*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other

document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the

rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CR-16-000904

No. 2194

September Term, 2016

______________________________________

DONOVAN JAMAL ROBINSON

Friedman,

______________________________________

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A jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County convicted appellant, Donovan

Jamal Robinson, of possession of heroin.

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He timely noted this appeal, asking us to

consider the following questions:

2. Did the trial court err in restricting the cross-examination of a state

witness regarding alternative suspects?

3. Did the trial court err in allowing improper closing argument?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Annapolis City Police executed a search warrant at an apartment at 9-F Bens Drive

in Annapolis, a building in “a high crime, high drug area.” The subject of the warrant was

the apartment. Jasmine Johnson, Robinson’s girlfriend, was the leaseholder of the

apartment.

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Upon entering the apartment, the officers found Robinson, Jasmine, and Jasmine’s

possession of drug paraphernalia (in this case, two scales) with intent to use.

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related. Because they share a surname, however, we will refer to each by his or her given

name. According to Jasmine, Corben dated her cousin and stayed at her Bens Drive

residence from time to time.

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apartment revealed women’s undergarments and suspected heroin—packaged in 20 plastic

baggies inside one larger baggie—in a dresser drawer in the bedroom.

search turned up plastic baggies and a digital scale showing a “brownish powdery

substance” inside a container in the bedroom closet, $240 in the pocket of a camouflage

jacket in the same closet, a second digital scale, also with a powdery substance, on top of

the refrigerator in the kitchen, and documents bearing Robinson’s name.

When a detective showed the suspected heroin to Robinson and Jasmine and asked

“if these belonged to anybody,” Robinson said that “the drugs were his and that he would

take the charge.” Robinson and Jasmine were arrested.

Before being transported to the

police station, Robinson asked for clothing from the bedroom closet in which the jacket,

baggies, and scale had been found.

Jasmine’s apartment—approximately 10 grams packaged in 20 baggies, each containing

approximately 0.5 grams—was “definitely more than personal use.” In the expert’s

opinion, the packaging of the heroin in small, individual baggies and the recovery of two

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I. “PRIOR BAD ACTS” EVIDENCE

Robinson challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit, over his objection, two

documents bearing Robinson’s name found in Jasmine’s apartment (and thus tying him to

the location). Robinson’s challenge to both documents is identical: the documents each

contain references to his previous incarceration, which improperly permitted the jury to

infer his involvement in “prior bad acts.” He argues, therefore, that the circuit court erred

in admitting the documents without first conducting a Maryland Rule 5-404(b) “prior bad

acts” analysis. We will review the documents first and then explain our reasoning.

The first document is a $35 money order, purchased from a CVS Pharmacy and

made payable to “AACDF,” which we understand stands for the Anne Arundel County

the number listed on the “recipient” line corresponds to Robinson’s commissary account.

We have reproduced the money order as it appears in the record of this appeal:

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The second document is a hearing notice issued by the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County to notify Robinson of a status conference in a case captioned, State of

Maryland v. Donovan Jamal Robinson. We make two additional observations about this

document. First, it is not addressed to Robinson at Jasmine’s apartment, where it was

found, but rather at 131 Jennifer Road, the location of the AACDF. Second, the hearing

notice does not identify or describe the type of case for which notice is given, but the case

caption strongly suggests that the case is criminal in nature. Moreover, the notice contains

a line titled “Inmate ID Number,” which also supports its connection to a criminal case.

Again, we have reproduced the notice as we received it:

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As we will discuss, we agree with Robinson that the circuit court erred in failing to

conduct a “prior bad acts” analysis prior to admitting the money order and hearing notice

into evidence. Md. Rule 5-404(b). Crucially, however, Robinson admitted to the police that

the heroin recovered in the apartment belonged to him. That admission alone is sufficient

for us to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would not have returned a

different verdict, even if the challenged documents had been excluded. Thus, we hold that

any error by the circuit court with respect to the documents was harmless. Donaldson v.

