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As of: February 5, 2021 7:33 PM Z

Stanton v. Donaldson

United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division

March 16, 2020, Decided; March 17, 2020, Filed

CASE NO. 1:18-CV-01364

Reporter

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46460 *

SHEILA STANTON VERSUS TYRONE DONALDSON ET

For Tyrone Donaldson, A & T McGaha Trucking L L C,

Defendants: Matthew Sanford Green, LEAD ATTORNEY,

Dill Law Firm, Lafayette, LA.

For Prime Insurance Co, Defendant: Richard G Duplantier, Jr,

LEAD ATTORNEY, John Frances McCormick, III, Megan

Marie Clark, Galloway Johnson et al (NO), New Orleans, LA.

For Great American Assurance Co, incorrectly named as

Great American Insurance Co, Defendant: Charles Edward

Riley, IV, LEAD ATTORNEY, David F Bienvenu, David

Mark Schroeter, Simon Peragine et al, New Orleans, LA.

Company's ("GAAC")motion for summary judgment in which

it seeks dismissal of all claims against it arguing a policy

exclusion that precludes coverage when the insured is "in the

business of any lessee" is applicable to the facts in this case.

Plaintiff Sheila Stanton and Defendant Tyrone Donaldson

filed [*2] oppositions to the motion for summary judgment

claiming the exclusion inapplicable because Donaldson was

not "in the business of A&T McGaha Trucking, LLC

("McGaha") at the time of the accident. Neither Plaintiff

Russell Stanton nor Defendants McGaha and Prime Insurance

Sheila Stanton was driving a 2007 Ford Taurus northbound on

Hwy 1207 and Tyrone Donaldson was driving a 2007

Peterbilt Conventional commercial truck and pulling a utility

flatbed trailer eastbound on Louisiana Highway 28.

Davidson was returning home to Mississippi after completing

a delivery for McGaha in Texas.

1

As he approached the

intersection of highways 1207 and 28 he noticed Stanton who

had entered the intersection. Though Donaldson veered to the

left to avoid the accident, he collided with the Ford Taurus.

as lessee may require...." (Doc. 38-5).

October 2018 against Donaldson, McGaha, United Specialty

Insurance Company (as [*3] McGaha's insurer) and ABC

Insurance (as the fictitious name for Davidson's insurer). In

January 2019, Plaintiffs amended to replace United Specialty

Insurance with Prime Insurance Company and ABC Insurance

Company with Great American Insurance Company. GAAC

II. Summary Judgment

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202

(1986). We consider "all evidence in the light most favorable

to the party resisting the motion." Seacor Holdings, Inc. v.

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, or the

absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.

The burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward

with evidence which demonstrates the essential elements of

his claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The

nonmoving party must establish the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact for trial by showing the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to him, is sufficient to

enable a reasonable jury to render a verdict in his favor.

Id. "Conclusory allegations unsupported by concrete and

particular facts will not prevent an award of summary

judgment." Duffy, 44 F.2d at 312, citing Anderson v Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247.

III. Applicable Law

"The interpretation of an insurance contract presents a

question of law, rather than fact, and therefore is an

appropriate matter for determination by summary judgment.

Martco Ltd. Partnership v. Wellons, Inc., 588 F.3d 864, 878

(5th Cir. 2009) (Citations omitted). "Louisiana law provides

between them." Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So.3d 888,

892 (La. 2014). "The role of the judiciary in interpreting an

insurance contract is to ascertain the common intent of the

insured and insurer as reflected by the words of the policy."

Id. (quoting Peterson v. Schimek, 729 So. 2d 1024, 1028

(La.1991)); See also La. Civ. Code art 2045. "When the

words of an insurance contract are clear, explicit and lead to

no absurd consequences, courts must enforce the contract as

written and make no further interpretation in search of the

parties' intent." Id. (quoting Peterson 729 So. 2d at 1028); see

contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished

its text." La Civ. Code art 2056.

As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court:

870 So.2d 1002, 1010 (La.2004). The insurer bears the burden

of proving the applicability of an exclusionary clause within a

policy. Id. "Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage

under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is

no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the

undisputed material facts show by the evidence supporting the

the term "in the business of to be ambiguous. The policy

clearly defines "in the business of a lessee" by setting forth

six specific instances in which an insured would find himself

"in the business of' his lessee. Second, we find LeBlanc

inapposite as that policy, unlike the instant policy, did not

contain language defining "in the business of." Accordingly,