JULY 2012
Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of
the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent
Supreme Court Decision
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) have updated their estimates of the budgetary effects of the health
insurance coverage provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to take into
account the Supreme Court decision issued on June 28, 2012.
1
This report
describes those new estimates, how they were derived, and how they differ from
the previous ones.
The insurance coverage provisions of the ACA establish a requirement for most
legal residents of the United States to obtain health insurance or pay a penalty tax;
create insurance “exchanges” through which certain individuals and families may
receive federal subsidies to substantially reduce their cost of purchasing health
insurance; significantly expand eligibility for Medicaid—now at each state’s
option; impose an excise tax on certain health insurance plans with relatively high
premiums; establish penalties on certain employers who do not provide minimum
health benefits to their employees; and make other changes to prior law.
2
The Supreme Court’s decision has the effect of allowing states to choose whether
or not to expand eligibility for coverage under their Medicaid program pursuant to
the ACA. Under that law as enacted but prior to the Court’s ruling, the Medicaid
expansion appeared to be mandatory for states that wanted to continue receiving
federal matching funds for any part of their Medicaid program.
3
Hence, CBO and
JCT’s previous estimates reflected the expectation that every state would expand
1
See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The ACA
comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148) and the health
care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). As
used here, the term “ACA” includes the effects of subsequent related changes in statute.
2
For more information on the insurance coverage provisions of the ACA, see the statement of
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the Subcommittee on
Health, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, CBO’s Analysis of the Major Health Care
Legislation Enacted in March 2010 (March 30, 2011) .
3
CBO and JCT’s previous estimate of the effects on insurance coverage of the ACA, before the
Court’s decision, were reflected in the projections contained in Congressional Budget Office,
Updated Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (March 2012) and further described in
Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the
Affordable Care Act (March 2012).
2 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
eligibility for coverage under its Medicaid program as specified in the ACA. As a
result of the Court’s decision, CBO and JCT now anticipate that some states will
not expand their programs at all or will not expand coverage to the full extent
authorized by the ACA. CBO and JCT also expect that some states will eventually
undertake expansions but will not do so by 2014 as specified in the ACA.
CBO and JCT now estimate that the insurance coverage provisions of the ACA
will have a net cost of $1,168 billion over the 2012–2022 period—compared with
$1,252 billion projected in March 2012 for that 11-year periodfor a net
reduction of $84 billion. (Those figures do not include the budgetary impact of
other provisions of the ACA, which in the aggregate reduce budget deficits.)
4
The
projected net savings to the federal government resulting from the Supreme
Court’s decision arise because the reductions in spending from lower Medicaid
enrollment are expected to more than offset the increase in costs from greater
participation in the exchanges. That outcome is projected to occur despite the fact
that the government’s average additional costs per person in the exchanges will be
greater than its average savings per person for those who, as a result of the
Court’s ruling, will not enroll in Medicaid. Why? Because the number of
additional people entering the exchanges as a result of the ruling is projected to be
only about half the number who will not be obtaining Medicaid coverage, many
of whom will be ineligible to participate in the exchanges.
In updating their estimates, CBO and JCT have not relied on state-by-state
predictions about Medicaid expansions under the ACA. Instead, they have
projected the approximate shares of the affected population residing in states that
will fall into different broad categories—ranging from no expansion to an
expansion encompassing the income threshold established by the ACA. States
will face different costs and benefits from expanding their Medicaid programs and
will have different preferences about whether or to what degree to do so. Those
that opt to expand their programs may also have different preferences with regard
to timing; some may want to expand eligibility in 2014, while others may prefer
to delay expansion until later in the decade. Moreover, how flexible executive
branch agencies will be regarding the choices that states will haveparticularly
states’ options for pursuing partial expansions—is unclear. Hence, what states
will be able to do and what they will decide to do are both highly uncertain. As a
result, CBO and JCT’s estimates reflect an assessment of the probabilities of
different outcomes (without any explicit prediction of which states make which
choices) and are, in their judgment, in the middle of the distribution of possible
outcomes. Future legal or administrative actions will certainly affect those
outcomes; CBO and JCT’s assessments in this analysis should not be viewed as
representing a single definitive interpretation of how the ACA should or will be
implemented in light of the Court’s decision.
4
See the statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the
Subcommittee on Health, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, CBO’s Analysis of the
Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010 (March 30, 2011). For the provisions of
the ACA unrelated to insurance coverage, most of which involve ongoing programs or revenue
streams, separating the portion of projected spending for those programs or revenue streams that is
attributable to the ACA from the portion that would have existed under prior law is very difficult.
3 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
In its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ACA’s
provision requiring most individuals to obtain insurance coverage or pay a penalty
tax.
5
The Court viewed that arrangement as a valid exercise of the Congress’s
constitutional power to levy taxes. That ruling has not caused CBO and JCT to
change their estimate of the impact of the coverage requirement and the
associated penalty on people’s decisions about whether to obtain insurance
coverage. CBO and JCT’s original assessment of the effects of the coverage
requirement was strongly rooted in comparisons with other taxes and penalties,
drawing heavily from the academic literature on tax compliance. In earlier
estimates, CBO and JCT expected that individuals would perceive the mandate as
a requirement to purchase insurance or pay a penalty tax administered by the
Internal Revenue Service. Because the Court upheld the constitutionality of that
arrangement, CBO and JCT continue to expect similar behavioral responses to the
insurance requirement.
Changes in the Estimated Effects of the ACA on
Insurance Coverage and the Federal Budget
In this update of figures published in March 2012, CBO and JCT now estimate
that fewer people will be covered by the Medicaid program, more people will
obtain health insurance through the newly established exchanges, and more
people will be uninsured. The magnitude of those changes varies from year to
year. In 2022, for example, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) are expected to cover about 6 million fewer people than
previously estimated, about 3 million more people will be enrolled in exchanges,
and about 3 million more people will be uninsured (see Table 1, at the end of this
report).
