Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee
Opinion Request Number: 2012-07
Date of Issue: June 12, 2012
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impressions such activities may create,
judges may and do continue to socialize with
attorneys and others.
The mere existence of a friendship between a judge and an attorney does not, in
and of itself, disqualify the judge from cases involving that attorney. Rule 2.11 sets forth
specific circumstances in which a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself” because “the
judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]” A personal friendship with one of
the attorneys is not among the enumerated circumstances. The list set forth in the Rule,
however, is not meant to be exhaustive. Comment [4] to Rule 2.11(c) states: “A judge
should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their
lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even
if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.” A personal relationship with
any of the attorneys or parties might be included in such information. The Committee
sees no reason to view or treat “Facebook friends” differently.
The requesting judge states: “This request assumes that a Judge is not permitted to
post anything on a social media site which pertains to Courthouse matters, and that a
judge cannot engage in any activity on a social media site which is otherwise prohibited
by the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct. In other words, this request does not pertain
to what can or cannot be posted on social media, but simply whether the mere fact of a
social connection creates a conflict.” The Committee recognizes that there are many
reasons why a judge would want to participate in a social networking site such as
Facebook (e.g., to communicate with family members, college and law school
classmates, etc.). Accordingly, it is the Committee‟s position that “the mere fact of a
social connection” does not create a conflict. As the California Judicial Ethics
Committee aptly observed, “[i]t is the nature of the [social] interaction that should govern
the analysis, not the medium in which it takes place.” (Emphasis added). We reiterate,
however, the admonition of our counterparts in Kentucky and Oklahoma,
that “social
C-102 of the Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “Judges should maintain the dignity of
judicial office at all times, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their
professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible
public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.”
For a discussion of judges‟ personal relationships, see Cynthia Gray, The Too Friendly Judge? Social
Networks and the Bench, Judicature, May-June 2010 and Cynthia Gray, Disqualification and Friendships
with Attorneys, Judicial Conduct Reporter, Fall 2009.
The New York Judicial Ethics Committee similarly stated that “the Committee urges all judges using
social networks to, as a baseline, employ an appropriate level of prudence, discretion and decorum in how
they make use of this technology[.]” [New York Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 08-176] The
California Judicial Ethics Committee suggested, “notwithstanding the explosion of participation in online
social networking sites, judges should carefully weigh whether the benefit of their participation is worth all
the attendant risks.” [California Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 66].