Origin and Development of Indian Logic and Buddhist Logic

International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)

ISSN (Online): 2319-7064

Index Copernicus Value (2015): 78.96 | Impact Factor (2015): 6.391

Volume 6 Issue 1, January 2017

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Licensed Under Creative Commons Attribution CC BY

Origin and Development of Indian Logic and

Buddhist Logic

Ven.Dr. LenagalaSiriniwasa Thero

Head, Department of Sanskrit, Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka - Homagama, Sri Lanka

1. The Development of Indian Logic

It is very difficult to give satisfactory chronological accounts

of the rise and growth of Indian Logic for the reason that the

texts, which the science of logic or various logical terms

have been mentioned or used, have so far failed to be dated

with certainly. The earliest reference to logic or science of

debate seem to be contained in chāndogyaupanisad where

Nārada includes among the disciplines studied by him, one

called vākovakyam(Ch.U.7.1.2).The term is explained by

Sankarācārya as meaning logic(tarkasāstra),but it seems to

signify the art or science of debate. Among later works the

arthasāstra of Kautilya (400 B.C.) mentions logic under the

name of anvīksikī, which is the first among the four

disciplines, alluded to by him (arthsāstra 1-2.p.6). Perhaps

even in those days, as now, the followers of reason or logic

were not very orthodox people. Arthasāstra says that a

person well versed in the art of governing ought to know

logic also. Next important references are to be met with in

the kathāvatthu (300 B.C.), which is a part of the

abhidharmapiµaka in Buddhism. The work mentions

Anuyoga(inquiry),âharana(illustration), patina (proposition)

[1]. In the Mahābhāratanot only the term Upanayana

(application of reason), Niggaha(Nigraha-humilation of or

defeat),Anvīksikī,etc. have been used, but also there is a

reference to the five member sentence or speech whose

strong and weak points were thoroughly known to Nārada

[2] In vanaparva,a chapter of Mahābhārata there is a story

about the controversy between vandi, the court philosopher

of king Janaka, and Astāvākra, a young scholar. The story is

illustrative of the fact that the rules of controversy were

known at the time of Mahābhārata. It is certainly true that

rules of controversy cannot be identified with the theory of

logic. But it is the rules of controversy, which are primarily

discussed in aphorisms of Aksapāda. So the reference to the

rules of controversy in Mahābhārata is very important for

the historical development of logic.

The Mahābhārata relates the story of a Brāhmaõa who on

account of his being addicted to logic chopping all through

his life was born a jackal in his next birth. [3] According to

Vyāsa, spiritual doctrines cannot be communicated to those

made callous by dialectics (tarkasāstradagdhāya). [4]

Manu-samhita, though recommending Anvīksī(logic) as a

useful and necessary study for a king and insisting on a

hetuka and a tarkin being indispensable members of a legal

assembly, [5] enjoins excommunication upon those

dvijas(twice-born class) who have become skeptics (nāstika)

owing to recourse to hetusāstra and set at defiance sruti and

smruti, the two recognized sources of religion. [6] Manu

urges that dharma is to be analyzed by means of

argumentation in conformity with the Vedas. [7] Though

there are several references to the necessity and usefulness

of logic as well as debates and discussions, nowhere in

Brāhmanic literature is logic appraised at its full value. On

the contrary, its importance has been emphasized, if at all, to

prove things in concurrence with the beliefs and doctrines of

the Vedas whose authority was commonly acknowledged to

be one of the several means of right cognition (āgama or

sabdapramāna) in the Brāhmanical schools of philosophy.

[8] As the Vedas present no set philosophy, the Upanisads

likewise are diffuse and figurative in their expressions. It is

for this reason that the Upanisads to which the germs of all

later philosophical thoughts can be definitely traced have

little to say about logical problems. [9] But the debates and

the discussions found in the Upanisads may be regarded as

the anticipations of the logical system that followed.

Upanisads, though they encourage debates and discussions,

declare that truths regarding Brahman are not obtainable by

argumentation alone (naisātarkenamatirāpaneyā). [10] It is

also to be noted in this connection that an approach to

religion or metaphysics purely from the standpoint of

reason, quite irrespective of the conclusion that may follow,

is not much favoured in Brāhmanicliterature in general. In

Manusmruti there is a reference to tarkaor logic and it is

asserted that those who follow tarka would not attain Svarga

or heaven.

The most important fact about these all documents of logic

is that they mention ten parts or Avayavās of syllogism

instead of traditional five. Some of the Jain logicians like

Bāhubali, also refer to these ten parts. These additional five

parts of the syllogism are strictly irrelevant to the theory of

syllogism and so Vātsyāyana, the commentator of Aksapāda

Sutras rejects them. But certainly these additional five parts

give rise to much speculation.

The story of Indian logic covers a period of over two

thousand years. From the time of Mahābhārata, when logic

was still a practical art of controversy, logical theory has

steadily and constantly developed in India till about the

seventeenth century A.D., when it culminated in a formal

discipline of language in the neo-logical school of

Navadeepa in Bengal. All this time it is spread through three

different disciplines, the discipline of orthodox Hindu logic,

the discipline of Buddhist logic and the discipline of Jain

logic. Each of these schools produced many logicians of

great eminence who attacked and counter-attacked the

logicians of the other schools by trying to point out the

weakness in the theory of the opponents. Thus, for example,

Nāgarjuna,Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti tried to attack the

Hindu logicians by pointing out the dimensions of Hetu(or

reason)and its significance in the theory of inference. On the

other hand the Hindu logicians tried to uproot the Apoha

theory of negation, [11] which was accepted by Buddhist

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)

ISSN (Online): 2319-7064

Index Copernicus Value (2015): 78.96 | Impact Factor (2015): 6.391

Volume 6 Issue 1, January 2017

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logicians. The result was that logical theory became richer

and richer and culminated in the finest and subtlest

instrument of human thought and reasoning. Philosophers of

the other schools of orthodox Hindu thought also contributed

to the growth of logic though they rejected the metaphysical

tenets, they accepted the general methodology of Nyāya-

Vaisesika school and soon thanks to their efforts it instead of

remaining a mere school of philosophy, attained a position

of pre-eminence in the science of methodology. Thus in

ancient India a pupil was required to learn first grammar and

then Nyāya or logic. Unless a student took lessons in Nyāya

he was not supposed to be competent to study

purvaMimāmsa or Vedānta.

2. The Meaning of the Term Nyāya

The earliest attempt to define Nyāya seems to have been

made by vātsyāyana in his Bhāsyaon the Nyāyasutra.

According to him it is the examination of objects by mean of

pramānas. The definition seems to be wide, including as it

does the ontological topics as presented in Nyāyasutra. Later

on, particularly in the hands of the Buddhist logicians,

Nyāya or logic became identified with the discussion of the

pramānas. This seems to be the most general and current

meaning of the term Nyāya in Indian philosophy. The

carakasamhita contains for the first time an exposition of

the doctrine of syllogism under the name of sthāpana. Hence

it is presumed that the word Nyāya as an equivalent for logic

came into use about the composition of that samhita that is,

about the opening of the Christian era. The only systematic

treatment of the Nyāya can be found in the Nyāyasåtra of

Gautama in later lines (Nyāyasåtra of Gautama-2

century

A.D./Uddyotakara-about 635 A.D./Vācaspati Mishra-about

841 A.D.).

The literature of Buddhism gives little aid; the Buddhist

doctrine of perception in its developed form has affinity with

the Nyāya, but no derivation suggests itself; either follows a

line of thought already foreshadowed in the Upanisads. [13]

The old pāli texts ignore the names Nyāya or vaisesika: in

the Brahmajālasuttawe hear in lieu of them only of takki,

‘Sophist’ and vīmansī ‘casuist’ and in the Udānatakkikās

appear as in the epic and Puranas.The silence is of

importance, still more so the fact that in the

Kathāvatthuppakarana,which does not claim to a greater

antiquity than Asoka’s alleged council about 255 B.C., we

find no reference to either school, and nothing more

significant than use of the terms patiñña, ‘proposition’,

upanaya, ‘application of a reason’, and niggaha,

‘humiliation’, which later in Gautama's logic are technical

terms, but which at this period have their more general

sense. It is in keeping with this that the Nyāya, under the

name nīti and the vaisesika, first appear in the milindapañha.

