NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
POLITICAL DYNASTIES, TERM LIMITS AND FEMALE POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM THE PHILIPPINES
Julien Labonne
Sahar Parsa
Pablo Querubín
Working Paper 26431
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26431
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
November 2019
We thank Cesi Cruz, Raquel Fernandez, Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne and seminar participants in
Galatina Summer meetings 2018, Hunter College, NEUDC 2015, the Political Dynasties
workshop in Oslo, the 3rd Ottawa Applied Microeconomics Workshop, Petralia Applied
Economics Conference 2019, Queens College CUNY, 2019 Scottish Workshop in Development
Economics, Tufts University, the University of Oxford, and the University of Washington for
constructive feedback. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been
peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies
official NBER publications.
© 2019 by Julien Labonne, Sahar Parsa, and Pablo Querubín. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that
full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Political Dynasties, Term Limits and Female Political Empowerment: Evidence from the Philippines
Julien Labonne, Sahar Parsa, and Pablo Querubín
NBER Working Paper No. 26431
November 2019
JEL No. D72
ABSTRACT
We investigate the effect of term limits on female political representation. Using data from
Philippine municipalities where strict term limits have been in place since 1987, we show that
term limits led to a large increase in the number of women running and winning in mayoral
elections. However, we show that this increase is entirely driven by female relatives of the term-
limited incumbents. We further show that the differential gender impact of this policy is driven
by political dynasties' adaptive strategies to stay in power.
Julien Labonne
University of Oxford
United Kingdom
Sahar Parsa
New York University
Department of Economics
19 W 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
Pablo Querubín
Department of Politics
New York University
19 West Fourth Street, Room 428
New York, NY 10012
and NBER
1 Introduction
The second half of the 20th century has seen women break gender roles and stereotypes in all
spheres of life. Despite such dramatic shifts, they still lag in leadership positions, particularly
in politics, in both developed and developing countries. In 2019, only 24.3 percent of national
legislators around the world are women, and such low representation is even more severe for
elected executive positions, with only 11 female Heads of State.
1
Scholars and policy-makers are interested in understanding women’s pathways to elected
oces. Recent studies have brought attention to structural characteristics of the political en-
vironment such as electoral systems (Rosen, 2013), political competition (Escobar-Lemmon and
Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Lawless and Pearson, 2008; Folke and Rickne, 2016) and the politicization
of ethnicity (Arriola and Johnson, 2014) as well as cultural norms such as matrilineality (Robinson
and Gottlieb, 2019). In parallel, a growing body of research has focused on how policies such as
gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Pande and Ford, 2012; O’Brien and Rickne, 2016) or political reser-
vations (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Bhavnani, 2009; Cassan and Vandewalle, 2017) shape
female political representation both substantively and descriptively.
We investigate the eect of a widely used policy on female political representation: term limits.
Although the intended goal of term limits is not explicitly to improve women’s representation, a
plausible side eect could be a rise in female elected ocials. After all, open-seat races races
where the incumbent is not running – are known to attract outsiders and lesser-known candidates
to the political scene (Cain, Hanley and Kousser, 2006). The search for a context to elucidate these
issues takes us to the rise of female politicians in mayoral positions in the Philippines.
The Philippines ranks among the top countries in the world in terms of female political represen-
tation. Women currently hold 29 percent of the seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
However, the Philippines didn’t always have such high share of female politicians. In the after-
math of the fall of Ferdinand Marcos’ autocratic regime in the mid 1980s, only 9 percent of women
were elected to the Senate and the House of Representatives. Other elected oces followed similar
trends. Of relevance to the present study, in 1988 only 9 percent of the municipalities had a female
1
https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures accessed on
September 5, 2019.
1
mayor, climbing to 21 percent in 2010.
We provide evidence that this increase in female political representation is linked to the term
limits introduced in the 1987 constitution. Our analysis relies on a dierence-in-dierences em-
pirical strategy where we compare forced open-seat races to other races, before and after term
limits bind. Hereafter, we use the term forced open-seat races to refer to open-seat races following
binding term limits, to dierentiate from open-seat races in which the incumbent was eligible to
run but decided not to.
