References: See Enclosure I

1. Purpose. This instruction establishes the methodology for conducting the

three components of Combat Assessment (CA) that may result in a re-attack

recommendation (RR): battle damage assessment (BDA), collateral damage

assessment (CDA), and munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA). It provides

analysts with the definitions, methodology, and principles of reporting required

for CA. It bridges the gap between doctrinal guidance provided in Joint

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff (JS), Services,

CCMDs, Joint Forces, Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agencies

(CSAs), and joint activities conducting CA for use in joint or coalition

operations. As this instruction does not apply to third-party damage estimates;

use the damage definitions in Enclosure H for damage assessments where U.S.

forces do not conduct strikes.

4. Procedures. This instruction provides the methodology for CA. This

instruction’s review process establishes processes for evaluating the

effectiveness of new weapons or capabilities.

c. Establishes a CDA methodology, including databasing and graphic

production standards.

Secretary of Defense ....................................................................................... 2

Secretary of State ........................................................................................... 2

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ...................................................... 2

Office of the CJCS Legal Counsel .................................................................... 2

*The office of primary responsibility chose electronic distribution to the above

organizations via e-mail. The JS Information Management Division has

responsibility for publishing the subject directive to the NIPRNET and

SIPRNET Joint Electronic Library websites.

ENCLOSURE E – MUNITIONS EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

6. Target Taxonomy................................................................................... C-15

7. Federated BDA Example...................................................................... C-B-1

13. PDA and FDA Definitions and Considerations for Distillation Towers . H-A-6

14. Physical Damage/Change and Functional Damage Definitions and

15. PDA and FDA Definitions and Considerations for Ground Force Personnel

16. PDA and FDA Definitions and Considerations for Ground Force Personnel

17. PDA and FDA Assessment Definitions and Considerations for Military

B-2 Enclosure B

Attainment of clear, measurable, and achievable objectives will enable the joint

force to achieve the desired end state. The outputs from this phase provide the

orders during Phase 1 of the JTC.

a. A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions in accomplishing

tasks—“Are we doing things right?” MOPs evaluate the task performance of

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Derive targeting MOPs from the

general operational MOPs.

b. A MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,

capability, or operational environment in measuring the attainment of an end

state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect—“Are we doing the

B-3 Enclosure B

d. CA analysts and target developers should coordinate to document BDA

indicators and/or essential elements of information for each target developed to

develops appropriate options, evaluate specific capabilities against identified

critical elements to estimate effects. Effects estimates include estimated repair

and recuperation times. CA depends on desired weapons effects and target

response estimates (e.g., repair and recuperation times).

a. The target graphics produced during Phase 3 include information used in

CA, i.e. critical elements, aim point selection, and collateral damage

estimations (CDEs) or collateral effects estimates. Use aim points produced in

Phase 3 in CA to compare the planned and actual capability effects.

B-4 Enclosure B

b. Tasking orders and documentation produced in this phase provide a

definitive record of intended targets and effects to serve as a starting point for

for and supports the actual tasking, construction, and subsequent execution of

missions for weapon systems.

a. CA depends on tactical mission planning products and/or near-real-time

execution reporting. “5W” reporting, post-mission debriefings, MISREPs, route

or flight plans, in-flight reporting, and full motion/aircraft/weapons system

video of the engagement provide valuable CA inputs. Additionally, products

derived from open-source, signal, geospatial, and human intelligence, may

provide valuable insight to target damage/change. Operations units must

provide this information to CA analysts to facilitate timely and accurate CA.

B-5 Enclosure B

decide whether and how to adjust the end state and/or the commander’s

objectives. JP 5-0 defines assessment as “the continuous monitoring and

a. The three components of an engagement are: effect on the target; effect

on the surrounding environment; and performance of the operational

capability. The three components of CA that may result in a recommendation

for re-attack are (Figure 2): J2 personnel conduct BDA to assess the effects on

the target element/target/target system; J2, J3, and JFE personnel conduct

CDA to assess the damage outside the target boundary; and J3 and JFE

personnel conduct MEA to assess fires in terms of weapon system and

munitions effectiveness. MEA results can identify and recommend required

changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fuzing, and

weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness. Intelligence and

b. CA and the Levels of War. Conceptually, CA consists of national-

strategic, theater-strategic, operational, and tactical-level assessments.