3. The Classical Nyāya School

Founded by Gautama Aksapāda probably at second century

A.D., the school, like its ally Vaisesika, represents the most

stubborn proponent of realism in Indian philosophical

tradition. Scholars have divergent opinions regarding the

authorship of Nyāyasāstra. Some of them, for instance,

Dr.Vidyabhusana, maintain that Gautama and Aksapāda

were two different persons. Out of the five subjects

discussed in the Nyāyasåtra, viz, (1) pramāna (2) prameya

(3) vāda (4) avayava and (5) anyamataparīksa, the first,

second and third, which constituted Anviksikī, were

compiled by Gautama and the last two were introduced by

Aksapāda. “Aaksapāda”, according to Dr. Vidyābhusana,

was, therefore, the real author of the Nyāyasutra, which

derived a considerable part of its materials from the

Anvīksikīvidya of Gautama. Just as Caraka was the redactor

of the Agnivesatantra or the Ayurveda, Aksapāda was the

redactor of the Anvīksikī of Gautama. Vātsyāyana, the

author of the earliest extant commentary on the Nyāyas³tra

vaguely refers to some other commentators and gives

different explanations of some terms or concepts, but their

works are no longer available. It seems that there must have

been a gap of at least two hundred years between Aksapāda

and vātsyāyana.

Later Naiyayikās like Uddyotakara, Jayanta and vācaspati

engaged themselves in explaining various theses put forth in

Gautama’sNyāyasåtra, the fundamental text of the school,

and vehemently defended them against, above all, their arch-

rival, and the Buddhist non-realist.

Nyāya is mainly a logical and epistemological, and its

metaphysics is mostly subordinate to or overshadowed by

the Vaisesika metaphysical theory of category

(padartha).So, as a common practice, we take the latter to

bear the name “Nyāyavaisesika”. The Nyāyavaisesika word

is populated with real (sat), particular existents, including

substances, quality-particulars, then, universals,

particularities, the relation of inherence, and finally absence.

The metaphysics is thing-oriented, with substance forming

the central and the most essential category. Substances are

the substrata of qualities, action and universals, etc. which

inhere in them. They are either non-composite, like earth-

atoms, sky and selves, or composite, composed of

indivisible, eternal atoms of the four elemental substances,

earth, water, fire and air.

Nyāya accepts four types of means of knowing, viz.

perception, inference, analogy and word-generated

cognition. Unlike the Buddhist, the school draws a

distinction between a mean of knowledge and the resulting

knowledge. In any case a knowledge-episode (pramā) is and

object-accordant (yathārtha) presentative cognition.

A cognition or awareness is a transitory quality of the self.

Naiyāyikās denounce the thesis of self-awareness. For them

an awareness-episode, unless it is pre-predicative, can be

known by a reflective awareness called ‘anuvyavasāya’.

Now, according to Nyāya, a sense-awareness of an object is

void of a concrete form, yet its reflection perceives not only

the awareness itself but also the object. This problem is thus

resolved: by dint of the first order awareness setting up,

jñānalaksana-wise, an epistemic relation the reflective

awareness comes to perceive even the object of the first

order awareness.

For Nyāya there is no intentional content, e.g., concepts, that

mediates between awareness and its external object-

complex. The content of awareness is indeed its external

object. For the Buddhist a conceptual awareness may

ascertain as the same various different homogeneous objects.

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

891

International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)

ISSN (Online): 2319-7064

Index Copernicus Value (2015): 78.96 | Impact Factor (2015): 6.391

Volume 6 Issue 1, January 2017

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Projecting a conceptual-intentional form onto the objects

does this. And different ascertaining awareness may have a

very similar intentional form. But Jayanta (NyāyaMañjari

11: 26-27) repudiates the view as he argues that if the

seemingly generic form revealed by the conceptual

awareness is distinct from the awareness, then it is just a real

phase of the latter, the form is as specific and

instant(ksanika) as the awareness.

“The Nyāya system of philosophy is generally identified

with logic. But it is by no means true that it is a system of

logic alone and nothing else. It is primarily a method of

controversy” [14] Logic, like Metaphysics, is only a part of

it. It is a matter of history that adherents of the Nyāya

system of philosophy laid great stress on methodology,

which, in the course of time, was also accepted in large

measure by other systems of philosophy to prove their

propositions. Though it does prameya and apavarga

amongst the categories, from the aphorisms, which have

come down to us the metaphysical presuppositions of the

system, are by no means clear. On the other hand it is clear

that the system provides instruments of controversy and

decision. But traditionally and in its later thought at least, the

followers of the Nyāya system accepted the metaphysics of

the Vaisesikās.In fact later Indian logic is mostly the

development of vaisesika logic, unifying it with the main

tenets of the Nyāya, In fact, even Udyotakara regards

kanāda, the profounder of Vaisesika system as a great sage

and adores him with even greater veneration than Gautama.

The author of the vaisesika system was kanāda. His other

name seems to be Uluka. Etymologically ‘kanāda’ means

one who eats atoms. Kanāda was, perhaps, so called because

he believed that the world was composed of atoms. Like the

Greek Democrats, he tried to reduce everything to four kinds

of atoms, the atom of fire, the atom of earth, the atom of air

and the atom of water.

The logics of the Vaisesikas and the Naiyāyikas proceeded

for some time on parallel lines, but were ultimately unified

in the neo-logical school. Perhaps the works of Udayana

who wrote on both the systems must have been partly

responsible for this unification. In fact some as the founder

of neo-logical school has regarded Udayana. He wrote

profusely and criticized almost every logical doctrine of the

Buddhists. The systematization of the logical doctrines of

Indian origin is most probably due to Udayana.

Udayana seems to have flourished in the 10

century A.D.

Most probably he belonged to the Saiva school of religious

sect. One of his celebrated works, known as Kusumāñjali-‘A

bunch of flowers’-is a work devoted to establishing the

existence of God. In this work, as in others, he discusses in

detail, the whole theory of logic and the work is indeed very

important from the point of logical theory.

He wrote a commentary called Kiranāvali-‘A beam of rays’-

on the Bhāsya of Praœastapāda and on Nyāya side wrote

another commentary called Nyāya- vārtikatātparya-

parisuddhi on Nyāya- vārtika- tātparya of vācaspati Mishra.

Another important work of his is Atmavādaviveka where he

tries to prove the existence of soul and analyses its nature. It

is here that he discusses the Buddhist doctrines of Apoha and

ksanabhanga or flux. He revived and re-established the

Nyāya and Vaisesika theory. On account of his epoch-

making work, the TatvaCintamaniGangesaUpadhyaya is

usually called the father of neo-logical school. Udayana was,

at least, responsible for preparing the ground for that great

work of Gangesa.