First, we show that forced open-seat races are significantly more likely to have (i) a woman
running for oce, and (ii) a woman being elected to the mayoral oce. Our estimates suggest that
term limits can account for about two thirds of the increase in the share of female mayors in the
Philippines. We next show that dynastic candidates are more likely to run in forced open-seat races
and that the increase in female representation following binding term limits is entirely driven by
dynastic women. While non-dynastic women are slightly more likely to run in forced open-seat
races, they are not more likely to win. Thus, in our context, term limits increase the share of a very
specific group of women in power: dynastic women. This is a striking and unexpected result given
the low share of municipalities that had a female representative to start with.
What explains this dramatic increase in the number of female dynastic politicians? Recent
studies have shown that family ties are an important vehicle for women’s access to politics, in both
developed and developing countries (Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, 2009; Jalalzai, 2013; Chandra,
2016; Folke, Rickne and Smith, 2016; Smith and Martin, 2017; van Coppenolle, 2017; Jalalzai and
Rincker, 2018). If political dynasties are more likely to field female candidates, then the increase in
the share of dynastic candidates in forced open-seat races may explain the rise of female politicians.
However, we show that term limits also aect the gender composition of these dynastic successions.
We find that the share of dynastic candidates that are female increases from 15% prior to binding
term limits to 45% in forced open-seat races. A simple simulation exercise suggests that these two
eects can help account for the rise of female politicians, though neither by itself can fully explain
the observed change.
We provide evidence of two mechanisms that help explain why term-limited incumbents are
more likely to nominate female relatives. First, term-limited incumbents who wish to return to oce
after waiting out one term, may be more likely to select female relatives who, given existing social
2
norms, might be more willing to step aside after one term to restore their male relative’s political
career. Our data shows that female relatives are three times more likely than male relatives to hold
oce for one term and then retire to allow the termed-out incumbent to run again. Following
Coronel et al. (2004), we refer to these politicians as “benchwarmers”. Second, we show that given
their age, term-limited incumbents may be constrained in the number of eligible male relatives. In
particular, if term-limited incumbents are, on average, younger than those who retire voluntarily,
they may not have any sons of eligible age when the term-limit binds and may thus have to rely
on their wives to keep the mayoral position in the family.
Our results are relevant for multiple reasons. Most recent research on female descriptive
representation focuses on institutions such as quotas that mandate candidacy or incumbency and
are often relevant for legislative bodies. Here, we bring attention to term limits, an electoral
institution widespread across the world, and most common for executive oces, for which women
are particularly underrepresented. Unlike quotas, term limits are not introduced with the deliberate
goal of increasing female representation. We find that in our context forced open-seat races increase
the probability of women accessing elected oces, but mainly for a small group of women: dynastic
women.
2
This unintended consequence of term limits is related to a recent study by Cassan and
Vandewalle (2017), where female reservations in India increased the representation of low-caste
groups. In their case, the increase in low-caste representation is related to traditional gender
norms prevalent among high caste people in Indian villages. Thus, while our empirical analysis is
limited to local elections in the Philippines, the patterns we document are likely relevant for other
democracies.
Our findings are also broadly related to the nascent literature emphasizing the importance of
culture when exploring the eects of policies, see Ashraf et al. (2016) and Corno, Hildebrandt
and Voena (2017). Ashraf et al. (2016) show that female education is more responsive to school
construction programs for ethnic groups practicing bride price. Our paper highlights a similar point
within a political context. Although we do not exploit cultural variation within the Philippines,
our results provide strong evidence that the impact of term limits on political outcomes is tied to
the dynastic nature of the Philippine political institutions and the high share of male term-limited
2
We thus contribute to existing work that explores the characteristics of women who run for public oce. See for
example, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) and Schwindt-Bayer (2011)
3
incumbents. Absent a strong dynastic environment, the impact of term limits will most likely
manifest itself through other channels such as increased competition.
2 Term limits and the Rise of Female Politicians
The Philippines saw a dramatic increase in the share of female mayors in the last 30 years. Using
ocial candidate-level results of all mayoral elections between 1988 and 2010, provided by the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC), Figure 1 reports the share of municipalities with an elected
female mayor in each of the eight elections between 1988-2010.