6
Although the estimates discussed here are dominated by the movements
of people losing eligibility for Medicaid, other smaller shifts in coverage are
expected to occur as well. The changes in coverage shown in Table 1 reflect the
net effect of all estimated changes stemming from the Court’s decision, not just
the movements of people who lose eligibility for Medicaid. For example, relative
5
The ACA requires nearly every resident of the United States to obtain health insurance by
January 1, 2014. People who do not comply with the individual coverage requirement will be
charged a penalty, assessed through the Internal Revenue Code, although exemptions from that
requirement or its associated penalties are provided for several categories of peopleincluding
those with taxable income below the threshold for mandatory tax filing (projected by CBO and
JCT to be about $10,000 for a single filer and about $19,000 for a married couple in 2016),
unauthorized immigrants, members of certain religious groups, people who would have to pay
more than 8 percent of their income for health insurance, and those who obtain a hardship waiver.
In 2016, the penalty for noncompliance with the requirement for obtaining insurance is set to be
the greater of a flat dollar amount specified in statute ($695 per individual and up to three times
that amount for a family) or a percentage of income in excess of the filing threshold (2.5 percent
of income).
6
The effect of the Court’s decision is primarily to shift enrollment between Medicaid and
exchanges or between participating in Medicaid and being uninsured. In addition, CBO estimates
some changes in enrollment in the Children’s Health Insurance Program. The changes in CHIP are
very small compared with prior estimates in some years and are negligible in years, starting in
2016, when CHIP funding will be subject to a much lower ceiling. In general, in the tables
accompanying this report, Medicaid and CHIP are combined, but in discussing the effect of the
Court’s decision, the focus is on Medicaid.
4 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
to prior estimates, not all of the increases in enrollment in exchanges and in the
uninsured are among people who would have been newly eligible for Medicaid.
As a result of those changes in projected health insurance coverage, CBO and JCT
now anticipate that the net costs of the coverage provisions of the ACA will be
$84 billion less over the 2012–2022 period than they estimated in March 2012
(see Table 2, at the end of this report). That reduction occurs mostly because
federal spending during that period for Medicaid and CHIP is now projected to be
$289 billion less than previously expected, whereas the estimated costs of tax
credits and other subsidies for the purchase of health insurance through the
exchanges (and related spending) have risen by $210 billion. Small changes in
other components of the budget estimates account for the remaining $5 billion of
the difference.
Why are the projected Medicaid and CHIP savings stemming from the Supreme
Court’s decision greater than the projected additional costs of subsidies provided
through the exchanges? The key factors leading to that result are as follows:
Only a portion of the people who will not be eligible for Medicaid as a
result of the Court’s decision will be eligible for subsidies through the
exchanges. According to CBO and JCT’s estimates, roughly two-thirds of
the people previously estimated to become eligible for Medicaid as a
result of the ACA will have income too low to qualify for exchange
subsidies, and roughly one-third will have income high enough to be
eligible for exchange subsidies. In addition, those who become eligible for
subsidies will have to pay a portion of the exchange premium themselves,
which will affect their decisions about whether to enroll in the exchanges.
For the average person who does not enroll in Medicaid as a result of the
Court’s decision and becomes uninsured, federal spending will decline by
roughly an estimated $6,000 in 2022.
7
For the average person who does not enroll in Medicaid as a result of the
Court’s decision and enrolls in an exchange instead, estimated federal
spending will rise by roughly $3,000 in 2022—the difference between
estimated additional exchange subsidies of about $9,000 and estimated
Medicaid savings of roughly $6,000.
8
With about 6 million fewer people being covered by Medicaid but only
about 3 million more people receiving subsidies through the exchanges
and about 3 million more people being uninsured, and because the average
savings for each person who becomes uninsured are greater than the
average additional costs for each person who receives exchange subsidies,
7
That amount equals the change in Medicaid and CHIP spending for that year divided by the
change in enrollment in the programs; in 2022, spending for Medicaid and CHIP is estimated to be
reduced by $37 billion and enrollment is expected to be reduced by 6 million people.
8
The estimated additional exchange subsidies equal the change in exchange subsidies for that year
divided by the change in enrollment in the exchanges; in 2022, exchange subsidies are estimated
to increase by $28 billion and enrollment is expected to increase by 3 million people.
5 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
Figure 1.
Major Effects on the Federal Budget in 2022 of Changes in
Medicaid Enrollment Due to the Recent Supreme Court Decision
(Billions of dollars)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Reduced Federal
Spending for People
Who Do Not Enroll in Medicaid
and Become Uninsured
Reduced Federal
Spending for People
Who Do Not Enroll in Medicaid
and Enroll in the Exchanges
Increased Federal Costs for
Exchange Subsidies for
People Who Do Not Enroll
in Medicaid and Enroll in
the Exchanges
Medicaid Savings:
Exchange Costs:
Net Federal
Savings
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The effects shown in the figure reflect the major changes in enrollment and do not include
smaller shifts in coverage. For example, relative to prior estimates, not all of the increases
in enrollment in exchanges and in the uninsured are among people who would have been
newly eligible for Medicaid.
See the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on June 28, 2012 (National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 [2012]).
the projected decrease in total federal spending on Medicaid is larger than
the anticipated increase in total exchange subsidies (see Figure 1).
Updated Estimates of the Budgetary Effects of the
Insurance Coverage Provisions of the ACA
CBO and JCT now estimate that the insurance coverage provisions of the ACA
will have a net cost of $1,168 billion over the 2012–2022 period—compared with
$1,252 billion projected in March 2012 for that 11-year period (see Table 2).
9
That net cost reflects the following:
Gross costs of $1,683 billion for Medicaid, CHIP, tax credits, and other
subsidies for the purchase of health insurance through the newly
9
The budgetary effects of the ACA discussed in this report are the effects of the coverage
provisions on federal revenues and mandatory spending; they do not include federal discretionary
administrative costs, which will be subject to future appropriation action. CBO has previously
estimated that the Internal Revenue Service will need to spend between $5 billion and $10 billion
over 10 years to implement the law and that the Department of Health and Human Services and
other federal agencies will have to spend at least $5 billion to $10 billion to implement the law
over that period. In addition, the ACA included explicit authorizations for spending on a variety of
grant and other programs; that funding is also subject to future appropriation action.