State, 200 Md. App. 581, 595-96 (2011) (“In Maryland, an error is harmless if ‘a reviewing

court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict.’”) (quoting Dorsey v.

State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976)).

appeal and affirm his conviction on that ground. We will, however, in the exercise of our

discretion and for the benefit of the trial court and the parties, address the issue of the “prior

bad acts” evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 388 Md. 385,

person … to show action in conformity therewith. Such

evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such

as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common

scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.

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Md. Rule 5-404(b). There are four steps involved in deciding whether to admit or exclude

necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s character.”

Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 549 (1999). Second, if it does, the court must determine

218 Md. App. 689, 710 (2014); Md. Rule 5-404(b). Third, if one or more of the exceptions

applies, the court must decide whether the defendant’s involvement in the “prior bad act”

A. Prior Bad Acts

The first step of the 5-404(b) analysis requires the court to determine if the evidence

relates to the defendant’s involvement in a “prior bad act.” That requires the court to decide

if the evidence related to conduct that would “impugn or reflect adversely upon [a

defendant’s] character.” Klauenberg, 355 Md. at 549. The trial judge here misunderstood

speculated about the jury’s ability to understand the nature of the evidence. To illustrate

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the proper considerations the trial court should have made, we discuss each challenged

document separately.

1. The Money Order

As we described above, the money order is a deposit of funds into Robinson’s

commissary account in a correctional facility. The clear implication of the document is that

have been enough to move to the second step of the analysis. Instead, the trial judge

overthought the matter. He speculated that the money order “says nothing” and raised no

problem, because an average juror would not know that “AACDF” referred to the Anne

Arundel County Detention Facility. Thus, to the average juror, the judge assumed, the

money order would not imply that Robinson had engaged in a “prior bad act.” The trial

for. But the judge had no way to know whether, in fact, any single member of that jury

possessed that knowledge. No voir dire had been conducted on that topic. Maybe one juror

drove past the facility each day on the way to work. Maybe one juror worked in the Anne

2. The Hearing Notice

Also as described above, the State introduced a hearing notice addressed to

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conference in a case captioned State of Maryland v. Donovan Jamal Robinson. There can

be little question that such a document suggests that Robinson is a defendant in a criminal

matter. The trial judge, however, again failed to understand the test he was to perform. As

with the money order, the trial judge reasoned that the hearing notice “just simply has the

address of 131 Jennifer Road, without referring to it as the Detention Center, so I don’t see

where that’s an issue.” The judge further explained that he “would probably let it stay even

if [it] said Detention Center … it is what it is. If that was his mailing address, then it is

what it is.” Again, maybe the judge was right, and no juror would have known that 131

Jennifer Road was the address of the AACDF. But then again, a single juror might have.

Moreover, it doesn’t require specialized knowledge to recognize that criminal cases are

captioned as this one was, and even though the trial judge agreed to redact the case number,

Thus, with the hearing notice (as with the money order), the trial judge asked the wrong

question.

After concluding, erroneously, that neither of the challenged documents were

admissible. Instead, as to each document, the trial court should have proceeded to the

second step of the 5-404(b) analysis. We now briefly address how the trial court’s analysis

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jacket and cash were found. Therefore, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the

evidence that the camouflage jacket belonged to a man.

Moreover, it makes no difference if the jacket was for a man or a woman, as

have convicted him on that fact alone.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

AFFIRMED; COSTS ASSESSED TO

APPELLANT.

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“he doesn’t remember whether that was a men’s jacket or a woman’s jacket” and stated,

“there’s no evidence about this jacket, and what kind of jacket that was.” The jury was thus

aware that the State and the defense contested whether the jacket was a man’s or a

woman’s. It was permitted to accept the characterization by either side. Therefore, it is

extremely unlikely that the jury was misled by the prosecutor’s single comment, even if it

was erroneous.