3
Starting at nine percent in 1988,
the share of municipalities with a female mayor jumped to 16% in 1998 and kept on increasing to
21% by 2010. The discontinuous jump in 1998 is key. It hints at the importance of term limits in
the rise of female politicians as this is the first election year with forced open-seat races following
binding term-limits.
Term limits for all elected oces were introduced in the 1987 constitution. At the municipal
level, a politician can only be elected to the same oce three times consecutively (not counting
elections before 1987). The first municipal elections following the fall of Ferdinand Marcos were
organized in 1988. In accordance with provisions of the 1987 constitution, the next municipal
elections were organized in 1992. Thereafter, all municipal ocials the mayor, vice-mayor and
eight municipal councilors, were elected in first-past-the-post elections organized every three years.
Upon reaching a binding term limit, a politician can run immediately for a dierent oce or run
again for the same oce after waiting out an election cycle. Thus, the 1998 election was the first
election with potentially term-limited incumbents. In what follows, we formally test the hypothesis
that term limits led to an increase in the number of women elected as mayors.
3
The dataset includes the full names and votes received for all candidates. The only exception is 1988; we only
have data on winning candidates for that election. We used the first name of the candidates in our sample to code their
gender.
4
Figure 1: Share of municipalities with a female mayor
2.1 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
To test the impact of term limits on the rise of female politicians, we use a dierence-in-dierences
estimation strategy. We compare municipalities with a term-limited incumbent to municipalities
without term-limited incumbents, before and after the forced open-seat race. Our basic estimating
equation is:
y
mt
= α + βTerm_Limit
mt
+ µ
m
+ ρ
t
+
mt
(1)
where y
mt
is one of two indicators: a dummy for whether a woman ran in a mayoral election
in municipality m and election year t and a dummy for whether a woman won a mayoral election
in municipality m and election year t. Term_Limit
mt
is a dummy equal to 1 if at time t municipality
m had a forced open-seat race and zero otherwise. Our main coecient of interest is β. We cluster
standard errors at the province level. We include election-year dummies to account flexibly for
common shocks or trends at the national level and a full set of municipality fixed eects to account
for all time-invariant municipal characteristics. We also estimate a more demanding specification
by including interactions between election-year dummies and province fixed eects.
5
Table 1 presents our main results. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a woman ran
(Columns 1-2) or won the race (Columns 3-4). Municipalities are 17 percentage points more likely
to have a woman running for the mayoral oce in a forced open-seat race (Column 1). Women
are not only more likely to run, they are also 10.5 percentage points more likely to win in forced
open-seat races (Column 3). These results are robust to using the interactions between election-year
dummies and province fixed eects instead of country-wide year fixed-eects (Columns 2 and 4).
4
Contrasting our point estimates to the jump in the share of female politicians in 1998 (the first year
with forced open-seat races), binding term limits could account for more than two thirds of the 6.09
percentage points increase in the share of female mayors between 1995 (9.91%) and 1998 (16.0%).
Given that 41% of the municipalities had a forced open-seat in that year, our estimates would imply
a 4.3 percentage points increase in the share of municipalities with female mayors.
Table 1: Term Limits and the Rise of Female Politicians
Female Candidate Female Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Limit 0.170 0.165 0.105 0.104
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Election FE Yes No Yes No
Province × Election FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,892 11,892 11,835 11,835
R
2
0.309 0.354 0.317 0.353
Mean Dep. Var. 0.299 0.299 0.146 0.146
Notes: Results from municipality*elections regressions and include municipal and time fixed eects. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether a woman ran for mayor (Columns 1-2), or a dummy for
whether a woman was elected mayor (Columns 3-4). The standard errors (in parentheses) account for
potential correlation within provinces.
To sum up, the estimates in Table 1 show that women are more likely to run and win in forced
open-seat races. This results from (both) an increase in the likelihood of women running, and to
a minor extent in the likelihood of women winning conditional on running. Prior to 1998 (before
term limits bind), conditional on at least one woman running, the likelihood that a woman was
4
Sample sizes are a bit smaller in Columns 3 and 4 since, for a few cases, we don’t have information on who won
the election.
6
elected mayor was 0.45. In forced open-seat races, that likelihood increases slightly to 0.5.