6 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
established exchanges (and related costs), and tax credits for small
employers. Those gross costs include spending of $642 billion for
Medicaid and CHIP ($289 billion less than the March 2012 projections),
and $1,017 billion for exchange subsidies ($210 billion more than the
March 2012 projections). Gross costs are $79 billion less than what was
estimated in March 2012.
Those gross costs are offset in part by $515 billion in receipts from
penalty payments, the new excise tax on high-premium insurance plans,
and other budgetary effects (mostly increases in tax revenues stemming
from changes in employer-provided insurance coverage). That offsetting
amount is $5 billion more than what was estimated in March 2012.
10
Those amounts do not encompass all of the budgetary impacts of the ACA
because that legislation has many other provisions, including some that will cause
significant reductions in Medicare spending and others that will generate added
tax revenues, relative to what would have occurred under prior law. CBO and JCT
have not updated their estimate of the overall budgetary impact of the ACA;
previously, they estimated that the law would, on net, reduce budget deficits.
CBO and JCT have, however, updated their estimate of the budgetary impact of
repealing the ACA, incorporating the updated estimates of the effects of the
coverage provisions presented here.
11
(For various reasons, the estimated
budgetary effects of repealing the ACA are not equivalent to an estimate of the
budgetary effects of the ACA with the signs reversed.) On net, CBO and JCT
estimate, repealing the ACA would increase federal budget deficits by
$109 billion over the 2013–2022 period. Repealing the coverage provisions
discussed in this report would save $1,171 billion over that period, but repealing
the rest of the act would increase direct spending and reduce revenues by a total
of $1,280 billion.
12
Medicaid Expansion After the Supreme Court’s Decision
Before the Supreme Court’s decision, states appeared to have been required to
extend Medicaid coverage, beginning in 2014, to all individuals whose income is
below 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) or lose federal matching
10
States’ spending for Medicaid and CHIP will also be affected by the Court’s decision. CBO
estimates that states’ spending related to the coverage provisions of the ACA will total roughly
$41 billion over the 20122022 period, compared with the roughly $73 billion estimated in March
2012.
11
See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable John Boehner providing an estimate
for H.R. 6079, the Repeal of Obamacare Act (July 2012).
12
The estimated effects of repealing the coverage provisions of the ACA differ slightly from CBO
and JCT’s current projections of the budgetary effects of those provisions. Some of the effects of
changes made under the ACA that are captured in those current projections are expected to
continue even if the law is repealed. In addition, the projections for the effects of the coverage
provisions presented in this document include small effects in fiscal year 2012, but an estimate of
repeal includes effects only for 2013 through 2022 because of the assumption that repeal would be
enacted near the start of fiscal year 2013.
7 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
funds for their existing Medicaid program.
13
Thus, it was expected that, under the
ACA, individuals with income below 138 percent of the FPL (and who met the
other requirements of the law) would be eligible for Medicaid in every state
beginning in 2014. The Court’s decision has the effect of converting the ACA’s
Medicaid coverage expansion from a de facto requirement for states to an option
for them.
Eligibility for Federal Health Care Programs Under the ACA
Currently, Medicaid and CHIP cover most children and some parents of
dependent children whose family income is below 138 percent of the FPL—
although the income ceilings for parents vary widely among states. Until the new
eligibility criteria established by the ACA go into effect in 2014, most childless
adults will not be eligible for Medicaid, except in cases in which states have
obtained waivers of federal law. Therefore, most of the new enrollment projected
to occur under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is expected to be among childless
adults and parents who are not already covered under their state’s eligibility rules.
Under the ACA, the federal government will fully cover the cost of the newly
eligible individuals in 2014, 2015, and 2016. After that, states will be required to
contribute toward the costs for those individuals. States’ shares of the costs rise
over several years so that, for 2020 and subsequent years, states will be required
to pay 10 percent of the costs for such individuals. For any new enrollees who
were previously eligible for Medicaid, traditional federal matching rules will
apply; on average, the federal government pays about 57 percent of Medicaid
costs, and states pay the rest (although the shares vary by state).
Under the ACA, states are required to maintain coverage up to the income
eligibility levels they had established under prior law for children until 2019 and
for adults until 2014. That “maintenance of effort” requirement and the
requirement that states determine eligibility using the measure of modified
adjusted gross income (MAGI) specified in the ACA were not directly affected by
the Court’s decision.
In addition to expanding Medicaid coverage, the ACA provides for subsidies to
certain individuals and families who purchase insurance through the exchanges
established under the law.
14
To be eligible for subsidies, individuals and families
must have income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the FPL and cannot
have access to an affordable offer of insurance from an employer or be eligible for
Medicaid (among other criteria). In 2014, eligible individuals or families with
income between 100 percent and 133 percent of the FPL will be able to enroll in
the reference plan in an exchange by paying 2 percent of their income; individuals
and families with more income will have to pay a higher percentage of their
13
The FPL for a family of four, for example, is projected to be about $24,000 in 2014. The
legislation established the eligibility threshold for Medicaid at 133 percent of the FPL, but five
percent of applicants’ income is disregarded, raising the effective threshold to 138 percent of the
FPL.
14
CBO and JCT expect that subsidies will be available to people in exchanges run entirely by
states, exchanges run entirely by the federal government, and exchanges run together by states and
the federal government.
8 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
income according to a schedule established in the ACA.
15
For example, CBO and
JCT estimate that eligible individuals or families with income equal to
100 percent of the FPL in 2014 (roughly $24,000 for a family of four) will pay
about $480 toward their premium for the reference plan. Eligible individuals or
families with income at 150 percent of the FPL in 2014 will be able to enroll in
such coverage by paying 4 percent of their income.
16
Such individuals and
families, because they have income at or below 150 percent of the FPL, will also
be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies in the exchanges, whereby their insurance
coverage will pay, on average, 94 percent of their covered medical expenses. In
contrast, most state Medicaid programs either do not require any payment to
enroll or charge only small monthly premiums and have only small cost-sharing
amounts for medical services.
If a state decides not to expand its Medicaid program to the extent authorized
under the ACA, some people who would not be eligible for Medicaid will instead
be eligible for premium and cost-sharing subsidies in the insurance exchanges. In
particular, individuals with income between 100 percent and 138 percent of the
FPL who live in a state that chooses not to expand Medicaid coverage or to defer
such an expansion and who meet certain other criteria would be eligible for such
subsidies.