Before Udayana, there flourished great logicians like

Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Vācaspati Mishra, Bhāsarvajña,

Jayanta and several others on the Nyāya side. On the

Vaisesika side there were celebrated authors like

Prasastapāda, Sridhara and Vyomasiva. The work of

Prasastapāda is known as Padartha-Dharma-samgraha. It is

usually known as Bhāsya though an independent work

running along the line of Vaisesika Sutra. It is very valuable

because it is the earliest Vaisesikawork available. Unlike the

NyāyaSutra which has been arranged by Vācaspati,

Vaisesika Sutras are not properly arranged and the

authenticity of many of them is doubted.

Another important work on the Vaisesika side is the Nyāya-

kandali of Sridhara. It is a commentary on

PrasastapādaBhāsya and shows a great advance in logical

theory. Another very early commentary on the Bhāsya of

prasatapāda is known as Vyomavati and is useful as it

preserves many of the doctrines of Indian logic in its early

form. When the new system of education was introduced in

India, the study of Indian logic was neglected; the

development of logic came to an end.

4. The Buddhist School

The Buddhist epistemological school is virtually founded by

Dinnāga, a Yogācāra philosopher, at the early sixth century

A.D. As Dinnāga and his successors also subscribed

themselves to or made use of certain views of the Buddhist

Sautrantika School, the school is also known as Sautrantika-

Yogācāra school. Dharmakīrti later took up Dinnāga’s

theses, enlarged and refined them against criticisms from the

rival schools. Dharmakīrti wrote a number of books

explaining his viewpoints on perception, inference, language

and relation, etc. Apart from Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, we

can refer to Sāntaraksita and his pupil Kamalasīla,

especially, their new semantic theory. Although Yogācāra

metaphysicians are idealists, the Buddhist epistemologists

normally accept the existence of mind-independent reality. It

is well known that in NyāyabinduDharmakīrti says to the

effect that a particular (svalaksana) gives rise to different

immanent objective appearances according to it is near to or

remote from the perceiver.

Buddhist literature generally falls into two divisions, Pāli

and Sanskrit. In Pāli Buddhist literature there is not a single

treatise devoted to logic; nevertheless it gives very clear

indications of current logical doctrines. As Keith figures in

the Pāli literature, Buddha is ‘a reasoner whose interlocutors

are not his match; his weapons against them, beside his

authority are analogy, simile, parable and an occasional trace

of inductions by simple enumerations of cases’. [15] We

must also bear in mind in this connection that in the

personality of Buddha the preacher and the philosopher

blended together. While Buddha gave a rationalistic

philosophy in an age of Upanisadic dogmatism, he had to

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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deal with ‘relatively immature minds’, ‘the man in the street’

and 'the average bhikkhu or sekha (learner in the order). ‘But

any way the prevailing method of the Buddha in his replies

to interlocutors is one of gentle 'reasonableness’. [16]

The period of Pāli Buddhism was rather one of criticism

than of construction and it is not a matter of surprise that we

do not find during this period any systematic study of logical

principles. In the later period of Sanskrit Buddhism when the

schism of the Buddhist institute resulted in the four principle

schools of Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrantika and

Vaibhāsika, every school for the purpose of opposing rival

doctrines as well as vindicating its own, found it necessary

to evolve logical methods of arguments and thus gradually

there grew up a vast literature on logic which to our great

misfortune, is now a mere catalogue of names. Excepting

only a few, almost all the treatises on Buddhist logic are lost.

But some have providentially escaped utter destruction as

they were translated into Tibetan or Chinese. The Japanese

scholar SadajiroSugiura has given an account of the

Buddhist logic in Chinese and Japanese in his work, ‘Hindu

logic as preserved in China and Japan’ (1900).Dr.Satis

Chandra Vidyābhusana’s monumental work-History of

Indian Logic, (1921), presents an elaborate account of the

Buddhist Nyāya literature which was transported to Tibet

and remains up till now, buried in its Tibetan translation.

Dharmakīrti’sNyāyabindu with the Nyāyabindutīka is the

only complete and comprehensive work on Buddhist logic

that has survived in its original Sanskrit form. The six

Buddhist Nyāya tracts (Bib. Indica) edited by

MahāmahopādhyayaDr.H.P. æastri discusses some

interesting problems of logic. The Tattvasamgraha of

Sāntaraksita with Pañjikā of Kamala sīla (Gaekwad Oriental

Series), an encyclopaedic Buddhist work, gives a

comprehensive account of Buddhist logic. The

Nyāyapravesa, Part І (Sanskrit text) and Part ІІ (Tibetan

text) in the above series in an important manual of the

Dinnāga’s school of logic. The pre-Dinnāga Buddhist texts

on logic from Chinese Sources by Professor Tucci in the

same series have no doubt been a very valuable publication.

The publication of a few more works on Buddhist logic has,

however, been announced in the Gaekwad Oriental Series.

But that we possess of the Buddhist Nyāya literature is

insignificant in comparison with what has perished of it.

It is much to be regretted that Buddhist logic has in recent

times scarcely received any attention of the orthodox Indian

Scholars of logic (Nyāya) who are occupied with the

subtleties of the new school of Indian logic (Navya-Nyāya).

But it is worth noting that Buddhist logic has had greater

influence upon Navya-Nyāya than the ancient Brāhmanic

logic. While Gautama introduces sixteen categories

(padartha), rather topics of discussion in his logical system

(i.e. the Nyāyasutra) the Buddhist logicians were restricted

to one topic only, viz.pramāna. The Navya-Naiyayikas also

exclusively confined themselves to pramā and discussion

pertinent to it in their extensive and elaborate speculations in

the field of logic. Gautama's Nyāyasutra has no reference to

vyāpti or the invariable concomitance between the

probandum and the probans, which is the pivot of inferential

argument, though Vātsyāyana’s suggestive remarks in his

commentary on the Nyāyasutra 1.1.39 are worth noting. All

the subtle discussions on the invariable concomitance or

vyāptithat have found a prominent place in the NavyaNyāya

have, it appears, been profoundly influenced by the theories

of inference as held by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti.

It is to be noted in this connection that the erudite

Brāhmanic scholars like Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana

and Partahasarati Mishra appear to have possessed a

profound knowledge of Buddhist logic, which they exhibit

in course of their criticism of the Buddhist doctrines.

The Jaina philosophers also took interest in Buddhist logic.

Not only did they refer to the Buddhist views in their own

works by way of criticism but they also sometimes wrote

commentaries on the Buddhist logical treatises, e.g.

Haribhadra’sNyāyapravesapañjikāon the Nyāyapravesa and

Mallavādin'sDharmottaratippanaka (Bib.Buddhica) on the

Nyāyabindutīka of Dharmottara. It deserves to be mentioned

here that these commentaries along with the texts,

Nyāyapravesa, Nyāyabindutīka(with Nyāyabindu) and a few

more texts of Buddhist logic that have survived in their

original Sanskrit form.

The Nyāyasutra of Aksapāda and the Bhāsya of Vātsyāyana

show the influence of Buddhist critics like Nāgarjuna and

refute some of their charges. Dinnāga then sets himself to

criticizing Brāhmanic doctrines as those of Aksapāda and

Vātsyāyana .To answer the objections of Dinnāga, urged

against Aksapāda and Vātsyāyana,Uddyotakara made an

attempt to interpret elaborately the Nyāyasutra of Aksapada

and the Bhāsyaof Vātsyāyana with all their implications.

