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21 March 2023
Investigative Report 23-03
Douglas R. Hoffer Vermont State Auditor
Universal Broadband in
Vermont:
Managing Risks
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Mission Statement: The mission of the Auditor’s Office is to hold State
government accountable by evaluating whether taxpayer funds are
being used effectively and identifying strategies to eliminate waste,
fraud, and abuse.
Investigative Report: An investigative report is a tool used to inform
citizens, policymakers, and State agencies about issues that merit
attention. It is not an audit and is not conducted under generally
accepted government auditing standards. Unlike an audit, which
contains formal recommendations, investigative reports include
information and possible risk-mitigation strategies relevant to the topic
that is the object of the inquiry.
Principal Investigator: Ilan Weitzen, Government Research Analyst
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Introduction
Since at least the mid-2000s,
Vermont policymakers have
recognized that high-quality
broadband infrastructure is
essential to promoting
economic growth,
employment and educational
opportunities, public health
and safety networks, and
social and civic engagement.
Despite broad agreement
about the need for
ubiquitous broadband,
progress has been slow.
While Vermont’s population
centers generally feature at
least one broadband
provider, 19 percent of
Vermont addresses do not have access to 25/3 megabits per second (Mbps) service (the federal
definition of broadband). More troubling, 70% of Vermont addresses lack 100/100 coverage, the state’s
goal for every address.
There are several primary reasons so many Vermonters have been unserved or underserved. First, for-
profit corporations have shown little interest in serving more rural, less profitable communities. Second,
and related to the first, the federal government has not required telecom companies to meet rural
areas’ broadband needs as they did with telephone service. Third, a Vermont telecom company, VTel,
received $116M during the Obama Administration to make coverage available to every unserved
address in Vermont. That effort failed. And fourth, Vermont did not identify a source of funds to make
more than incremental progress.
This report examines the State’s efforts to expand access to high-speed broadband since the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic when the federal government provided funding to overcome the fourth barrier
described above. Much has been written and said about the state’s broadband goals. This report is
concerned with identifying risks that could impede successfully meeting those goals in the coming years.
Background
Concluding that existing broadband providers failed to achieve universal, reliable, high-quality service,
the Legislature sought to expand coverage through other means. In 2015, it authorized the creation of
multi-municipality Communications Union Districts (CUDs). CUDs were intended to develop, coordinate,
and implement broadband expansion in their respective territories, particularly where existing providers
have not provided adequate service (or any service) that meets the needs of residents and businesses.
CUDs allow towns to join forces and aggregate demand for broadband infrastructure to create
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economies of scale while featuring an element of public accountability by virtue of representation of
each member municipality on a CUD’s board of directors. There are now 10 CUDs in varying stages of
development that together represent 214 municipalities.
State funding to further the CUDs’ efforts began in earnest
with the arrival of COVID and the substantial federal funds
that filled the state’s coffers. In June 2020, $800,000 from
the CARES Act was made available to CUDs for planning
activities. Separately, $12 million was granted to existing
internet service providers to extend broadband service to
unserved and underserved areas, prioritizing low-income
households who needed high-speed internet access during
the pandemic to learn remotely, telework, and access vital
medical services. An additional $2 million was dedicated to
help some Vermonters pay to connect their homes to
existing, nearby fiberoptic lines. As a result of these
investments, nearly 10,000 addresses gained access to high-
speed broadband.
A year later, with funds from the federal American Rescue
Plan (ARPA), the Legislature allocated $150 million to
support CUDs’ buildout efforts. At the same time, they passed Act 71, the law that created the Vermont
Community Broadband Board (VCBB) to coordinate, facilitate, and accelerate the implementation of the
State’s universal broadband goals. The VCBB was entrusted with granting the initial $150 million to the
CUDs. First, the CUDs were to receive preconstruction grants from the VCBB to fund comprehensive
studies of the infrastructure needed to create universal service in their geographic areas, and to develop
business plans utilizing private partnerships with internet service provider (ISP) operating partners.
Through subsequent construction grants, the CUDs would then be responsible for building out
broadband infrastructure over the next several years according to their VCBB-approved plans. To future-
proof the investments, only networks capable of at least 100 synchronous Mbps (100/100) would be
funded (only fiberoptic lines are capable of reliably achieving that standard at this time).