Typically, the JS provides national strategic CAs to national decision makers.

Theater-strategic and operational-level assessments use MOEs and MOPs to

assess progress toward accomplishing targeting objectives and targeting tasks.

Use these assessments with other factors to evaluate theater campaign

progress. Tactical-level assessments help shape ongoing, daily targeting

B-6 Enclosure B

(1) At the national-strategic level, CAs provide the President, Secretary of

Defense, CJCS, and CCMDs with the status of efforts to fulfill national strategy

accomplishing the JFC’s targeting objectives and targeting tasks. These types

of CAs may also vary in style and content from CONOPS-tailored tactical-level

CA products. Typically, the joint force depends the most on CAs because the

reports answer the question: “Were the JFC’s operational objectives met as a

result of the forces employed against the selected targets?” CAs informs the

planning and execution of ongoing operations and the JFC’s decision-making

process. The JFC’s Red Team should participate in assessments to provide an

independent assessment of the likely effects of physical and functional damage

on the adversary’s perceptions. The Red Team’s assessment of the adversary’s

mindset may shape operational objectives designed to change the enemy’s

B-7 Enclosure B

(b) Phase 2 BDA, Functional Damage and Change Assessment

2. As in Phase 1 BDA, the change assessment measures change to

the target resulting from fires that do not create physical damage. Change

relates to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom resulting from an action

or set of actions. The capabilities that drive change assessments may not

result in immediate or easily recognizable effects. Include the level of

confidence for the physical and change assessments in the BDA.

(c) BDA Phase 3, TSDA. The TSDA encompasses all-source

assessments of the change and remaining target system functional capabilities

B-8 Enclosure B

parameters to increase force effectiveness. MEA compares the anticipated

effectiveness calculated in the weaponeering solution to the actual effectiveness

potential for recuperation. This process concludes the CA and attempts to

solve deficiencies identified during the BDA and MEA processes. RR is a

shared J2, J3, and JFE responsibility. Enclosure F details RR.

(5) CA for Cyberspace Operations. Due to the wide variety of complex

operations in the cyberspace domain, planners and CA analysts should

reference the Cyberspace Assessment Determination Matrix (see Table 2) to

determine when to complete BDA or other forms of assessment, or when

B-9 Enclosure B

B-10 Enclosure B

C-1 Enclosure C

methodology provides methods and principles to conduct BDA. BDA

determines effects at the target element, target, and target system levels. BDA,

along with CDA and MEA, supports RR and can assist in determining possible

follow-on targets. The BDA methodology provides the framework to answer

these questions:

a. Did the weapon or capability affect the target?

b. What was the extent of the effect at the target element, target, and target

system level?

C-8 Enclosure C

example, a target element attacked by a weapon with a probability of damage of

75 percent would have physical damage assessed as POSSIBLE SEVERE

which target(s) and weapon type combinations approved for EDA. Based on

the CCMD and component commanders’ BDA CONOPS, these assessments can

be refined with additional intelligence collection as the operation continues. If

considered sufficient by the JFC, EDSs can serve as final assessments.

b. Phase 2 BDA

(1) Functional Damage Assessment. FDA estimates the effect of target

engagements on the functional or operational capability of the target to perform

its intended mission. FDA estimates the remaining functional or operational

C-9 Enclosure C

could reconstitute 50 percent capacity in only 3 days. Depending on the

function, this could be enough for the enemy to maintain its course of action.

function.