And again as Buddhist criticisms on Aksapāda and

Vātsyāyana led Uddyotakara to write his Nyāyavārtika,

Brahmanic criticism on Dinnāga similarly induced

Dharmakīrti to write the Pramānavārtika, a metrical

commentary upon the Pramānasamuccaya effecting all

possible improvements in their own defense. Dharmakīrti

was again answered by Vācaspati, the great Brāhmaic

Philosopher and commentator. Dharmakīrti was succeeded

by a number of Buddhist logicians like Devendrabodhi,

Vinītadeva, Jinendrabodhi, Santaraksita, Dharmottara,

Arcata and jetari, many of whom wrote commentaries and

sub-commentaries on the treatises of Dinnāga and

Dharmakīrti and occasionally criticized Brāhmanic writers

like Kumarila and Vācaspati. But they did not possess much

originality of thinking like the two masters: Dinnāga and

Dharmakīrti. Owing to these mutual conflict and opposition

Indian logic had the opportunity of developing by a process

of alternate criticism and construction.

“The continuity of Buddhist logic came up to about 1000

A.D. when the decline and fall of Buddhism in India

sounded its death-knell. During this time with the revival of

Brahmanism Brāhmanic logic being tinctured with Buddhist

influence came to be studied over again and thus was laid

the foundation of the new school of Brahmanic

logic(NavyaNyāya) which flourished later on so luxuriantly

in Mithila and Nadia”. [17]

The history of logic in India presents three stages: The first

stage, when dogmatic philosophy and authority reigned

supreme and was thrown into the back-ground; the second

stage, characterized by a rampant revolt against authority

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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when logic was raised to the rank of philosophy and was on

a par with it; and the third stage, when logic got the upper

hand over philosophy and in a sense smothered it, but at last

lost its self in its own groove. Buddhist logic, it is to be

noted, belongs to the second stage.

Classical Indian epistemologists concerned themselves with

examinations of various means of knowing (pramāna)

regarding their number, functioning, object, validity, etc.

The Buddhist accepts only two means of knowing, viz.,

perception and inference. It is often said that Dinnāga

reduces verbal cognition to inference. In

Pramānasamuccaya he does say that the cognition from the

utterance of the worthy person is inferential, for it and

inference similar in being non-deceiving. The two are also

alike in being conceptual and having a negative route to

reality. Yet, to affirm these similarities (and for under

inference) is not necessarily to reduce verbal Cognition to

inference. It may be the case that Dinnāga just found a

common basis for both of them.

Dharmakīrti characterizes both perception and inference as a

correct (samyak) knowing in the sense of being non-

deceiving (avisamvādi) in its adherence to efficient

operation or to the fulfillment of useful effect (arthakriya). It

is held in Pramānavārtika11 6d-7a that the own form of a

cognition is known through the practical activity of

confirmation regarding the production of the intended effect.

Dharmakīrti account of the notion of Pramāna in relation to

its validity is pragmatic. Pramāna- vārtika- vrutti

(Manorathanandin in pandeya-1989) however, suggests that

when illusion, doubt and apprehension are absent, the

validity of awareness is known intrinsically. [18]

The notion of non-deceiving does not define a correspondent

relation with one relatum, the cognition, to represent the

other, the intended object. As said, the notion means

adherence to efficient operation. So, we need to see whether

there is any discordance between what the cognition takes its

object to be and the production of the concerned effect. One

sees something as water from a fair distance but, when

approaching it, finds no water there. Then, the first seeing-

experience turns out to be deceiving; it disappoints or

dissatisfies (visamvādin) the confirming experience.

On the other hand, the Buddhist views conceptual cognition

as erroneous, for it apprehends the real through an unreal

conceptual veil. [19] Thus, the immanent appearance of such

cognition fails to conform to the form of the external object:

it fails to present its object the way it is with its failure of

conformance (arthasārupya) or its miss-presentation; a

conceptual cognition can be both pragmatically non-

deceiving and presentatively erroneous.

5. The Epistemological Outlook in Early

Buddhism

Early Buddhism is primarily concerned with practical

problems of life. Its aim is to attain supreme perfections

through proper conduct. To attain this aim knowledge of

truth and reality is necessary. Thus the problem of

knowledge forms the basis for ethics and metaphysics in

early Buddhism.

In AnguttaraNikāya, we find the division of knowledge into

six kinds. [20] This is just a division of knowledge and has a

little to do with the theory of knowledge.

The Buddha distinguishes between paranormal and sensory

or intellectual knowledge and attack greater value to the

former one by saying that it in “Profound, difficult to see

and comprehend, serene, excellent super-rational, subtle and

comprehensive only by the wise”. [21]

The highest knowledge [22] too, according to early

Buddhists, is conceived by extra-ordinary visual perceptions,

through the eye of wisdom. One is to know and see truth

directly. It is interesting to see the significance of the use of

'knowing' and ‘seeing’ in Buddhism-The Buddha uses the

word 'seeing' along with 'knowing' in many contexts. [23]

To both normal and paranormal perception Buddhism offers

empirical explanations.

Inference (anumāna) in Indian thought necessarily both

inductive and deductive process. While seeking for material

truth corresponding to reality, mere formal truth would not

serve. Probably this is the reason why tarka (Pali -takka),

which is the method showing formal consistency, is not

recognized by early Buddhist as an independent source of

knowledge.

Early Buddhism bases its inference both a normal and Para-

normal perception and we find many such references in Pāli

texts. [24] This is the case of inference based on normal

perception with regard to inference drawn on the basis of

paranormal perception also there are many references. We

find the Buddha asking monks to cultivate and practice the

noble eight-fold path and saying ‘whatever a monk

cultivates the noble eight-fold path it leads him to Nibbāna’.

[25] This kind of statements are said to be based on the

direct paranormal perception of the Buddha himself. Many

instances containing inferential passages are found in

AnumānaSutta of Majjhima Nikāya. [26]

There are also references, to fallacies of inference based on

both normal and paranormal perception in the canon.

The Buddha refuses to accept ‘authority’ (sabda) as valid

mean of knowledge. Many scholars are of the opinion that

the Buddha himself has adopted many views from pre-

Buddhist thought. [27]

But the Buddha claims that he has influenced the old ideas

on the basis of his own direct personal experience and not on

the ground of authority. [28] His non-acceptance of

authority as independent from his criticism of six ways of

knowing based on authority. [29] He criticized that all six

theories may be true or false. [30] The Buddha demands that

his own statements should be tested and if found true can be

accepted and if found false can be rejected. This shows that

his attitude to authority is critical and not dogmatic. Saddhā-

faith too, which is an important aspect in teaching of the

Buddha, is not to be confused with uncritical, dogmatic and

blind faith.

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DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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6. The Role of Tarka in Early Buddhism

Many scholars have called the Buddha a rationalist in

different senses. But many instances show him not to be in

favour of rational theories, rather we see him criticizing

rationalists (takki) in pāli cannon. Moreover he has

dissociated himself from the class of rationalist (takki) and

traditionalists (anussāvika) and has associated himself with

experiencialists. We find him criticizing the four different

kinds of knowledge based on reason viz. 1.takkahetu,

2.Nayahetu, 3.Ākāra-parivitakkana and 4.ditthi-

nijjhānakkhanti. In all these forms of reasoning their

unreliability is pointed out on the ground that they may be

well or ill reasoned and true or false.

Though reason has not been accepted as a means of valid

knowledge, its limited value is not ignored. [31] It is utilized

to expose the absurdity of the opponents view by pointing

out its inner-inconsistency and indirectly to show the

validity of one's position. [32]

Buddha lays emphasis upon individual experience and not

infrequently he declares in express terms that the path to be

adopted is what one oneself recognizes as true. “Then

monks, what you have just said is only what you yourselves

have recognized, what you yourselves have comprehended,

what you yourselves understood, is it not so?” “It is even so?