In 2022, the Legislature committed an additional $95 million to the VCBB to support Act 71’s broadband
goals. A minimum of an additional $100 million more, and as much as $250 million, is expected to be
made available through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) signed into law by President
Biden in November 2021. This more than $350 million investment represents one of the largest
infrastructure projects in Vermont history, rivaling rural electrification and the Interstate Highways.
Since its inception, the VCBB has awarded $114.41 million in preconstruction and construction grants to
the CUDs and spent an additional $9.85 million for the bulk purchase of materials to avoid supply chain
issues and lower overall project costs. Six CUDs have commenced construction in their respective
territories.
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Risks That Threaten Vermont’s Universal Broadband Goals
The risks below represent threats to Vermont’s ambitious plan to utilize the CUD model to deliver
universal, affordable broadband access to every Vermont address. These risks are informed by our
review of CUD contracts and grant agreements, VCBB, Vermont Communications Union District
Association, and CUD board meeting minutes and materials, dozens of interviews, and relevant
legislation.
Risk 1. Some CUDs Face a Potential Construction Funding Gap in Calendar Year 2024 Which Could
Halt Construction Mid-stride if Additional Funds Are Not Identified
The VCBB has identified several CUDs that, at present, would run out of construction funds after the
2023 building season. This would put construction on hold and could lead to higher project costs and
delayed service availability.
The gap will develop when CUDs’ ARPA grant monies run out and
the State awaits its share of federal Broadband Equity, Access, and
Deployment (BEAD) investments. Vermont is slated to receive a
minimum of $100 million, and up to $250 million, in BEAD funding
over the next two years, but it is uncertain when those funds will
become available. The initial payment to the State will amount to
just 20 percent of the total award, and the precise timing of its
arrival is unknown at this time. Even when the funds arrive, it may
take the VCBB and its consultants time to evaluate a new round of
grant applications.
Funding-related delays would be problematic for several reasons.
First, and most obviously, it will prolong the amount of time many
Vermonters wait for broadband service. Second, qualified
construction crews may select other work while the CUD waits for
funds, and may not return or be easily or promptly replaced. Third,
materials will likely be scarcer and more costly by the time funds
are in hand. And fourth, the CUDs’ business plans are based on
anticipated growth in subscribers (known as the take up rate). If the
plan anticipates paying customers being added throughout 2024,
but they are not hooked up, the lost revenue may pose cash flow problems and jeopardize operations
and further build out.
The VCBB, CUDs, and other stakeholders have suggested several possible ways to fill the potential
funding gap. They include:
* Creation of a $50 million revolving loan fund CUDs could draw from and replenish with their BEAD
allocation when it arrives.
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* Seek infrastructure funds
from the Northern Borders
Regional Commission (NBRC)
to establish grants or low-
interest loans. [The NBRC is a
Federal-State partnership for
economic and community
development in northern
Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and New York.]
* Use $30 million appropriated
in the FY 2023 Budget
Adjustment Act as a match
for Vermont’s $67 million
Middle Mile federal funding
request to supplement and
accelerate construction
efforts by the CUDs.
Whatever mechanism is chosen, the sooner it is established, the lower the risks involved.
Risk 2. CUDs May Struggle to Access Needed Construction Materials
Ensuring that CUDs have the necessary materials to construct their network is vital whether or not the
funding gaps described above occur. Demand for fiberoptic cable and other supplies will be heavy
throughout the country when $42.5 billion in BEAD funds are released. The sooner the necessary
materials are procured, the less risk that CUDs will face long wait times or inflated costs. Ideally, CUDs
would purchase materials this year for the 2024 season.
Risk 3. Construction May be Slowed by a Lack of Qualified Construction Workers
According to the VCBB, an additional 200 fiber technician workers are needed to support Vermont’s
broadband buildout. These new positions would join a labor market that is already unstable.
It is not clear how the VCBB concluded that 200 new positions are necessary, nor is it clear whether
those positions would still be needed once the fiber buildout has been completed. VCBB’s current
workforce development strategy centers around a training program designed in collaboration with the
Vermont State Colleges and other partners. This program
, plus the 2000 hours of apprenticeship the
VCBB says are needed before a new technician is proficient, may produce a cadre of new fiber techs
within a year or two, though the VCBB anticipates that for every three workers trained, one will elect to
pursue a different career path.