Key Factors in States Decisions Regarding Medicaid Expansion
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, there are many questions about how
the new state option for Medicaid will be administered. For example, final
regulatory guidance is not yet available regarding whether states will be allowed
to begin their expansion after 2014, to expand eligibility to a threshold below
138 percent of the FPL, or to cover only certain groups of people. Under other
provisions of Medicaid law that specify options for states, they may cover
“reasonable categories” of individuals with income below a specified threshold.
Whether the Court’s decision allows for that flexibility, or whether the current
Administration or future ones will allow such flexibility, will have a significant
impact on the choices that state governments make.
CBO and JCT’s updated estimates reflect careful consideration of the many
factors that state officials are likely to take into account in determining if, when,
15
Whereas the ACA included a provision to disregard 5 percent of income for determining
eligibility for Medicaid, no such provision exists for determining subsidies in the exchanges. The
reference plan is the “silver” plan in the exchange with the second-lowest premium for an
individual’s age group (for single coverage) or with the second-lowest premium among family
plans (for family coverage). A silver plan has an actuarial value of 70 percent; that value is the
average share of costs for covered benefits that will be paid by the plan. The other 30 percent
represents amounts that enrollees will pay, on average, for covered medical services in the form of
deductibles or other cost sharing.
16
Under the ACA, the percentage of income that individuals or families pay toward their
premiums is indexed over time; its future value depends on changes in wages and health insurance
premiums. For additional information on indexing premiums under the ACA, see Congressional
Budget Office, Additional Information About CBOs Baseline Projections of Federal Subsidies for
Health Insurance Provided Through Exchanges (May 2011).
9 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
and to what extent Medicaid coverage will be expanded. In making their
decisions, states will face different incentives depending on their overall
budgetary situation, their current thresholds for Medicaid eligibility, the amounts
that they and their local governments spend to provide health care to uninsured
people or to pay providers for uncompensated care, the number of people likely to
enroll in the program after an expansion (including some of those already eligible
but not enrolled), the federal contributions toward the cost of their care, and many
other factors. Moreover, states often have different preferences regarding their
policies even when facing the same incentives.
One significant incentive for states to undertake the Medicaid expansion
prescribed in the ACA is that the federal government is scheduled to cover a very
large share of the costs of that expansion. Specifically, for people who become
newly eligible for Medicaid under the expansion, the federal government will
cover 100 percent of those costs from 2014 through 2016 and a share declining to
90 percent of the costs in 2020 and thereafter. Thus, states will be able to offer a
significant benefit to some of their residents while bearing only a small fraction of
the costs. In addition, states and local governments will probably realize savings
in existing programs that provide direct care to people who are uninsured or that
cover uncompensated costs incurred by providers serving uninsured residents.
Pressure to expand Medicaid coverage is also likely to come from health care
providers that stand to gain when more people have coverage. In particular,
hospitals that will receive smaller disproportionate share payments from Medicaid
under the ACA may exert pressure on states to make up for those losses by
expanding Medicaid eligibility.
17
At the same time, there are significant disincentives for states to expand Medicaid
eligibility. One is that states would ultimately have to bear some costs for an
expansion of Medicaid coverage during a period when their budgets are already
under pressure, in part from the rising costs of the existing Medicaid program.
Health care costs tend to rise faster than those for other services or products in the
economy. And although the 10 percent share of the costs of newly eligible people
that states would ultimately bear would be a small share of total additional
Medicaid spending, it would nevertheless represent a large extra cost for some
states. In addition, CBO estimates, and states expect, that expanding the
Medicaid-eligible population would lead to an increase in enrollment among those
who would have been eligible under prior law and would not qualify for the
higher federal matching rates, resulting in additional costs for participating states.
States may also fear that the federal government, which faces its own severe
budgetary pressures, will ultimately reduce the federal matching rate and that if it
did so, rolling back expansions already in place would be difficult.
States’ choices will also be significantly shaped by how the current
Administration and future ones respond to the Supreme Court’s decision. CBO
17
States make disproportionate share (DSH) payments to certain hospitals serving large numbers
of Medicaid and low-income patients relative to other hospitals. The ACA reduced the amounts of
DSH payments that states may make beginning in 2014. CBO expects that the Court’s decision
will not affect those cuts, which are estimated to total more than $22 billion over the 20142022
period.
10 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
anticipates that, instead of choosing to expand Medicaid eligibility fully to
138 percent of the FPL or to continue the status quo, many states will try to work
out arrangements with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
undertake partial expansions. For example, some states will probably seek to
implement a partial expansion of Medicaid eligibility to 100 percent of the FPL,
because, under the ACA, people below that threshold will not be eligible for
subsidies in the insurance exchanges while people above that threshold will be if
they do not have an offer of affordable coverage from an employer and meet other
eligibility requirements. Other states may seek to expand coverage to levels above
their existing thresholds but below 100 percent of the FPL. In addition, some
states may pursue a range of other options that would have the effect of reducing
participation in Medicaid compared with earlier estimates. For example, states
might seek changes to methodologies and procedures for determining eligibility.
How the current Administration and future ones will respond to states’ interest in
pursuing these various approaches is unclear.
The timing for expanding Medicaid eligibility may be another choice for states.
Some states may want to delay their Medicaid expansion by a year or more, until
budgetary pressures stemming from the recent recession and slow economic
recovery abate somewhat. Other state governments may take some time to weigh
the various options. In contrast, states that are in better fiscal condition or that
anticipate relatively small additional costs or potential savings from a Medicaid
expansion (because of anticipated reductions in their costs for uncompensated
care or other state-funded health care), are less likely to want to defer
implementation. However, how much flexibility states will have in setting the
timing of an expansion is unclear.
Given those various considerations, states’ decisions will probably span a very
wide range: Some states will probably forgo the expansion entirely; some are
likely to expand coverage to everyone whose income is below 138 percent of the
FPL; and if the flexibility is allowed, some states may choose partial expansions.
