expect these changes to
stay.
Challenges for police in dealing with new protests and new protesters
• Anti-authorities extremism may be associated with a (even more) vague and blurred distinction
between legitimate/illegitimate/potentially dangerous activities.
• A lot of new protesters, and new and improvised organisers or even a lack of official organisers,
often overlap several circles of ideologies or other shared group identities. Also, there are now also many
people who were never active in extremist circles. This creates challenges for building dialogue and
managing events.
• Police and former police colleagues could have sympathy with the anti-authority sentiments, in protest
groups or even in function.
• The COVID protesters sometimes organise their own militant “police” or “defend groups”. For example,
the Dutch local defend groups were comprised of hooligans, outlaw motorbike gangs, extreme-right
groups, and people with a link to crime or conspiracy. They even created their own brands with flags,
clothes and masks. Sometimes they wear tactical protective gear, carry weapons and have their own
communication channels.
• For the Dutch police, known for the de-escalating “Dutch approach”, it was a shock to have multiple
protests with a high level of violence, mainly initiated by the COVID curfew measures or the COVID
policies in general.
• Brussels police have a lot of experience in maintaining public order (“negotiated public space”). The four
levels of policing (basic policing, public management, crowd control and riots) and available toolsets
(dialogue, negotiations, potential partnerships, communication, feedback, etc.) are being challenged by
the new ways of protesting.
• New and alternative social media are accelerating the mobilising and recruitment capacities.
• In Milano (Italy), the police is innovating with intel fusion in the Great Events Room to get real-time
intelligence and coordination organised. They pay attention to communication, now even more, on three
levels: operational, with the press and with citizens.
• The Dutch police, challenged by the riots and protests of the anti-authorities extremists, are in a process
of redefining the changing phenomenon police and society are facing: these cover five phases in the public
state of mind: a) peaceful, b) agitation, c) resistance, d) revolt, e) violence.
Additionally, they have reordered the toolkit with around 10 newly defined tasks / products:
o Intelligence
o Public order / riot policing
CONCLUSION PAPER
The challenges of anti-authorities extremism for police
Page 4 of 5
Product of the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(RAN)
o Investigation
o Social networks
o Traffic
o Administrative advice (to mayor)
o Communication
o Protection / security
Newest additions:
o Community policing
o Partners: multi-agency working
In big manifestations, those responsible for the above tasks are all present.
Recommendations
• This is a new form of extremism and it is here to stay. Police need more knowledge and understanding on
how it is evolving. Perhaps researchers of LOT 2 can be of help.
• Police in Europe should share more information on these developments in a uniform way, in order to get a
grip on the scale and nature.
• Police officers need training on this new form of extremism, and in dealing with it in a professional, neutral
way.
• Police need to anticipate they are part of the “la bataille de perception” — perception battle — with
independent journalists and distrust in the traditional news media. Because of the critical anti-authority
attitude of anti-authorities extremism, police need to be extra aware of how their actions are being
monitored and presented on social media. Unprofessional police action can easily be used by anti-
authorities extremists.
• Police need real-time intelligence and innovation and adaptivity in tactics to meet the gained speed and
creativity of new disruptive social movements.
• Police and politicians should be careful not to misuse the extremism label for people who are protesting
and are critical towards the government and authorities.
Follow up
• It was suggested that this relatively new and complex extremist phenomenon could be on the 2023
calendar for RAN POL and other RAN events.
• RAN Policy Support could have more research being done on the definitions, nature and scale of anti-
authorities extremism.
CONCLUSION PAPER
The challenges of anti-authorities extremism for police
Page 5 of 5
Product of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN),
Based on a paper prepared by RAN Staff Ceren Özkan and Steven Lenos,
after consultation with the RAN POL co-leader Marzena Kordaczuk-Was and Luc Van Der Taelen.
Further reading
• Champion, K. Ferrill, J., & Milligan, K. (2021). Extremist Exploitation of the Context Created by COVID-
19 and the Implications for Australian Security. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15(6), 23–40.
• Davies, G. (2021). A Witch’s Brew of Grievances: The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to
Violent Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
• Europol. (2021). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2021. Publications Office of the
European Union.
• Jackson, S. (2019). A Schema of Right-Wing Extremism in the United States. ICCT Policy Brief.
• Marone, F. (2022). Hate in the time of coronavirus: exploring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
violent extremism and terrorism in the West. Security Journal, 35(1), 205–225.
• Van Dongen, T. (2021). Assessing the Threat of Covid 19-Related Extremism in the West. ICCT
Publications.
Relevant practices
The Swedish police presented a model (a simplified representation of a more complex reality) picturing a
manifestation with protesters with and without violent intentions. The v’s in the model are the people willing
to use violence, and the V’s are their leaders. The P’s are leaders,
organisers and spokespersons who demonstrate peacefully and who
represent protesters who also protest with non-violent intentions.
The task for police is to facilitate the peaceful protesters executing their
democratic right. If there are potentially violent factions, then the peaceful
P-leaders might have the biggest leverage on the violence-prone protesters
and their leaders. If police in the eyes of the v’s, and even the p’s, are
perceived as acting unjustly and for instance unnecessarily violent in their
actions, this will be exploited by the violent leaders to draw peaceful
protesters in. This was something that was recognised in many countries.
The problem for the “new protest” is that there are more than one of these circles of protesters in one
manifestation. So the picture has more dimensions and is more complex. Who are the P’s and V’s and what is
the leverage they have on v’s and p’s, who might be in one or more circles?
The Dutch approach to redefining the new ways of protesting and redefining the existing police tasks and
products is still under construction, but it seems like a promising practice in bringing police up to speed with
the rapidly and radically changing new ways of protesting.
The Italian operational approach from Milano was a relevant approach because of the operational coordination
in combination with the communication approach.
