races. Finally, the dependent variables in Columns 5 and 6 are dummies for whether dynastic
candidates or incumbent relatives win the election, respectively. The point estimate in Column
6 shows that incumbent relatives are 33 percentage points more likely to get elected following
binding term limits. Contrasting the estimated coefficient to the share of mayors that are relatives
of the incumbent in non-open seat races (4.7%), incumbent relatives are 7 times (33/4.7) more likely
to become mayors in forced open-seat races. In sum, our findings show that while forced open-seat
races attract more candidates, they do not necessarily lead to an increase of “new blood” in the
system.
Table 2: Term Limits and the Rise of Female Dynastic Politicians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A All Candidates:
No. Cand. Share Dyn. Dyn. Ran Inc. Rel. Ran Dyn. Won Inc. Rel. Won
termlim 0.595 0.060 0.197 0.464 0.139 0.334
(0.031) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928
R-squared 0.547 0.491 0.495 0.372 0.462 0.327
Mean Dep. Var. 2.654 0.176 0.366 0.188 0.234 0.101
Panel B Female Candidates:
Dyn. Ran Inc. Rel. Ran Non-Dyn Ran Dyn. Won Inc. Rel. Won Non-Dyn Won
Term Limit 0.171 0.243 0.043 0.105 0.161 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 11,927 11,927 11,928 11,892 11,892 11,835
R-squared 0.305 0.251 0.295 0.307 0.217 0.336
Mean Dep. Var. 0.111 0.0617 0.209 0.0691 0.0368 0.0764
Notes: Results from municipality*elections regressions and include municipality and election-year fixed
effects. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the number of candidates (Column 1), the share of candidates
who are dynastic relative to the pool of candidates (Column 2), a dummy equal to one if a dynastic
candidate ran (Column 3), a dummy equal to one if an incumbent relative ran (Column 4), a dummy for
whether the elected mayor is dynastic (Column 5) and a dummy for whether the elected mayor is related to
the previous incumbent (Column 6). In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a dynastic
woman ran (Column 1), a dummy for whether a woman related to the incumbent ran (Column 2), a
dummy for whether a non-dynastic woman ran (Column 3), a dummy for whether a dynastic woman won
(Column 4), a dummy for whether a woman related to the incumbent won (Column 5), and a dummy for
whether a non-dynastic woman won (Column 6). The standard errors (in parentheses) account for
potential correlation within provinces.
Turning to the sample of female candidates in Panel B, in Columns 1-3 we use as dependent
variables dummies for whether a dynastic, incumbent relative or non-dynastic woman ran in the
race, respectively. The estimates show that the increased probability of women running for office
10