2.2 Testing for the Parallel-Trends Assumption
We now provide evidence of the key identifying assumption in dierence-in-dierences designs:
namely, that municipalities with and without forced open-seat races were on similar trends before
binding term limits. To do so, we estimate an extended version of equation (1) where we include
leads and lags of the term limit variable. More concretely, we estimate the following equation:
y
mt
= α +
+2
X
S=3
β
S
Term_Limit
S
mt
+ µ
m
+ ρ
t
+
mt
, (2)
where β
S
are the estimates on the full set of leads and lags (up to three years). For example,
Term_Limit
1
mt
is the first lead of the term-limit dummy. It is equal to one for all term-limited
municipalities one election before they became term-limited and zero otherwise.
Figure 2 provides strong evidence in support of the parallel trends assumption. The coecients
on the one and two period leads are small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that treated
and control groups follow a common trend prior to term limits. This reinforces our confidence
that the results discussed above capture the causal eect of binding term limits on female political
participation.
In addition to documenting parallel trends, Figure 2 highlights an interesting feature. The
eect of term limits becomes much weaker one and two periods after the forced open-seat race.
The coecients on the one and two-period lags, while positive, are substantially muted compared
to the contemporary term-limit dummy. We return to this finding below in Section 4.
7
Figure 2: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for Leads and Lags of Term Limit Variable
3 The Dynastic Nature of the Rise of Female Mayors
What drives the increase in female politicians during forced open-seat races? Are the patterns
consistent with the original goal of the policy which was to promote alternation in oce and curb
the power of incumbent political elites, namely political dynasties? Political dynasties play an
important role in politics at both the national and local levels (McCoy, 2009) and have persisted
across many decades. It is common for relatives to take turns holding the same oce, and
for the same family to control multiple elected oces at the same time (Querubin, 2012). To
understand how term-limits interact with this prevalent role of political dynasties, we next explore
the composition of candidates across dierent races between dynastic and non-dynastic. Contrary
to the original intent of the policy, we provide evidence that forced open-seat races lead to an
increase in the number and share of dynastic politicians, particularly of incumbent relatives and
show that the increase in female representation following binding term limits is driven by the entry
of female relatives of the incumbent into the mayoral races.
A key step to analyzing changes in the composition of mayoral races is to identify dynastic
candidates and the relatives of the incumbents in our sample. Individuals in the Philippines carry
two family names: the mother’s maiden name and father’s family name (men and single women)
or the father’s family name and husband’s family name (married women). We follow Querubin
(2016) and Fafchamps and Labonne (2017) and classify a candidate as dynastic if it shares at least
8
one family name with any current or previous mayor and as an incumbent relative if it shares at least
one family name with the current mayor.
This approach assumes that a shared family name indicates an actual family tie, which is
valid given the historical way in which family names were allocated in the Philippines. In 1849,
Governor Narciso Claveria y Zaldua assigned a dierent family name to every household in each
municipality. As a consequence very common family names are not as prevalent in the Philippines
as in other countries and thus, sharing a family name is very strongly correlated with an actual
family tie. For example, using biographical data, Querubin (2016) documents that the rate of false
positives (i.e. candidates who share a family name but are not related to each other) amongst
candidates for provincial oces (a larger sub-national level) is around 5%. This rate is likely lower
at the municipal level since unique family names were originally allocated at this administrative
level.
5
Fafchamps and Labonne (2017) and Cruz, Labonne and Querubin (2017) validate and
discuss this method for tracing relatives in more detail.
Our empirical strategy is identical to regression (1), but we use a dierent set of outcome
variables related to whether candidates or elected mayors are dynastic.
6
In Panel A of Table
2 we focus on the composition of candidates and mayors, between dynastic and non-dynastic,
independently of their gender. In Column 1, we use as dependent variable the number of candidates
in the mayoral race and find, as expected, that forced open-seat races attract a larger number of
candidates. However, once we turn to the composition of the pool of candidates between dynastic
and non-dynastic candidates in Column 2, we find that the share of candidates that are dynastic
(relative to all candidates) increases by 6 percentage points in forced open-seat races. This is driven
by the higher likelihood of dynastic candidates (Column 3) and in particular incumbent relatives
(Column 4), running in forced open-seat races. The point estimates show that incumbent relatives
are almost 50 percentage points more likely to run in forced open-seat races relative to other
5
For example, in principle there should be one Aquino family per municipality, even if the Aquino family name
may exist in several municipalities. Two individuals with the Aquino family name living in the same municipality are
thus much more likely to share an actual family tie than two individuals with the Aquino family name from dierent
municipalities in the same province.