Before committing significant funds to broadband workforce training, policymakers should evaluate the
schedule of anticipated statewide buildout and determine whether such training programs are capable
of bringing new workers on-line in time to be useful. The cost of such training should be evaluated in
comparison to paying premium rates to existing workers or vendors to encourage them to take on this
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work. Existing utility workers also present a
possible alternative to lengthy and costly training
programs. Partnerships with Vermont utilities
should be evaluated to determine whether utility
and CUD construction schedules could be
coordinated in order to deploy skilled workers who
already have comparable training, either by
contracting with the utilities or extending the offer
of secondary work to utility employees.
Risk 4. The Tension Between the VCBB Supporting the CUDs and Ensuring They are Viable Risks
Allowing Any Weaknesses in CUD Business Plans to Persist and Deepen
Act 71 requires the VCBB to ensure that each CUD has a viable business plan in place prior to granting
them funds. According to the VCBB, VCBB staff and Board members and a contracted third-party
consulting firm review and subject the business plans to stress testing to make certain they are
financially sustainable. Nonetheless, VCBB staff analysis has acknowledged the uncertainties inherent in
the state’s unique approach to broadband buildout and in external factors like federal funding rules. For
instance, VCBB staff have speculated that a time could come when two or more CUDs may be more
viable in the long run if they merge with one another due to demographic and infrastructure
considerations that risk the standalone CUD’s failure.
The VCBB has the authority to condition its grant awards to CUDs as it sees fit to achieve the state’s
broadband goals. The VCBB must apply continuous and rigorous scrutiny of CUD business plans to avoid
squandering the substantial, one-time funding driving the state’s efforts. And whether the VCBB directs
two or more CUDs to merge as a funding condition, or if CUDs elect to merge of their own accord, the
VCBB should anticipate this possibility by developing merger documents, so they do not need to be
drafted on the fly or under duress.
Risk 5. Reliance Upon CUDs with Varying Levels of Expertise and Capacity May Delay Broadband
Service to Some Vermonters, Lead to Increased Spending, and Establish Inequitable Policies
and Access
The VCBB’s executive director frequently remarks that the Board’s work has been akin to building a
plane while flying it. The same may also be said of the CUDs. In each case, an entity was established,
then required to hire staff and develop processes, all with the specter of deadlines for expending funds
hovering over their endeavors. As a result, the VCBB was not in a position to apply a robust, mature
oversight function over CUDs from the onset. Similarly, some CUDs were making business decisions in
the absence of professional staff, and without the benefit of the technical assistance the VCBB and a
maturing Vermont Communication Union District Association (VCUDA, the CUDs’ trade association) can
now offer.
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The VCBB conducted a Grantee Risk-Based
Assessment of each CUD before considering
applications for preconstruction and construction
grant awards, as required by the State. In every
instance, the CUDs were determined to be high-
risk grantees, largely due to having little or no
track record receiving and administering grant
funds. For this and other factors, activities to date
have not always been smooth, as illustrated by
these examples:
While the VCBB’s 2023 Legislative Report
indicates that existing grant agreements
address methods to support low-income
and disadvantaged communities, we have
not found any such language in the
agreements.
The VCBB has relied, in part, on surveys
and self-attestations from the CUDs
regarding their own capacity, financials,
and reporting when considering funding awards despite their high-risk classification. Self-
attestations fall far short of the verification standard detailed in the Department of Finance and
Management’s Internal Control Standards: A Guide for Managers
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Despite its broad powers to be more directive, the Board has given CUDs freedom to make
business decisions that vary in terms of staffing, cost, strategy, negotiations, and public
disclosure/confidentiality. As a result, CUD activities may not always reflect the most efficient
and publicly beneficial use of public funds.
At least two CUDs based their initial business plans upon the anticipated service take rate and
financials of another CUD even though they have different demographic and geographic
concerns.
Though their grant agreements require monthly reporting to the VCBB, multiple CUDs submitted
reports that were late and lacking useful detail with regard to scope and scale.
While more than $110 million of public funds have been awarded under the initial, looser oversight
framework, a more comprehensive framework is being developed by Public Service Department grant
administration staff for consideration and adoption by the VCBB. The recommended oversight plan
includes a combination of desk and on-site monitoring methods, including compliance with:
CUDs’ statutory requirements in terms of governing board composition and competency,
meeting records, bylaws.