Lord”. [33] The Lord Buddha is said to have admonished his

followers on one occasion thus: “Do not accept, oh Bhikkus,

my words out of any respect for me, but accept them for

what they are worth after proper scrutiny, just as a piece of

gold is accepted by an expert after it is put to fire, cut or

tested on the touchstone”. [34] “No sentence”, to quote Mrs.

Rhys David, “occurs oftener than Tam kissahetu? What is

the reason of that?” [35] In PāliTripitaka. This tendency of

Buddhism to appeal to reason and argument accelerated the

development of logic in the hands of the Buddhist

philosophers who took it up with all earnestness for the

purpose of challenging the antagonistic views and

vindicating their own.

7. The Use of ‘Upamā’ in Canon

Comparison (Upamā), though not accepted as a valid means

of Knowledge, has not been ignored as useless. In many

instances parables and similes have been used to make the

views clear to the nearest. A section in MajjhimaNikāya is

called OpammaVagga [36] as it is rich in parables and

similes. The Buddha was well aware of the intellectual

gradation amongst his disciples in the discourse to give clear

meaning of the idea contained in them.

8. The Art of Debate in Kathāvatthu

About hundred years after the passing away of the Buddha

the monks had differences of opinions regarding the actual

sayings and the interpretations of their master. The

dissensions brought, about schism in the Sangha and within

two or three centuries after the Buddha's death as many as

eighteen sects arose. Each of these sects in order to hold

their views firmly started criticizing the views of others. The

resorted to arguments in the form of debate to condemn their

opponents. This is evident from Kathāvatthu which was

compiled during the reign of Asoka in the Third Buddhist

council.

In Kathāvatthu the heretical doctrines were thoroughly

examined and refuted. Its attempt is to reduce the view of

the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussion

proceeded in the form of question and answer and the

answer of the opponent are often shown to be based on the

contradictory assumptions.

The text opens with the controversial point whether the Soul

(Pudgala) is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact or

not. Theravādins do not admit the existence of soul

(Pudgala) as an ultimate fact while Pudgalavādins, the

respondents, assert that there is an ultimate reality called

Soul (Pudgala).

They argue:

Theravādins- Is the Soul (Pudgala) known in the sense of a

real ultimate fact (is A=B)?

Pudgalavādins –Yes.

Theravādins-Is the Soul (Pudgala) known in the same way

as a real and ultimate fact is known (is C=D)?

Pudgalavādins- No that cannot be said.

Theravādins- Acknowledge your defeat.

If A is B then C should be D. But as C is not D therefore A

should also be not B. Here B is affirmed of A but not D of

C, which is false and so the answer is refuted. This is the

cause of anuloma and in contrast to this indirect method

(patikamma) is used by the Pudgalavādin to prove

Theravādin wrong where in the Theravādin affirms not B of

A but deny not D of C which is wrong according to

Puggalavādins.

When the arguments take place between the two they use

Niggaha (the rejoinder causing defeat of the

opponent).Upanaya (application) Nigamana (conclusion)

etc. to strengthen their arguments. In course of their

arguments they change the place that is to say sometimes the

Theravādin is a respondent and sometimes the Puggalavādin.

The subject matter of the argument also changes with

reference to space, time and things. When a case is presented

through a simple comparison, it is called

Suddhikasamsandana.For example:

Pudgalavādin maintains that A is B and M is B and also say

that A and M are not distinct. To this the Theravādin

answers if we assert separately that A is B and M is B, Then

A and M should be distinct.

A section on Lakkhanayuttikathā deals with the definition of

terms, while another section on ‘Vacanasodhana’deals

with distribution of terms. In the controversy of

vacanasodhana the extension of the subject in relation to its

predicate is set forth. Theravādin ask whether all A is B and

all B is A. To this Puggalavādin answers all A is B But some

B areA and some are not. This shows how the early

Buddhists were conversant with the distribution of terms.

Thus we see that the doctrines are put forward in the form of

Questions and answers and systematic logical methods are

applied in this debate of Kathāvatthu. Though not a separate

logical treatises of the later time, many technical terms of

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logic found in Nyāya treatise already find mention in

kathāvatthu. B.C. Law has rightly observed that “In

kathāvatthu, we have a great book of controversy which lies

at the immediate background of the entire Nyāya literature”.

[37]

9. The Use of Dilemma in MilindaPañha

Milinda Pañha [38], a beautiful prose wrote has its unique

position in the non- canonical Pāli literature. Apart from

being a comprehensive exposition of Buddhist metaphysics,

ethics and psychology, Milindapañha is the only Pāli work

which an explicit reference to logic called nīti or Nyāya. It

contains questions of king Milinda who was well versed in

logic and the answers of Nāgasena, who seems to surpass

the former in the same, or various topics. The dialogue

between them shows how scholars carried on debates and

arguments in these days.

Fourth book of the text viz. ‘MendakaPañha’ contains many

dilemma put forward by the king for the venerable one to

solve. For instance-Milinda asks Nāgasena to explain why

the Buddha refused to answer certain questions. He added he

must have refrained from answering out of ignorance or out

of wish to conceal something (A is either B or not B). Either

of the disjunctive statements should be true. To this double

pointed dilemma Nāgasena answered in negative saying that

neither of the statement is true (A is neither B nor not B) and

explained that the questions put to the Lord were not to be

answered as there is no reason or object for answering them,

the very nature of those questions was such that they could

not but be put aside.

10. The Nature of Questions in Buddhism

Truth or falsity can be asserted of a proposition only after it

has been tally analyzed. Buddha who claims to be an

analysts, [39] distiguishes between categorical and non-

categorical propositions, while saying, “I have taught and

laid down doctrines which cannot be categorically asserted.”

[40] The four noble truths come under the first group and the

‘Avyākatavatthuni’under the second. Some of the non-

categorical propositions are analyzable while some others

are non-analyzable. Thus division of statements according to

their truth-value resulted in a division of four types of

questions. There are the four types of questions

(‘cattārimāni……pañhavyakaraõāni’):

1) EkamsaVyākarasa – question which are explained

categorically.

2) PatipucchaVyākaranīyo – questions which are answered

after a counter-question has been put.

3) VibhajjaVyākaranīyo – questions which are explained

analytically and

4) Thapanīyo – questions that are set aside. [41]

However in the Pāli canon, apart from this classification of

questions we hardly find any explanation or illustration,

which was later provided in the Abhidharmakoùa. [42] Of

these four types of questions the Thapanīya or the Avyakata

– the inexpressible ones find mention in many dialogues of

the canon. Then metaphysical theses are enumerated. [43]

The Mahāsanghikas extended this to fourteen theses by

adding four, logical alternatives to ‘sassatoloko’and

‘antavāloko’ on which the Buddha refused to give any

answer and set them aside. The Buddha thought that none

of the logical alternations could be categorically asserted. So

he preferred keeping silent. This 'silence' of the Buddha later

formed the basis of Mādhyamikas dialectic.

The history of Buddhist thought evinces two types of

following of the Buddha, one philosophical and the other

theological. Theologically, his followers from two camps

known as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, each having many sects

and sub sects were spread in the world. Philosophically,

Buddhist thought in India has four broad divisions,

namely,Vaibhāsika, Sautrantika, Madhyamika, and

Yogācāra.NārāyanaBhaµµa in Mānameyodaya cryptically

summarizes the basic thrust of each of these four schools as

follows:

“MukhyoMādhyamikovivartamakhilamsunyasyamenejagat

Yogācāra mate tusantimatayahtesāmvivarto'khilam

artho'stiksanikotvasavanumitokathyetiSautrantiko

pratyaksamksanabhanguramcasakalamVaibhasikobhāsate”.

