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¶ 31 Section 23-5 appears in article 23 of the Code, which is titled “Procedures and Adjudication
for Tax Objections.” Id. art. 23. Section 16-160, the provision setting forth the procedure for
initiating an appeal before the PTAB, appears in an entirely different part of the Code, article
16 (id. art. 16), titled “Review of Assessment Decisions.” The two means of challenging an
assessment, the tax objection complaint and the appeal to the PTAB, are different procedures.
In the absence of language indicating otherwise, there is no reason to presume the legislature
intended that a statutory provision governing one should also apply to the other.
¶ 32 Further, the second sentence of section 23-5 expressly references section 23-10 of the Code
(the provision that authorizes the filing of tax objection complaints), indicating that the
payment of taxes in accordance with section 23-5 satisfies the “payment under protest”
requirement for filing the complaint. However, section 23-5 contains no reference to section
16-160 or, indeed, to any statutory provision related to proceedings before the PTAB.
Requiring a taxpayer to pay disputed taxes as a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal is a
significant matter. Had the legislature intended the “payment under protest” requirement of
section 23-5 to apply to PTAB appeals, there would be some reference to section 16-160 in
that provision. There is none. By its express terms, section 23-5 applies to tax objection
complaints, not appeals filed in the PTAB.
¶ 33 In addition, a fundamental contradiction arises when attempting to apply section 23-5 to
PTAB appeals. If the “payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 were also a
condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB, the taxpayer appealing to the
PTAB would have to file a tax objection complaint, since it is this complaint, and only this
complaint, that constitutes the statutorily required “protest.” However, section 16-160
expressly prohibits a taxpayer who appeals to the PTAB from filing a tax objection complaint.
That section states: “If a petition is filed by a taxpayer, the taxpayer is precluded from filing
objections based upon valuation, as may otherwise be permitted by Sections 21-175 and 23-
5.” Id. § 16-160. Such an internally contradictory approach is unworkable and could not have
been intended by the legislature. See, e.g., Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School
District 7, 2020 IL 125062, ¶ 16 (we presume the legislature does not intend absurd results).
¶ 34 Citing Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1973), Central Illinois Public
Service Co. v. Thompson, 1 Ill. 2d 468, 471 (1953), and other cases, the School District also
argues that the “payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 must apply to taxpayers
pursuing an appeal before the PTAB because, otherwise, a “loophole” would be created that
“resurrect[s] an antiquated process that allows taxpayers to ‘harass’ units of local government
by refusing to pay their taxes while awaiting relief from the assessments or as a means to
negotiate a more favorable property tax settlement.” This argument is unpersuasive.
¶ 35 As this court has explained, prior to 1933, there was no statutory mechanism in place that
allowed taxpayers to pay taxes under protest and, at the same time, file an objection to a
property assessment. Clarendon, 56 Ill. 2d at 106. Instead, a taxpayer wishing to challenge an
assessment would withhold paying the property taxes, and then, once the county collector made
the annual application for judgment and order of sale, the taxpayer would submit the objection
to the assessment in that proceeding. Id. When a large number of taxpayers followed this
procedure (as happened during the Great Depression), adjudication of the objections was often
delayed. Id. This, in turn, led to a delay in determining the final amount of taxes due, the entry