2. Understanding how a target’s critical elements relate to one

another and their contribution to the overall functionality of the target is

crucial. For example, if the critical elements perform in a series, then all the

critical elements must be recuperated before restoring the function. For linear

systems, the target’s recuperation time will be the same as the critical element

with the longest recuperation time. By contrast, if the critical elements

perform in parallel, then only one of the critical elements must be recuperated

before partially restoring the function. For nonlinear systems, the target’s

3. Recuperation depends on many factors. The most influential

involve national and local priorities, workload, equipment, and resources.

Priorities are difficult to determine, but use the remaining factors to describe

C-10 Enclosure C

whether the recuperation effort will be short, normal, or drawn out, as shown

in Table 3:

used to assess the task. The categories for task assessment are ACHIEVED,

NOT ACHIEVED, and UNKNOWN.

1. ACHIEVED. The assessed functional damage level and

recuperation times meet or exceed the desired damage or effect and times.

Include supporting analytical evidence and arguments in the BDA narrative.

2. NOT ACHIEVED. The assessed functional damage level and

recuperation time do not meet the desired damage or effect and times. Include

in the BDA narrative, if an attack on a target results in some functional

ACHIEVED. Detail the justification for this assessment in the narrative of the

assessment.

(b) Refer to either the DIA Critical Elements Handbook or the Critical

Elements Guide to determine critical elements, their functional relationship for

facility type targets, and estimated recuperation time (see references d and e).

C-11 Enclosure C

replacement for the target materials developed during Phase 2 of the JTC,

Target Development and Prioritization. The guide does not categorize elements

physical damage/change to critical elements provides a distinct correlation

with the damage/change achieved. For example, consider an attack conducted

with the objective to shut down a building’s power for 24 hours. The building’s

only source of power is a generator that is located just outside the facility and

fully exposed. Conventional air-to-surface munition targeted the generator,

and, based on imagery of a crater, use a CONFIRMED DESTROYED PDA for

the generator. Make a FDA based on the two variables mentioned above, as

depicted in Table 4:

C-12 Enclosure C

C-13 Enclosure C

(g) Inference and Functional Damage/Change. Functional damage/

change is not always observable directly. Even though a target may have

analyst to gather the needed intelligence and may require requests for

information and additional intelligence collection and production during pre-

and post-strike analysis. Analysts apply available intelligence to understand

their targets function, component organization, and interrelationships of the

critical target elements to enhance the estimate of functional damage reported.

(h) Battle Damage Indicators (BDIs). A BDI is as a measurable

phenomenon used to indicate damage/change to a target. Use BDIs in BDA

production. For example, potential BDIs for an attack on a power station could

include inoperable electrical lights or an increase in the use of backup power

2. Collection requirement managers should pre-determine what

type of intelligence collection could gain enough information from observables

to make a FDA on the target. For example, one observable for an attack

against a power station could be a critical headquarters (HQ) facility that relies

C-14 Enclosure C

on the power station for electricity. Multiple intelligence sources could

determine the status of electricity at this facility, including the use of backup

c. Phase 3: TSDA

desired effects across an entire target system. For example, a commander’s

objective might be to degrade an adversary integrated air defense system.

C-15 Enclosure C

(2) TSDA Framework. Base the assessment on the cumulative level of

functional damage to the targets that make up the system.

starting with aim point-level evaluations of primary damage mechanisms and

effects on targeted elements. Collect, document, aggregate, and assess micro-

level assessments to eventually build the necessary intelligence and rationale

for both entity-level and macro target system-level assessments. Update these

assessments at any time with new information, consistent with all intelligence

production. An established technique for BDA production is to produce an

initial Phase 1 and Phase 2 assessment and a supplemental Phase 1 and Phase

2 report when new intelligence or operational information requires modification

of the initial assessment. As required, call out CDA, MEA and RR on the same

BDA product.

apply restrictive timeline requirements as directed through the JPP. For mobile

C-16 Enclosure C

ground targets located short of the fire support coordination line, Phase 1 BDA

relies heavily on operational reports from units in contact and information from

target’s physical and functional status in MIDB. Use the U.S. Message Traffic

Format (USMTF) for all BDA-related formal message traffic to facilitate

automated databasing.

e. Phase 2 BDA products, because of their all-source nature, could require

longer periods to conduct. Phase 2 BDA provides assessment at the target

level. CCMDs may apply restrictive timeline requirements as directed through

the JPP. Disseminate Phase 2 BDA products in the same manner as Phase 1

reports as described above. Phase 1 and 2 BDA can be produced concurrently

in one BDA product.