That is, the Mādhyamika is the most important philosophical

school, which regards the entire world to be an apparent

manifestation of sunya. The next school is Yogācāra,

according to which ideas alone are real, and the entire world

is an apparent manifestation of ideas. The third school is that

of the Sautrantikas, which maintains that there are objects

existing independently of the ideas, but they are momentary,

and their existence is known only through inference. The last

school is known as Vaibhāsika, which holds that all objects

are momentary and perceivable.

For the sake of easy understanding, these four schools can

be put in a particular logical order as Vaibhāsika,

Sautrantika, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra. Perhaps this may

also be the chronological order. All these four schools claim

authenticity and faithfulness to Buddha's thought. Buddha

was quite prolific in his ideas, and it may not be difficult to

find rudiments of all these four schools in his thoughts. The

doctrine of impermanence (anityata), which subsequently

was formulated as the doctrine if momentariness

(ksanikavāda), and the doctrine of dependent origination

(pratītyasamutpada) are the common planks for all these

four schools. All the schools believe in the ideas of rebirth

and nirvāna. Their deference is only in terms of the

development of logical structures based on these doctrines

and ideas. I shall briefly discuss the major points of

difference characterizing each of these schools. The school

of Mādhayamika and Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) are idealistic

in their thrust and are associated with the Mahāyāna

tradition. However, these four schools constitute significant

facets of later Buddhist thought.

Vaibhāsika School

The Vaibhāsika School seems to have acquired this name

because it relies upon a commentary on the Tripitakaknown

as Vibhāsā. This school upholds dualism of mental and

physical elements. All that is real is momentary, and either

physical (bhuta) or mental (citta).The object of the world are

a conglomeration of either physical elements or mental

elements or both. No object is permanent or abiding, but

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since it is in the form of an incessant series, it gives the

impression of permanence. These objects are directly known

in perceptual cognition. When there is simultaneity of

appearance of the cognizing consciousness. Likewise, a

cognizing consciousness may also exist independently of the

cognized object. In this way, the Vaibhāsika School

advocates dualism in its metaphysics and realism in its

epistemology. The Vaibhāsika School concentrates more on

the analysis of mental phenomena, and we find an elaborate

psychological analysis in the literature belonging to this

school.

Sautrantika School

The Sautrantika School derives its name from a commentary

called Sutranta. It is also a realistic school, sharing its

metaphysics with Vaibhāsikas. Sautrantikas believe in the

momentary existence of the real and classify them into

mental and physical. The mental and the physical are

basically independent of each other, though subsequently

they may interact. Sautrantikas regard the object to exist

independently of the noetic process. The object, the

cognizer, and the cognition are all distinct. The object may

be known or may not be known. If an object is known, it

cannot be known in direct perception. In this respect they

differ from Vaibhāsikas. According to Sautrantikas, the

moment of existence of the object and the moment of the

cognition of the object cannot be the same because cognition

follows and presupposes existence, and every existence

precedes its cognition. There cannot be simultaneity of

existence and its cognition. The sautrantika thinkers examine

and refute the Vaibhāsika position in this respect. In fact,

this is the major point of difference between the two schools.

The Sautrantikas argue that the object of knowledge exists

independently of the cognizing consciousness, and it ceases

to exist in the next moment. So, when it comes into

existence at the very moment, it is not cognized, and it

cannot be cognized. It does not exist in the next moment to

be perceptually cognized, so there is never any perceptual

cognition of an object. However, it does not mean that an

object can never be cognized. There is another mode of

cognizing an object. Before an object ceases to exist, it

leaves out its impression this impression is the exact copy of

its original and has semblance (sārupya) with it. The

cognizing consciousness perceptually apprehends only this

impression, and through this perceptual apprehension of the

impression it infers the original object. Thus, Sautrantikas

introduce the concept of object impression and through this

advocate the representative theory of perception. For them

all cognitions are represented cognition of the object. An

object-Qua-object is not directly perceived. Only its

impression is perceived, and because of the resemblance of

the two and cognitive non-availability of the object the

impression is taken to be the original object.

Mādhyamika School

The third school is Mādhyamika, which is philosophically

very significant. Nāgarjuna has been the first known

exponent of this school. He argues that Buddha's teaching

consisting in the madhyamapratipada(middle path) to be

followed for the realization of nirvāna, which is cessation of

all suffering. According to Nāgarjuna, Buddha advocated

sunyatā(essencelessness) of all existence. All existence is

sunya(

essenceless

The pluralistic and realistic philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda

culminates in a monistic and idealistic philosophy of

Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) by way of critique and rejection of

Sunyavāda. The representative theory of perception of the

Sautrantikas implies that all that is cognized is the content of

cognition, and the content of the cognition has a form of its

own, which has sameness of form (sārupya) with the form

of the object. It resulted in the theory of sākārajñānavāda, a

theory according to which every-cognition has a form of its

own apart from the form given to it by its object. From the

theory of sākārajñānavādathere was a natural transition to

the theory that only contents of cognition or vijñānas(ideas)

are real and that they alone are cognized. The external

objects are only hypostatization. They are presumed to be

there, but, in fact, they are only projections of the

consciousness. Consciousness alone is real. Thus, in

Vijñānavāda we find repudiation of the theory that the object

of cognition exists externally and independently of the

cognizing consciousness (bāhyarthavāda). The

consciousness that alone is primarily real is momentary and

is in the form of a continuous flow (pravāha). The

Vijñānavāda advocates three levels of reality, namely,

parikalpita(imaginary), pāratāntrika(dependent or empirical

reality), and pāramārthika (transcendental reality).

Transcendental reality is conceived to be unitary stream of

consciousness, technically known as ālayaVijñāna. It is a

storehouse of consciousness in the sense that it is the

foundation of all streams of consciousness that are

responsible for the appearance of the world of external

objects. It is a repository of the old impressions (samskāras)

and a depository of new impressions. In this way

ālayavijñāna is the only ultimate reality. In itself it is pure

and cannot be characterized. It can be experienced only in

the state of nirvāna. The other level of reality is empirical,

) in the sense that they do not have self-

existence (svabhāva).Every existence has a borrowed

existence or a dependent existence (pratītyasamutpanna);

svabhavasunyata (lack of independent existence)

characterizes all reals. The same position holds good in

respect of all thought and language. Just as all real is self-

negating, all thought and all language are also self- negating,

Nāgarjuna exposes the hollowness and self-contradictory

nature of the important concepts and doctrines prevalent in

his time in Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophies. He

successfully employs the weapons of sunyata and

pratītyasamutpada to demolish all systems of metaphysics.

He advocates a twofold approach to reality in terms of

samvrutisatya

(empirical real) and

paramārtasatya(transcendental real).Both are characterized

by sånyata in different ways. Empirical is Svabhāvasunya

(devoid of intrinsic existence), and transcendental is

prapañcasunya.Byprapañca he means display of thought and

language. Nāgarjuna emphasizes the anti-metaphysical,

practical, and pragmatic nature of Buddha's teaching and

lays stress on the attainment of prajña(wisdom) leading to

sīla(noble conduct)and samādhi(state of equipoise).This

school is known as Mādhyamika because of its emphasis on

madhyamapratipada, which is a practical middle path,

avoiding all extremes. It is known as Sunyavāda because of

its exposition of essencelessness of all real on account of its

dependent character.