Further, states may be able to make those choices in any year after 2014. The
updated estimates by CBO and JCT represent their assessment of the middle of
the distribution of the many possible outcomes arising from the Supreme Court’s
decision. The estimates do not reflect a forecast of specific decisions by
individual states; many different combinations of state decisions could produce
the projected results. Future legal or administrative actions will probably change
the scope of what is possible under the ACA and the Court’s decision; CBO and
JCT’s assessments should not be viewed as representing a single definitive
interpretation of those possible outcomes.
Projected Decisions by States Regarding Expanding Medicaid
CBO and JCT project that under the ACA after the Court’s decision, of the people
who would become newly eligible for Medicaid if all states opted to expand
coverage up to 138 percent of the FPL, about two-thirds will become eligible for
Medicaid by 2022 and about one-third will not. Those who will become eligible
reside in states that will opt to partially or fully expand coverage. Because some
states are likely to delay expanding Medicaid coverage until after 2014, the
projected proportion that will become eligible is smaller in earlier years.
11 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
For this estimate, CBO and JCT considered states’ possible behavior relating to
three types of choices: whether or not eligibility for Medicaid will be expanded,
how far any eligibility expansions will extend, and when any such expansions will
occur. For 2022, CBO and JCT project these results:
About one-third of the potential newly eligible population will reside in
states that choose to fully extend coverage up to 138 percent of the FPL.
The costs to the federal government for those people will not be affected
by the Supreme Court’s decision.
About one-half of the potential newly eligible population will reside in
states that partially extend Medicaid coverage to an income threshold less
than 138 percent of the FPL. For this analysis, CBO and JCT adopted an
assumption that 40 percent would be in states that extend coverage to
100 percent of the FPL and 10 percent in states that extend to a lower
percentage; as with other values underlying the analysis, those shares were
designed to represent the middle of a range of possible outcomes.
In all of those states, people with income between 100 percent and
138 percent of the FPL will be eligible for exchange subsidies if
they do not have access to an offer of affordable health insurance
from their employer and meet other eligibility requirements. On
average, those exchange subsidies will be more costly to the
federal government than Medicaid coverage for those people
would have been; however, fewer of those people will take up
exchange coverage than would have enrolled in Medicaid because
of the higher out-of-pocket costs in the exchanges.
In states that expand coverage up to a limit less than 100 percent of
the FPL, some people with income above that limit but below the
FPL will not be eligible for either Medicaid or exchange subsidies
and will generally be uninsured. For those people, the government
will not bear any Medicaid or exchange costs.
The remainder, about one-sixth, will reside in states that do not extend
Medicaid coverage at all in the next decade. As with people who reside in
states that partially expand coverage, most people in those states who have
income between 100 percent and 138 percent of the FPL and meet other
eligibility requirements will be eligible for subsidies through exchanges;
the others, with income below 100 percent of the FPL, will not be eligible
for either Medicaid or exchange subsidies.
In addition to the impact on the coverage of the potential newly eligible
population, CBO and JCT estimate that the Court’s decision will also
affect the coverage of people who, in the absence of the ACA, would have
been eligible for Medicaid and CHIP but would not have enrolled. Some
of those people will be induced to enroll because of the ACA’s
requirement to obtain health insurance and because of publicity related to
the expansions of Medicaid coverage. However, as a result of some states
12 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
choosing not to extend eligibility levels or choosing to extend coverage
levels to an income limit less than 138 percent of the FPL, those spillover
effects on the population that would have been eligible in the absence of
the ACA will be reduced. CBO and JCT estimate that about one-fifth of
the people who would have been eligible for Medicaid in the absence of
the ACA and were, in prior estimates, projected to enroll will no longer
enroll in Medicaid or CHIP.
CBO and JCT project that the coverage expansions will unfold according to the
following rough timetable:
About one-third of the people who will ultimately become newly eligible
for Medicaid reside in states that will expand their program beginning in
2014.
About one-third of newly eligible people will reside in states that will
delay their coverage expansion until 2015.
The remaining one-third will reside in states that will delay longer than
one year—expanding coverage in 2016, 2017, or 2018.
CBO and JCT project that the newly eligible people living in states more likely to
expand coverage to 138 percent of the FPL are also more likely to see the
expansion begin in 2014, while those newly eligible people living in states that
are more likely to choose lower income eligibility thresholds or other options to
limit their costs are more likely to see expansion occurring later.
Insurance Coverage After the Supreme Court’s Decision
Compared with CBO and JCT’s March 2012 estimate, the changes stemming
from the Supreme Court’s decision result in fewer people now expected to obtain
coverage from Medicaid or CHIP and more people now expected to obtain
coverage through insurance exchanges and to be uninsured. For example, CBO
and JCT now estimate that, relative to their March 2012 projections, 6 million
fewer people will be newly enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP as a result of the ACA
in 2014 and in 2022 (see Table 1). The relative drop in the estimated number of
new enrollees is greater in the earlier years of the period—about 45 percent of
those projected to be newly enrolled in 2014 in prior estimates compared with
about 35 percent in 2022—because a significant number of people are expected to
reside in states that will not expand Medicaid coverage immediately but will do so
later in the decade.
By CBO and JCT’s estimate, in 2014 there will be 2 million more enrollees in
insurance exchanges and 4 million more uninsured than previously projected. In
2022, 3 million more people will be enrolled in the exchanges and 3 million
additional people will be without any insurance. Some of those people are not
those who previously were expected to enroll in Medicaid but would nevertheless
be affected by the changes to Medicaid. Not all of those people would have been
projected to be enrolled in Medicaid under prior estimates, in part because other
13 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
small changes will occur in the number of people with employment-based and
nongroup insurance.
CBO and JCT now estimate that the ACA, in comparison with prior law before
the enactment of the ACA, will reduce the number of nonelderly people without
health insurance coverage by 14 million in 2014 and by 29 million or 30 million
in the latter part of the coming decade, leaving 30 million nonelderly residents
uninsured by the end of the period (see Table 3, at the end of this report). Before
the Supreme Court’s decision, the latter number had been 27 million.