C-17 Enclosure C

c. Phase 3 BDA. TSDA products describe the FDA at the target system

all-source intelligence. Complete Phase 3 BDA expeditiously to ensure

assessments can inform operational and campaign planning. Operations and

intelligence collection determine the timeline for Phase 3 BDA production, as

directed through the JPP.

(2) Transmit Phase 3 BDA products from the national-level producer to

the JSTIC via CONOPS-specified procedures.

d. Table 7 shows the types of assessments used in the three types of BDA

products.

e. The JFC usually directs the BDA reporting process, but the nature of

BDA federation and the responsibilities of Service intelligence centers and

CSAs dictate the need for a joint standard. Commands should publish BDA

CONOPS in Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex B (Intelligence) of the plan or

operation. BDA CONOPS must provide theater-specific BDA procedures for

particular operations and expand on the minimum joint standards, but the

C-B-4 Enclosure C

C-C-1 Enclosure C

visually depicts the damage to a facility target resulting from joint force

engagement of that target. The BDA-G will display both pre- and post- strike

imagery of the target with appropriate annotations of target elements and

destruction to those target elements. Present BDA graphics either as side-by-

side pre- and post-strike images or as a single post-strike image with a pre-

strike inset. The JFC may establish a policy to consolidate BDA, CDA, and

MEA graphics into a consolidated CA-graphic (CA-G).

a. Annotations. All BDA-Gs will contain header and footer boxes.

C-C-2 Enclosure C

(e) Text line 4 will identify the target facility’s geo-coordinates, ICOD

currency, and date of image. Separate each subject by three spaces with text

(2) Remark Box. All BDA graphics will contain a free text box, beginning

with the BDA remark, and include the classification paragraph marking, date

and time of engagement, engaged entity or facility name, in vicinity of city

where the target was engaged, weapons employed, PDA, confidence

assessment, FDA, re-strike recommendations, estimated recuperation time,

and end with a paragraph classification marking (left justified and on its own

line). BDA physical and functional damage can be included on the same

graphic.

b. Graphics Standards

C-C-3 Enclosure C

provide CDA, MEA, or RR. Call-out boxes will have associated leader lines, an

outline weight of 1pt and text formatted as font bold, font type Arial and font

capture FDAs in call-out boxes, but include them in the BDA remark of the

BDA-G. Call-out boxes will have associated leader lines, an outline weight of

1pt, and text formatted as font bold, type Arial, and size 10pt. Leader lines

should appear clearly attached to call-out boxes.

2. Graphic Example. Only use the license call-out box when using commercial

imagery for the pre- or post-strike image. Use the image’s year for the license.

If the image is NTM, remove these licenses from the BDA graphic.

C-C-4 Enclosure C

3. Damage Modeling Graphic (DMG). CCMDs and DIA produce DMGs as a

supplemental BDA tool to provide the JFC with estimated damage assessments

circumstances exist where the standard inhibits target validation or creates

undue targeting risk acceptance by engagement authorities. Exceptional

circumstances apply when supported and supporting commands agree to a

limited period of time (i.e. dynamic targeting or a specific operation).

5. Magnification/Zoom Box. Magnification boxes coincide with a

corresponding box on the image with leader lines from two diagonal corners

extending to their matches on the corresponding box.