Yogācāra School

Paper ID: ART20163177

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which consists of finite stream of consciousness and objects

of consciousness. It is the level of the empirical world that

we experience in our ordinary life. It is a reality that is

amenable to empirical knowledge and linguistic expression.

It is empirical reality (samvrutisatya), as different from

transcendental reality (pāramārthikasatya).

According to those Buddhist sectors Buddhist logic split into

two main schools such as Hīnayāna (Theravada) and

Mahāyāna. Due to the differences of their opinions, the

nyāya of one school is not applicable to the other. In

particular, the Nyāya analyses of such Mahāyānic teachers

as Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti are not relevant to the

Theravāda. Ven.HagodaKhemanandaThera (A Sri Lankan

Buddhist Scholar) has scrutinized the Theravāda Buddhist

Logic in his Great work named “Logic and Epistemology in

Theravāda” [44] Ven.Thero has explained like this: “The

practice of certain scholars to mix all such divergent

Buddhist Nyāya systems is baffling to the average Buddhist

who seeks clear understanding of the matter. Although some

such fundamental principles as the Four Noble Truths are

common to all schools, there is a marked difference in the

analysis of the sources of knowledge between Mahāyāna and

Theravāda. Therefore, it is not appropriate to take what may

be called Buddhist Nyāya as one homogeneous system.

What we would like to stress is that a Nyāya for Theravāda

has to be built solely on the basis of the Pāli Tripitaka”. [45]

There are a sizeable number of Nyāya treatises compiled by

both Mahayana teachers like Nāgarjuna and Hīnayāna

teachers belonging to such schools as Sarvāstivāda. Some

call all such schools, with the exception of Theravāda,

‘Northern Buddhism’ for the reason that they subsequently

existed in Northern India. Equally, the pāli Buddhism which

found a home in Sri Lanka and Southern India is called

‘Southern Buddhism’. Therefore it seems reasonable to call

all forms of Buddhist Nyāya compiled in Sanskrit, whether

they are Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, ‘Northern Buddhist Nyāya’

and the Nyāya in Pāli which belongs to Southern Buddhism

‘Theravada Nyāya’ or ‘Southern Buddhist Nyāya’. The

Northern Buddhist Nyāya is rich in content. It is believed

that Dinnāga alone compiled more than one hundred Nyāya

treatises.

The Tripitaka which consist of Sutta, Vinaya and

Abhidhamma is the content of Theravada. It has existed in

Sri Lanka for twenty two centuries and Myanmar, Thailand

and Campuchia for fifteen centuries. The learned

Mahātheras (High priests) of these countries have enriched

the Buddhist literature by compiling commentaries, sub-

commentaries and various other exegetical works.

Nevertheless, in this literature as it is at present, we do not

find any work on Logic or Nyāya. Although some tend to

describe Nettippakarana as a TheravādaNyāya work, in

actuality what it contains is only some method of explaining

the doctrine. In other words, this work tells us how a given

statement from the teaching (of the Buddha) may be

explained meaningfully. Petakopadesaclosely follows the

former. In addition, there are Saddasāratthajālini,

Saddattabedhacintā, Ditthantaratanāvali and Nītipadavali

which have been subsequently added to the same line of

thought, but none countable as a Theravada Nyāya work.

There are reasons to believe that the Theravada tradition had

some Nyāya works in the past. The Sri Lankan commentator

Mahānāmathera who wrote during the reign of king

Kumaradāsa,516 A.D., supports his explanation to

“suññoloko” in Patisambhidāmagga by referring to a Nyāya

work that presumably existed in his time. [46] A similar

reference to a Nyāya work is available in Dāthavamsa of the

century. [47] In addition, it must be mentioned that there

are some Nyāya methods scattered in many parts of the

Tripitaka.

The reasons not to develop the Theravāda Buddhist Nyāya

are mentioned By Ven.Khemananda thero as follows:

1) People in those countries were less dogmatic and more

pliable compared to the Brahmins in India. And this may

have contributed to the situation that the Buddhist

teachers did not require logical treatises to convince the

local groups.

2) An ancient tradition of early Buddhism (represented in

Atthaka and Pārāyanavaggās of Suttanipāta) underscore

the view that debate is a result of dogmatism, and that

such exercises would not conduce for emancipation. This

explains why the Theravādins were less enthusiastic

about developing an art of debate.

3) Theravādins were very particular about the pristine purity

of their doctrine, and they made sure that it was not

corrupted by any heretic views. Whenever there was an

attempt to introduce any doctrine, which was against

Theravāda, such an attempt was thwarted at the very

outset. This may have done away with the necessity in

the Theravada tradition of forming any logical treatises.

4) Finally, the Theravādins did not require separate treatises

of logic for the entire Tripitaka was arranged in such a

way that it facilitated the logical understanding of truth.

In particular, the AbhidhammaPitaka reveals the

Theravāda philosophy, and the study of the

Visuddhimagga will give the student the quintessence of

Buddhist logic. [48]

11. Conclusion

The Indian logic covers a period of over two thousand years.

From the time of Mahābhārata, till about the seventeenth

century A.D., when it culminated in a formal discipline of

language in the neo-logical school of Navadeepa in Bengal,

it is spread through three different disciplines, the discipline

of orthodox Hindu logic, the discipline of Buddhist logic and

the discipline of Jain logic.The earliest reference to logic or

science of debate seem to be contained in

chāndogyaupanisadand the Mahābhārata is very important

for the historical development of logic.in Brāhmanic

literature. Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, Sāntaraksita and

Kamalasīla are eminent Buddhist logicians who have

compiled Buddhist logical rules in order.

Udyotakara,Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati, Udayana and other

Hindu logician have made a theoretical preparations for

Indian logic.

References

[1] Kathavatthu.Siameseedit.quoted by S.C.Vidyābhusaõa

F.234.

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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[2] Mahābhāratasabhāparva, 5 adhyāya,5.

[3] MahābhārataSāntiparva,adhyāya 180.47-49.

[4] “natarkasāstradagdhāyatathaivapisunāyaca”.

ibid.,adhyāya 246, 8.

[5] “traividyohetukastarkīnairuktodharapātakah

trayascasraminopurveparisadsyaddasāvarā”

.Manusamhitā,Adhyāya 12,111.

[6] “ yo’vamanyetate mule hetusāstrāsrayāddvijah

sasādhubhirbahiskāryonāstikovedanindakah”

.Manusamhitā,adhyāya 2,11.

[7] “ārùamdharmopadesamcavedasāsterāvirodhina

yastarkenānusamdhattesadharmamvedanetarāþ” .

Manusamhitā,adhyāya,12,106.

[8] See Vidyābhsana’s History of Indian Logic pp.36-39.

[9] For the roots of the Nyāya-vaisesika doctrines in the

Upanisads,SeeRanade’s “A constructive survey of the

Upanisadic philosophy”,p.190.also compare prof.

S.Radhakrisna`s remarks about Nyāya logic in his

Indian philosophy,vol.1(1923).p.263.

[10] Kathopanisad, 1.2.9.

[11] Which states, that an entity is the negation of its

opposite.

[12] Rhys Davids,Buddhist Psychology.,p.68.

[13] Vide. Barlingay S.S., A modern introduction to Indian

Logic.,p.1.Introduction

[14] Keith A.B.-Buddhist Philosophy. 303.

[15] Rhys Davids C.A.F.-Logic (Buddhist) in Hasitings'

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.p.132.

