Transportation & Logistics - Q&A in Plain English - Books 7, 8 & 9
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2. A.I.G. Uruguay Compania v. AAA Cooper Transp., 334 F.3d 997 (11
th
Cir. 2003) involved
a shipment of cellular phones worth $126,000 from Motorola in Illinois to Miami, Florida, where
they would be shipped onward to Uruguay. The customer had engaged a freight forwarder,
Miami International Forwarders (“MIF”), which in turn contracted with Cooper to handle the
movement to Miami. The shipment mysteriously disappeared while in Cooper’s possession.
One of the issues in the case was whether the carrier was entitled to a limitation of liability,
because the commodity was misdescribed on the bill of lading.
The description of the commodity on the bill of the lading was “NMFC 61700, Class 100”,
which covers “Electrical Appliances or Instruments . . . in inner containers, in cloth bags, or in
boxes.” Cooper argued that the appropriate category for this shipment was actually NMFC
62850, which applies to “Radio-telephones, cellular (Cellular Telephones), . . . in boxes.”
According to NMFC 62851, NMFC 62850 applies to those phones “not specifically released
as to value in accordance with the provisions of item 62820 at time of shipment”. Because the
form bill of lading used by Motorola in this case had no space for a declaration of released
value, it would be impossible to comply with item 62820, which requires that any released value
“must be entered on shipping order and bill of lading in [a specific] form.”
Although the court did agree with Cooper that NMFC 62850 was the appropriate
classification, it did not agree that this would have limited its liability, stating:
However, the only effect of re-classification to NMFC 62850 would be that
Cooper would have charged more to transport the Motorola shipment. NMFC
62850, like the misrepresented category NMFC 61700, does not contain within its
terms a limitation of liability. At this point, re-classification to NMFC 62850 would
probably only allow Cooper, if it wished, to collect the difference between the
shipping charge, but, as Cooper refunded the entire shipping charge once the
shipment was lost, that avenue of recovery appears waived.
Cooper also argued that the court should re-classify the shipment as a punitive measure for
its misrepresentation of the commodity on the bill of lading, but the court rejected the argument,
stating “we have no reason to believe that the misdescription was fraudulent, rather than a
mistake.”
The court concluded:
So the only difference in this case if the shipper had correctly represented the
contents of the shipment is that Cooper may have charged a higher rate for the
transportation of those goods. The goods still would have disappeared, AIG would
still have paid the claim for loss to Abiatar, and AIG as subrogee would still sue
Cooper for the full value of the shipment. We find in this circumstance that
preserving the contract-based relationship between carrier and shipper would be
more prudent than reading in a limited liability provision for punitive purposes.
Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in determining that Cooper did
not limit its liability for the Motorola shipment.
3. The most recent case is Diane’s Trucking, LLC v. Holmes QST, Inc., Case No. 05-72635
(E.D.Mich. July 31, 2006). In this case, Sovereign Sales, a distributor of perfume products
requested Diane’s Trucking d/b/a Load One to transport a shipment from its contract packer,
Pak Rite in Michigan to its customer, Walgreens in Florida. Load One apparently brokered the
shipment to Holmes QST, which engaged an owner-operator, Robert E. Foster, d/b/a TAB
Transportation to handle the movement. En route, the truck was broken into and a quantity of
the product was stolen. Load One paid Sovereign’s claim in the amount of $71,745; Sovereign
assigned its claim to Load One, and Load One then sued Holmes and Foster, alleging
negligence, breach of contract and indemnification under the Carmack Amendment.
Holmes did not move for summary judgment on the merits of the underlying claim. Rather,
Holmes contended that the claim was barred because Load One intentionally misdescribed the