The share of legal nonelderly residents with insurance is projected to rise from
82 percent in 2012 to 92 percent by 2022. According to the current estimates,
from 2016 on, between 23 million and 25 million people will receive coverage
through the exchanges, and 10 million to 11 million additional people will be
enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP as a result of the ACA. Between 4 million and
6 million fewer people are estimated to have coverage through an employer,
compared with coverage in the absence of the ACA. That number did not change
significantly as a result of the Court’s decision.
The changes in coverage in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision depend
importantly on whether individuals who will no longer become eligible for
Medicaid coverage instead become eligible for exchange subsidies and whether
they enroll in coverage through those exchanges. By CBO and JCT’s estimates:
Of the 6 million people who will not have Medicaid coverage in 2022 as a
result of the Court’s decision:
About three-quarters would have been newly eligible for Medicaid
under the ACA as estimated prior to the Supreme Court’s decision,
and
About one-quarter would have been eligible for Medicaid or CHIP
under pre-ACA rules and, prior to the Court’s decision, would have
been expected to enroll in one of those programs—but, with fewer
expansions of eligibility, will be less likely to become aware of and
sign up for either program.
18
Among the people who would have been newly eligible for Medicaid
under the ACA before the Court’s decision, about one-third will have
income between 100 percent and 138 percent of the FPL, and about two-
thirds will have income below 100 percent of the FPL. Most people with
income between 100 percent and 138 percent of the FPL in states that do
not expand or defer expanding Medicaid will be eligible for subsidized
coverage in the exchanges.
18
CBO and JCT do not expect the number of people enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP as the result of
other provisions of the ACA to be affected by the Court’s decision. In particular, the ACA
provisions requiring states to maintain certain Medicaid and CHIP eligibility thresholds and
procedures for adults through 2014 and for children through 2019 are expected to remain in effect.
14 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
Some people who will now be eligible to purchase insurance through an
exchange will find the insurance available through an exchange to be more
attractive than Medicaid because of the better access it offers to certain
providers of health care; other people will find an exchange to be less
attractive than Medicaid because of higher out-of-pocket costs for
premiums and cost sharing. On balance, CBO and JCT expect those higher
costs to reduce enrollment in the exchanges relative to what it would have
been in Medicaid.
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the ACA’s
provision requiring most individuals to obtain insurance coverage or pay a penalty
tax does not change CBO and JCT’s assessment of the mandate’s effect on
coverage. Under the ACA, the consequence for not obtaining required coverage—
the “shared responsibility payment”—is a penalty paid to the Treasury by
taxpayers when they file their tax returns and enforced by the Internal Revenue
Service. CBO and JCT’s previous estimates of the mandate’s impact on people’s
decisions to obtain insurance drew heavily from the literature on compliance with
tax law.
19
More generally, those estimates were based on an assessment of the
strength of incentives—both financial and otherwise—to buy insurance. Financial
considerations include the amount of any costs for premiums and cost sharing, as
well as the penalty, if applicable, for not having insurance. Nonmonetary factors
include the probability of detection, attitudes toward risk, enforcement
procedures, awareness of the mandate, and social norms reflecting the prevalence
of coverage.
The more limited Medicaid expansions that are projected to result from the
Supreme Court’s decision will probably lead to a gap in access to coverage for
some people below the federal poverty level. As a result, CBO and JCT project an
increase in the number of people who will be eligible for hardship exemptions,
which will slightly reduce the prevalence of coverage and thus the strength of the
social norm to obtain insurance. Changes in insurance coverage resulting from
those effects are reflected in this estimate.
The Budgetary Effects of the ACA’s Insurance Coverage
Provisions After the Supreme Court’s Decision
The largest changes in CBO and JCT’s estimates of the budgetary effects of the
coverage provisions of the ACA after the Supreme Court’s decision are in the
estimated costs of Medicaid and CHIP and of exchange subsidies and related
spending.
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays
According to CBO and JCT’s projections for the 2012–2022 period, spending for
Medicaid resulting from the coverage provisions of the ACA will be $288 billion
less than the amounts estimated prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, and such
19
See David Auerbach and others, Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage?
Synthesizing Perspectives from Health, Tax, and Behavioral Economics, Congressional Budget
Office Working Paper 2010-05 (August 2012).
15 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
spending for CHIP will be about $1 billion less (see Table 2). About 6 million
fewer people (mostly adults) are now projected to be enrolled in those programs,
on average, over the 2014–2022 period. The reduction in Medicaid spending is
expected to be $37 billion in 2022, and the reduction in enrollment is expected to
be 6 million in that year. The decline in projected Medicaid coverage reduces
estimated federal spending by about $6,000 per person in 2022, on average.
20
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending
According to CBO and JCT’s updated estimates, the subsidies to be provided
through the insurance exchanges over the 2012–2022 period are $210 billion
higher than the previous estimates—$178 billion more in projected tax credits for
health insurance premiums and $31 billion more in projected cost-sharing
subsidies and related spending.
21
As a result of the reduced availability of
Medicaid, a significant number of people with income between 100 percent and
138 percent of the FPL are expected to be eligible for and to obtain insurance
offered through the exchanges.
The average subsidy for the additional enrollees resulting from the Supreme
Court’s decision is expected to be higher than the average subsidy for all
exchange enrollees for two reasons:
The additional enrollees will have lower average income than those
previously expected to purchase insurance through the exchanges, so they
will qualify for higher federal subsidies for premiums and cost sharing.
The additional enrollees are likely to spend more on health care, on
average, than those previously expected to purchase insurance through the
exchanges because people with lower income generally have somewhat
poorer health. As a result, CBO and JCT now estimate that the premiums
for health insurance offered through the exchanges, along with premiums
in the individual market, will be 2 percent higher than those estimated in
March 2012.
22
20
That average cost per person who does not enroll in Medicaid does not reflect the cost of
medical services only, as is the case for the per capita Medicaid costs that CBO typically reports.
Rather, the figure presented here reflects both the medical costs of the enrollees and the effects of
changes to state administrative and policy choices that result from the Court’s decision.