[16] Chatterji D.C., Buddhist Logic-Article, Annals of the

Bhandarkar Oriental Institute.Vol.34.

[17] Pramāna-Vārtika-Vrutti, 4. Likewise, in his

TarkabhāsaMoksākaragupta holds that in hearing sound

or seeing far away objects like the moon, the validity of

awareness consists in the very experience of the own-

form of the objects irrespective of the actual attainment

of efficient operation pertaining to the object.

[18] In PramānaViniscayaDharmakīrti defines error

(bhrānti)as consisting in grasping that (a real object)in

non-that (an intentional);see katsura-1984.233,n.64.

[19] Cakkhuviññānam _ (ocular consciousness)

Sota ,, - (auditory consciousness)

Ghana ,, - (olfactory consciousness)

Jivhā ,, - (gustatory consciousness)

Kāya ,, - (tactual consciousness) and

Mano ,, - (mental consciousness).

[20] “

Gambhīrāduddasāduranubodhāsantāpanitāatakkavacar

ānipunāpanditavedaniyā”-DighaNikāya. 1. 12.

[21] Pāli canon refer to six fold higher knowledge attainable

after the fourth stage of Jhāna (meditation)

viz.1.iddhividha (assuming multiple

forms),2.dibbasotadhātu(clairaudience),3.cetopariyajñan

a(telepathic knowledge),4.pubbe

niwasanussatijñāna(retro cognitive knowledge),5.dibba

cakkhu(clairvoyance) and

6.āsawakkhayajñāna(knowledge of the destruction of

defiling elements).

[22] “tamahamjānāmipassāmi "Majjhima

Nikāya,1.329/"jānatā,passatā”M.N.11,111./Nibbāna is

also said to be seen “nibbānampasseyyamti”,M.N.

1.511.

[23] SuttaNipāta furnishes with an inferential method to

show how there can be no caste-distinctions. The trees,

worms, ants, serpents, birds and other creatures possess

characteristics denoting species (“lingam jātimayam”)).

So we find different species among them

(“aññamaññajātiyo”). But among human beings there is

no such characteristics denoting species

(“evamnatthimanussesu lingam Jātimayamputhå”).So it

is concluded that there can be no species or caste among

them(“manussesvetamnavijjati”)SuttaNipata 117-119.

[24] “evam….bhikkhuariyamatthangikammaggambhavento

….nibbānaninnohoti”.Samyukta Nikāya.,v.58

[25] “tatrāvusobhikkhunāattanāvāattānamevamanuminitabb

am”-the last word of this line suggests to give the sutta

the title Anumāna to mean 'inferring'. One of the many

references contained in this sutta is – ‘the man of evil

inclination is displeasing and disagreeable to me, and of

I incline to evil, others will regard me likewise as

displeasing and disagreeable. Realizing this almsman

must train his heart never to give way to evil

inclination’. AnumānaSutta- MajjhimaNikāya.

[26] The inference here is like - 'if P then Q, not Q therefore

no Q'.

[27] ‘Principles of Gautama’ says Prof. Rhys David, can be

‘found in one or other of the orthodox systems’.-

Buddhism., pp 83-84., ‘Early Buddhism is not an

absolutely original doctrine’-Dr. S. Radhakrisnan-

Indian Philosophy., vol.1.

[28] “nāññassasamanassavāBrahmanassavāsutvavadāmi,api

cayad eve

mayāsomamñātamsāmamditthamsāmamviditam tat

eva'hamvadāmiti”-SamyuktaNikāya.,v 390.

[29] 1.Anussava-traditional hearings (like

Vedas),2.Paramparā-tradition in general,3.Itikirāya-

report,4.Pitaka sampadā-

scripture in

general,5.Bhavyaråpatā-eminence of the speaker and

6.Samano no garu-prestige of the speaker.

[30] Sussutamtathā-well remembered and true,

Sussutamaññatā-well remembered and false,

Dussutamtathā-ill rememebered and true,

Dussutamaññathā-ill remembered and false-Majjima

Nikāya-1.520.

[31] In Apannakasutta we find the Buddha asking people to

decide their course of life on purely rational grounds, if

they are not in a position to see the objective truth.

Reason thus can act as pointer to the right path.

[32] If water purification can free one of evil karma (A) then

the Fishes, tortoises, frogs etc. will go straight to

heaven,(B)But B is absurd and false so it implies the

absurdity of A.-Therigāthā.,240-1

[33] MajjhimaNikāya,XXVШ.The rationalistic aspect of

Buddha's doctrine finds a brilliant exposition in George

Grimm’s “The doctrine of the Buddha or the religion of

Reason”, Leipzing–1926.

[34] “tāpācchedāccanikasātsuvarnamivapanditaih

parãksyabhiksavograhyammadvaconatu gauravāt ”.-

Tattvasamgraha,Kārikā,3588.

[35] Rhys Davids C.A.F., Logic

(Buddhist);Hesting’sEncyclopaedia of Religion and

Ethics;Vol.8,132.

[36] Opammavagga contains sections on parables-

kakacupamā (discourse on parable of saw)

alagaddupamā (discourses on parable of water snake)

hatthipadopamā (simile of elephant foot print) and

Saropamā (simile of pith).

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)

ISSN (Online): 2319-7064

Index Copernicus Value (2015): 78.96 | Impact Factor (2015): 6.391

Volume 6 Issue 1, January 2017

www.ijsr.net

Licensed Under Creative Commons Attribution CC BY

[37] Law B.C-History of Pāli literature-p.646.

[38] MilindaPañha was probably composed in 100 A.D.

There are many controversies regarding its exact date.

[39] ‘vibhajjavādo…aham’ -MajjhimaNikāya 1.197.

[40] “ekamsikapi……mayādhammādesitapaññattā”-Dīgha

Nikāya.1.191.

[41] "ekamsavacanamekamvibhajjavacanamparamtatiyampa

tipuccheyyacatutthamthāpaye”-Anguttara Nikāya.1.197.

[42] "ekamsenavibhāgenaprechatahsthāpanīyatahvyakrutam

maranotpattivisistātmānyatādivat”–AbhidharmaKosa.

v.22.

[43] Sassatoloko-The world is eternal,Assassatoloko-The

world is not eternal,Antavaloko-The world is finite,

Anantavaloko-The world is infinite, Tam jīvam tam

sarīram-The Soul is identical with the

body,Aññamjīvamaññamsarīram-The soul is different

the body,Hotitathāgatoparammarana-The tathāgata

exists after death,Nahotitathāgatoparammaranā-The

tathāgata does not exist after

death,Hoticanahoticatathāgatoparammaranā-The

tathāgata exists and does not exist after

death,Nevahotinahotitathāgatoparammaranā-The

tathāgata neither exist nor does not exist after death.

[44] Khemananda H.Ven.;Logic and Epistemology in

Theravāda(TheravādaNyāya),Translated from Sinhala

by:AsangaTilakaratne,Karunaratna and Sons

Ltd,1993.(Available in Buddhist Cultural Center,

Dehiwala-Sri Lanka.

[45] Ibid, p.2

[46] “Tathanāyaganthecasaddaganthecaayamevaattho”.

(paµisambhida aµµhakatha,Hevavitarana

Edition.p.358.)

[47] “Santappayamdhammasudharasena-

Yomānusetundilasukaropi

Isīvakatvāathanāyaganthamnijampavattesicirāyadham

mam” ( Dāthavamsa,41.)

[48] KhemanandaH.Ven.; Logic and Epistemology in

Theravada,pp.4-5.

Paper ID: ART20163177

DOI: 10.21275/ART20163177

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