Federal administrative requirements such as conflict of interest policies, cost allocation
methodology, and procurement and internal control processes
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The VCBB has also updated its monthly reporting requirement to obtain consistent, timely, and salient
information from CUDs.
The VCBB should adopt the new oversight framework as soon as possible so that the hundreds of
millions in future awards will be subject to a higher standard of public accountability.
Risk 6. With the Exception of the Early VCBB Fiber Purchase, CUDs Have Not Been Partnering for
Procurement of Goods and Services, Risking Higher Costs and Inferior Outcomes
Each CUD has, to this date, individually procured goods and services such as administrative support,
legal, and accounting. This raises the risk CUDs will pay varying costs for the same goods and services
with no public benefit or justification. It also limits the benefits of sharing the highest quality vendors to
perform comparable analysis and functions. In recognition of this, the VCBB and VCUDA recently
secured a grant of $2.5 million from the Northern Borders Regional Commission (NBRC) to fund an
initiative they have called the “Securing the Public Interest Through Shared Expertise and Services
Program”. The stated goals of the program include ensuring efficiency, accountability, and resilience in
the face of market challenges. The grant will fund positions for experts in the field who will mostly be
housed at VCUDA. These new “shared” staff will
conduct a needs analysis of shared services, and will
support CUDs in program management, policy
analysis, accounting, communications, and make
ready support. These roles have been funded for $2.1
million across three years. The VCBB and VCUDA
project that after year three CUD revenues will be
sufficient to sustain the shared positions.
There is a tension between combining services whenever possible and the autonomy of each CUD. The
VCBB will need to determine the extent to which it conditions its funding on the most efficient use of its
grant funds, even when that removes the options available to individual CUDs. For example, the VCBB
must decide whether it wishes to require CUDs to jointly purchase fiberoptic cable as a condition of
funding or to use a shared grant administrator.
Risk 7. Statutory Confidentiality Provisions Shield Some CUD Decision-making from the VCBB,
Policymakers and Residents of the Member Municipalities Despite Receiving Tens of
Millions in Public Funds
The CUDs have frequently invoked their statutory right to treat contracts and some other internal
documents as confidential or protected by attorney-client privilege even when it has prevented them
from receiving expert advice, though confidentiality concerns could be addressed with redactions or
nondisclosure agreements. This raises risks that CUDs will agree to provisions with their internet service
provider partners that are suboptimal from the point of view of end users and the taxpayers whose
funds are fueling their broadband buildout. Instances of contract provisions that are not being made
available for public inspection include:
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Proposed pricing plans.
Requirements around public access programming and other
content.
Service quality expectations.
CUDs are largely operating in unserved areas, and yet they are
concerned that public disclosure could allow for-profit
competitors who’ve previous ignored rural areas to swoop in
and undermine the CUDs’ business plans. While we cannot
judge the extent to which that fear is warranted, we do believe
the tendency, to date, to withhold key contractual elements
that will impact the end user raises the risk that anticipated
service take rates will not be as accurate as they should be, and
that users may be surprised to learn, when service arrives, that
certain policies have been locked in place by virtue of multi-
year contracts with service providers. CUDs’ member
municipalities each have a representative on their respective
CUD board of directors, but if those representatives do not seek
feedback from their fellow residents on key customer issues (or
are prevented from doing so by confidentiality provisions) such
as those bulleted above there is a risk that subscription rates
will not meet expectations.
Risk 8. Lack of Affordability Definitions and Requirements Threaten to Reduce Service Connections,
Undermine CUD Business Plans, and Create Regional Inequities
Act 71 directed the VCBB to give priority to applicants for broadband project funding that “provide
consumers with affordable service options.” Ensuring that Vermonters will be able to afford high-speed
broadband once it becomes available to them is central to the State’s universal service plan requirement
under Act 71 and the mission of the VCBB. While the CUDs are obligated to submit a plan to provide
low-income subscribers with affordable service options, specifically by referring them to a federal FCC
subsidy program, what affordability means for businesses and families has not been defined by the
Legislature or the Board. CUDs’ business plans assume service take rates from low- and moderate-
income households. If not enough low- and moderate-income Vermonters sign-up for plans because
they are deemed unaffordable, those who have subscribed will need to pay more to ensure sufficient
revenues for the CUDs to remain profitable.