21
The higher projected costs for exchange subsidies increase the probability that a provision of the
ACA limiting reductions in the year-to-year indexing of exchange subsidies if those subsidies
exceed a specified share of GDP will be triggered. The estimates reported here incorporate that
greater probability. Related spending refers to spending for high-risk pools, premium review
activities, loans to co-op plans, grants to states for the establishment of exchanges, and the net
budgetary effects of proposed collections and payments for risk adjustments and transitional
reinsurance. Taken together, those items are changed by a negligible amount by the Court’s
decision.
22
Under rules established by the ACA, in the market for individual coverage, insurers may not
vary premiums on the basis of health status, regardless of whether a policy is offered through an
exchange or directly to an individual. Projected premiums for insurance offered by large and small
employers are essentially unchanged from CBO and JCT’s March 2012 estimates.
16 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
With those factors taken into account, the federal costs for each additional person
enrolling in the exchanges (most of whom would have enrolled in Medicaid under
CBO and JCT’s prior estimate) will be approximately $9,000 in 2022, on
average. That amount is calculated by dividing the total increase in federal
spending in the exchanges in 2022 ($28 billion) by the number of additional
enrollees (3 million people). The extra exchange costs per person are larger than
the decrease in Medicaid costs per person primarily because, in CBO’s and JCT’s
estimation, private health insurance plans in the exchanges will pay providers at
higher rates than Medicaid pays and will have higher administrative costs than
Medicaid, although there are other, partially offsetting, factors as well.
Other Revenues
According to the updated estimates, the amount of deficit reduction from penalty
payments and other effects on tax revenues under the ACA will be $5 billion
more than previously estimated. That change primarily reflects a $4 billion
increase in collections from such payments by employers, a $1 billion increase in
such payments by individuals, and an increase of less than $500 million in tax
revenues stemming from a small reduction in employment-based coverage, which
will lead to a larger share of total compensation taking the form of taxable wages
and salaries and a smaller share taking the form of nontaxable health benefits.
Although the number of low-income people without health insurance is expected
to increase by 3 million, on average, relative to the March 2012 estimates, CBO
and JCT project only a slight increase, on net, in collections from penalty
payments arising from the individual coverage requirement over the coming
decade. The change in collections is modest for three reasons. First, many of the
people who will not become eligible for Medicaid because of the Court’s decision
will have income that falls below the mandatory tax-filing threshold (projected by
CBO and JCT to be about $10,000 for a single filer and about $19,000 for a
married couple in 2016) and will therefore be exempt from penalties associated
with the mandate. Second, the ACA exempts individuals who would have to pay
more than 8 percent of their income for health insurance. Many people who will
not become eligible for Medicaid or subsidies through exchanges because of the
Court’s decision will be eligible for that exemption. Third, people who will not be
exempt under those criteria will probably receive a hardship exemption as
provided in the ACA. It is likely that individuals who live in states that do not
expand Medicaid eligibility up to 100 percent of the FPL, thereby leaving a gap
between eligibility for Medicaid and eligibility for participation in the exchanges,
will qualify for one of those exemptions.
17 UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JULY 2012
by Members of Congress. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial
analysis, this report makes no recommendations. Jessica Banthin of CBO’s Heath, Retirement,
and Long-Term Analysis Division and Holly Harvey and Jean Hearne of CBO’s Budget
Analysis Division prepared this report under the supervision of Linda Bilheimer and Pete
Fontaine. The analysis described here was the work of many analysts at CBO and on the staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation; the CBO analysts who played especially important roles
were Sarah Anders, James Baumgardner, Mark Hadley, Paul Jacobs, T.J. McGrath, Alexandra
Minicozzi, Julia Mitchell, Kirstin Nelson, Lisa Ramirez-Branum, Robert Stewart, and Ellen
Werble. The report is available on the agency’s Web site (
www.cbo.gov).
Douglas W. Elmendorf
Director
TABLE 1.
CHANGES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE
March 2012
Baseline
July 2012
Estimate
Incorporating
Supreme Court
Decision
Difference
Between
July 2012 and
March 2012
Estimates
(Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)
2014
Medicaid and CHIP 13 7 -6
Employer
a
-2 -1 *
Nongroup and Other
b
-1 -1 *
Exchanges 8 9 2
Uninsured
c
-18 -14 4
2022
Medicaid and CHIP 17 11 -6
Employer
a
-3 -4 *
Nongroup and Other
b
-3 -3 *
Exchanges 22 25 3
Uninsured
c
-33 -30 3
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the
health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). As used here,
the term "ACA" also includes the effects of subsequent related changes to statute. This estimate incorporates
the effects of the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on June 28, 2012 (National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program; * = between 0.5 million and -0.5 million.
a. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of increases in and losses of offers of health insurance
from employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families.
b. Other includes Medicare; the effects of the ACA are almost entirely on nongroup coverage.
c. The count of uninsured people includes unauthorized immigrants as well as people who are eligible for, but not
enrolled in, Medicaid.
Comparison of Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions
Contained in the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage
TABLE 2.
11-YEAR EFFECTS ON THE FEDERAL DEFICIT, 2012-2022
a,b
March 2012
Baseline
July 2012
Estimate
Incorporating
Supreme Court
Decision
Difference
Between
July 2012 and
March 2012
Estimates
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays 931 642 -289
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending
c
808 1,017 210
Small Employer Tax Credits
d
23 23 *
Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 1,762 1,683 -79
Penalty Payments by Uninsured Individuals -54 -55 -1
Penalty Payments by Employers
d
-113 -117 -4
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plans
d
-111 -111 *
Other Effects on Tax Revenues and Outlays
e
-231 -231 *
Net Cost of Coverage Provisions 1,252 1,168 -84
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the health care provisions
of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). As used here, the term "ACA" also includes the effects of
subsequent related changes to statute. This estimate incorporates the effects of the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on June 28, 2012
(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program; * = between 0.5 billion and -0.5 billion.
a. Does not include effects on the deficit of other provisions of the ACA not related to coverage, which in aggregate reduce deficits.
It also does not include federal administrative costs that are subject to appropriation. CBO has previously estimated that the Internal
Revenue Service will need to spend between $5 billion and $10 billion over 10 years to implement the ACA and that the Department
of Health and Human Services and other federal agencies will have to spend at least $5 billion to $10 billion over that period.