6. Imagery Standards. Subject to the operational tempo, imagery analysts

D-1 Enclosure D

a. The JFC has a responsibility to account for any unintentional or

incidental injury or damage to civilians, noncombatants, or their property.

Engagements that result in collateral damage negatively affect the ability of the

joint force to achieve the commander’s objectives. Perceived use of

disproportionate force undermines support in the U.S., from coalition partners,

and within the contested area. Despite the best efforts of the joint force,

collateral damage will occur. In accordance with the values of our nation and

the Law of Armed Conflict, it is imperative that the joint force completes CDA to

identify any deficiencies requiring correction.

D-2 Enclosure D

3. Collateral Damage Assessment Methodology. Use the following steps to

assess collateral damage.

b. Compare actual strike with the CDE.

c. Assess damage as collateral damage or additional damage.

d. Database CDA.

4. Collateral Damage Assessment Databasing Standards. Database CDA in

the BDA remark of the ETF for a target in MIDB. This section provides the

J2 inputs for the J3 to investigate why collateral damage occurred.

E-1 Enclosure E

E-2 Enclosure E

d. When feasible, MEA efforts can and should continue after cessation of

hostilities, including subsequent on-site inspections collected by teams visiting

(1) Category 1. Category 1 involves direct observation of the weapons

striking the intended target. Crewmembers of the aircraft employing weapons

may observe WHI visually or with the aid of a targeting pod. Other observers

could include operators on the ground near the target area, such as a Joint

Terminal Attack Controller or an individual with Remote Operations Video

Enhanced Receiver.

(2) Category 2. Category 2 involves observation of secondary effects of

the weapon in the target area. Indicators include, fire, smoke, cratering, or

E-3 Enclosure E

indicate functional or operational changes of the observables due to specific

physical changes at the monitoring point. These changes can vary from

BDA. BDIs can range from temperature changes, to loss of communication

abilities, to increased/decreased activity levels. BDIs can exist at locations

outside of the target area (i.e. communications from a subordinate unit stating

that they have not received any information from a higher echelon). Having a

comprehensive list of BDIs and an associated timeline before looking for them

provides for the use of all-source intelligence to complete a comprehensive look

at holistic BDA. For example, BDI for a command bunker could include

indications of weapons impacting the northeast corner of the bunker, as that is

the location of the known power generator.

F-4 Enclosure F

G-1 Enclosure G

exploitation teams to collect empirical data to inform the BDA and MEA

components of CA. This data collection effort is essential to:

a. Evaluate the full extent of target physical damage/change and functional

damage.

b. Determine the true effectiveness of the asset-target interaction.

c. Critique and improve the BDA analysis and reporting process.

G-2 Enclosure G

H-1 Enclosure H

assessment. Standardized damage definitions support a JFC’s decision on

whether targeting achieved operational objectives or whether to order a re-

attack.

2. Organization. The appendix to this enclosure includes damage definitions

that include the following information:

a. Physical damage/change assessment definitions for specific types of

target elements. Note: The damage definitions for the types of targets provided

in Appendix A do not apply to targeting conducted with nuclear weapons. See

H-2 Enclosure H

c. POSSIBLE: <50 percent likelihood of the accuracy of the damage

assessment. Requires considerable inference.

H-A-1 Enclosure H

damage/change and functional damage, so that the JFC receives concise

information required to make decisions on whether or not to re-attack.

2. Damage Narrative. In addition to determining the physical and functional

damage levels, provide a damage narrative that describes the damage or

observed change. Consider the following items for each target element

assessed when writing a damage narrative:

a. Target Element PDA

H-A-2 Enclosure H

provide PDA definitions and FDA considerations for various types of military

targets.

H-A-3 Enclosure H

H-A-4 Enclosure H

H-A-5 Enclosure H

MODERATE DAMAGE—Weapon perforation into the bunker observed.

SEVERE DAMAGE—Less than 1/3 of bunker roof/side walls collapsed.

DESTROYED—Greater than 1/3 of bunker roof/side walls collapsed.