Furthermore, high-speed plans available in more populous areas often range between $55-80/month
and have already proven a barrier to many households. In more rural communities with a smaller
customer base per mile of fiber, service costs could be even higher, putting more pressure on the
monthly subscription prices.
The Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) administered by the FCC limits assistance to households with
incomes below 200% of the poverty line to a subsidy of $30/month to help pay for internet service.
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Therefore, in Vermont, only families of four with incomes below $60,000/year are eligible; and for
families of two, income must be below $39,440. Established with $14 billion dollars from the American
Rescue Plan, the ACP is currently the only subsidy available to Vermont consumers and the funding is
slated to run out in 2024 unless it is renewed by Congress. Even with this consumer subsidy, it is not
clear that a discount of $30/month on a bill that may otherwise approach $100/month will be sufficient
for many Vermonters to sign up for service.
Because neither the authorizing legislation nor the VCBB have defined affordability, it is possible that
each CUD will establish its own definition of the term. It seems unlikely that the Legislature intended
that two like CUDs, building out in comparable communities, would charge customers at rates that may
vary greatly.
If this issue is not addressed before buildout occurs and further funds are awarded, attempts to remedy
the “affordability” issue will be difficult to implement since CUDs’ business plans and contractual
arrangements with internet service providers will be more or less locked in place. It raises the prospect
that policymakers will be asked to make annual appropriations from the state budget to subsidize
service which has previously been a matter for the providers to address.
Risk 9. The Firm the VCBB Employs to Evaluate CUD Business Plans Has Also Consulted for a CUD
and Does Not Appear to be Prohibited from Consulting for Others, Raising Conflict of
Interest Risks
VCBB has contracted with the firm CTC to perform independent evaluations of CUD business plans.
However, in addition to their work for the VCBB, CTC was contracted to provide consulting services to
the SoVT CUD before the VCBB awarded SoVT CUD $9 million in construction grant funds. Furthermore,
CTC bid on other CUDs’ requests for proposals.
The VCBB’s contract with CTC relies solely upon the 23
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provision of the state’s standard conflict of
interest language to address the conflict of interest risk described above. That provision reads:
Conflict of Interest: Party shall fully disclose, in writing, any conflicts of interest or potential conflicts
of interest.”
It is not unusual, though, for contracts to include additional, case-specific processes allowing a
contractor to perform related work for another client while safeguarding against real or apparent
conflicts of interest. Contractors, especially larger ones, are capable of compartmentalizing their work
teams to mitigate conflict of interest concerns.
CTC’s services include advising the VCBB as they consider CUDs’ funding requests. In that context, the
ability of CTC or any other VCBB contractor to provide consulting services to a CUD should be
transparently addressed in order to maintain the public’s confidence that the VCBB is receiving truly
independent analyses of CUDs.
Risk 10. BEAD’s Irrevocable Letter of Credit Requirement is Not Designed for New and Small
Telecommunications Entities
Though BEAD funds are intended to be accessible by telecommunications entities of varying scale and
history, the program’s Irrevocable Line of Credit requirement presents a challenge for new and small
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entities who are unlikely to have the acceptable forms of collateral needed to access the funds. VCBB
staff are seeking a waiver of this requirement from the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), the BEAD program’s administrative agency. If the waiver is not granted, a means
of establishing acceptable collateral will need to be developed, which risks Vermont’s BEAD funds not
being deployed in a timely manner.
Conclusion
The Vermont Community Broadband Board and their staff have (1) stood up an administrative agency,
(2) supported the development of ten newly created Communications Union Districts, and (3)
distributed more than $110 million for broadband planning and construction, all since the summer of
2021. The speed and nature of the undertaking has resulted, at times, in accountability and risk
mitigation strategies being developed after dollars are awarded, rather than before. If current estimates
are correct, the total cost to build a universal broadband network in Vermont will be between $600-800
million. The VCBB hopes 60% of those funds will come in the form of state, federal, or private grants.
The risks identified in this report do not represent an exhaustive list, but represents factors that, if left
unaddressed, could jeopardize Vermont meeting its broadband goals.