In addition, the ACA included explicit authorizations for spending on a variety of grant and other programs; that funding is also
subject to future appropriation action.
b. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit.
c. Includes spending for high-risk pools, premium review activities, loans to co-op plans, grants to states for the establishment of
exchanges, and the net budgetary effects of proposed collections and payments for risk adjustment and transitional reinsurance.
d. The effects on the deficit of the ACA include the associated effects on tax revenues of changes in taxable compensation.
e. The effects are almost entirely on tax revenues.
Comparison of Estimates of the Budgetary Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions
Contained in the Affordable Care Act
TABLE 3.
Estimate of the Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage, Updated for Supreme Court Decision
EFFECTS ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
a
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
(Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)
Prior-Law Medicaid and CHIP 34 34 35 34 32 32 31 32 32 32 32
Coverage
b
Employer 154 156 157 157 159 160 160 161 161 160 161
Nongroup and Other
c
25 25 25 27 28 28 31 30 30 31 31
Uninsured
d
55 56 56 56 56 57 58 57 59 60 60
TOTAL 269 271 272 274 275 277 280 280 282 283 284
Change in Coverage Medicaid and CHIP * 1 7 9 10 10 11 11 11 11 11
under the ACA,
Employer
e
1 1 -1 -2 -5 -5 -5 -6 -5 -4 -4
Updated for Supreme
Nongroup and Other
c
1 * -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -2 -3 -3
Court Decision Exchanges 0 0 9 14 23 25 26 26 25 25 25
Uninsured
d
-2 -2 -14 -20 -26 -28 -29 -29 -29 -30 -30
Uninsured Population Given the Supreme Court Decision
Number of Uninsured Nonelderly People
d
53 53 41 36 30 29 29 29 29 30 30
Insured Share of the Nonelderly Population
a
Including All Residents 80% 80% 85% 87% 89% 90% 90% 90% 90% 89% 89%
Excluding Unauthorized Immigrants 82% 82% 87% 89% 91% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92%
Memo: Exchange Enrollees and Subsidies
Number with Unaffordable Offer from Employer
f
* * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of Unsubsidized Exchange Enrollees 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
Average Exchange Subsidy per Subsidized Enrollee $5,320 $5,380 $5,490 $5,640 $6,080 $6,470 $6,750 $7,160 $7,510
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). As used
here, the term "ACA" also includes the effects of subsequent related changes to statute. This estimate incorporates the effects of the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on June 28, 2012 ( National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program; * = between 0.5 million and -0.5 million.
a. Figures for the nonelderly population include only residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65.
b. Figures reflect average annual enrollment; individuals reporting multiple sources of coverage are assigned a primary source. To illustrate the effects of the ACA, which is now current law, changes in coverage shown compared
with coverage projections in the absence of that legislation, or "prior law."
c. Other includes Medicare; the effects of the ACA are almost entirely on nongroup coverage.
d. The count of uninsured people includes unauthorized immigrants as well as people who are eligible for, but not enrolled in, Medicaid.
e. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of increases in and losses of offers of health insurance from employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families. For example, in 2019, an estimated
11 million people who would have had an offer of employment-based coverage under prior law will lose their offer under current law, and another 4 million people will have an offer of employment-based coverage but will
enroll in health insurance from another source instead. These flows out of employment-based coverage will be partially offset by an estimated 9 million people who will newly enroll in employment-based coverage under
the ACA.
f. Workers who would have to pay more than a specified share of their income (9.5 percent in 2014) for employment-based coverage could receive subsidies via an exchange.
TABLE 4.
Estimate of the Budgetary Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions Contained in the Affordable Care Act, Updated for Supreme Court Decision
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
11-Year Total,
EFFECTS ON THE FEDERAL DEFICIT
a,b
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2012-2022
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays
c
-1 1 26 49 62 69 77 83 86 92 99 642
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending
d
2 4 25 61 97 119 129 137 141 148 155 1,017
Small Employer Tax Credits
e
1 2 3 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 23
Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 3 6 53 113 161 190 208 221 229 242 256 1,683
Penalty Payments by Uninsured Individuals 0 0 0 -3 -6 -7 -7 -7 -8 -9 -9 -55
Penalty Payments by Employers
e
0 0 -4 -9 -11 -12 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -117
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plans
e
0 0 0 0 0 0 -11 -18 -22 -27 -32 -111
Other Effects on Tax Revenues and Outlays
f
0 -1 -4 -7 -16 -25 -31 -36 -38 -37 -37 -231
NET COST OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS 3 5 45 94 129 145 145 144 145 153 159 1,168
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). As used
here, the term "ACA" also includes the effects of subsequent related changes to statute. This estimate incorporates the effects of the Supreme Court’s opinion issued on June 28, 2012 (National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program.
a. Does not include effects on the deficit of other provisions of the ACA not related to coverage, which in aggregate reduce deficits. It also does not include federal administrative costs that are subject to appropriation.
CBO has previously estimated that the Internal Revenue Service will need to spend between $5 billion and $10 billion over 10 years to implement the ACA and that the Department of Health and Human
Services and other federal agencies will have to spend at least $5 billion to $10 billion over that period. In addition, the ACA included explicit authorizations for spending on a variety of grant and other programs;
that funding is also subject to future appropriation action.
b. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit.
c. Under current law, states have the flexibility to make programmatic and other budgetary changes to Medicaid and CHIP. CBO estimates that state spending on Medicaid and CHIP as a result of the coverage provisions of the
Affordable Care Act in the 2012-2022 period would have increased by $73 billion as a result of the law prior to the Supreme Court decision, and instead will rise by $41 billion given that decision.
d. Includes spending for high-risk pools, premium review activities, loans to co-op plans, grants to states for the establishment of exchanges, and the net budgetary effects of proposed collections and payments for risk adjustment
and transitional reinsurance.
e. The effects on the deficit of this provision include the associated effects on tax revenues of changes in taxable compensation.
f. The effects are almost entirely on tax revenues. CBO estimates that outlays for Social Security benefits would increase by about $7 billion over the 2012-2022 period, and that the coverage provisions would have negligible effects
on outlays for other federal programs.