6
We show the results for our preferred specification with municipality and year fixed eects. The point estimates
are very similar when we include province-specific election-year fixed eects.
9
races. Finally, the dependent variables in Columns 5 and 6 are dummies for whether dynastic
candidates or incumbent relatives win the election, respectively. The point estimate in Column
6 shows that incumbent relatives are 33 percentage points more likely to get elected following
binding term limits. Contrasting the estimated coecient to the share of mayors that are relatives
of the incumbent in non-open seat races (4.7%), incumbent relatives are 7 times (33/4.7) more likely
to become mayors in forced open-seat races. In sum, our findings show that while forced open-seat
races attract more candidates, they do not necessarily lead to an increase of “new blood” in the
system.
Table 2: Term Limits and the Rise of Female Dynastic Politicians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A All Candidates:
No. Cand. Share Dyn. Dyn. Ran Inc. Rel. Ran Dyn. Won Inc. Rel. Won
termlim 0.595 0.060 0.197 0.464 0.139 0.334
(0.031) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928 11,928
R-squared 0.547 0.491 0.495 0.372 0.462 0.327
Mean Dep. Var. 2.654 0.176 0.366 0.188 0.234 0.101
Panel B Female Candidates:
Dyn. Ran Inc. Rel. Ran Non-Dyn Ran Dyn. Won Inc. Rel. Won Non-Dyn Won
Term Limit 0.171 0.243 0.043 0.105 0.161 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 11,927 11,927 11,928 11,892 11,892 11,835
R-squared 0.305 0.251 0.295 0.307 0.217 0.336
Mean Dep. Var. 0.111 0.0617 0.209 0.0691 0.0368 0.0764
Notes: Results from municipality*elections regressions and include municipality and election-year fixed
eects. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the number of candidates (Column 1), the share of candidates
who are dynastic relative to the pool of candidates (Column 2), a dummy equal to one if a dynastic
candidate ran (Column 3), a dummy equal to one if an incumbent relative ran (Column 4), a dummy for
whether the elected mayor is dynastic (Column 5) and a dummy for whether the elected mayor is related to
the previous incumbent (Column 6). In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a dynastic
woman ran (Column 1), a dummy for whether a woman related to the incumbent ran (Column 2), a
dummy for whether a non-dynastic woman ran (Column 3), a dummy for whether a dynastic woman won
(Column 4), a dummy for whether a woman related to the incumbent won (Column 5), and a dummy for
whether a non-dynastic woman won (Column 6). The standard errors (in parentheses) account for
potential correlation within provinces.
Turning to the sample of female candidates in Panel B, in Columns 1-3 we use as dependent
variables dummies for whether a dynastic, incumbent relative or non-dynastic woman ran in the
race, respectively. The estimates show that the increased probability of women running for oce
10
documented in Table 1 is mostly driven by dynastic candidates. Dynastic women are 17 percentage
points more likely to run in forced open-seat races (Column 1). The eect is even larger for female
relatives of the incumbent who are 24 percentage points more likely to run following binding term
limits (Column 2). The eect for non-dynastic women (Column 3), while positive and statistically
significant, is substantially smaller than that for women related to previous or current incumbents.
Investigating the composition of winning candidates (female mayors), in Columns 4-6 we use
dummies for whether dynastic, incumbent relatives or non-dynastic women won the election,
respectively. The estimates show that the increase in the number of female politicians following
binding term limits is driven entirely by the entry of dynastic female politicians, in particular, by
women related to the term-limited incumbents (Column 5) who are 16 percentage points more
likely to win in forced open-seat races. In fact, close to 75 percent of the women elected in the first
wave of forced open-seat races in 1998 were related to the term-limited incumbent and out of the 342
dynastic women winning an election in open-seat races, only 15 are dynastic but unrelated to the
term-limited incumbent. On the other hand, the coecient in Column 6 shows that non-dynastic
women are not more likely to win forced open-seat races.
In sum, the descriptive patterns and regressions presented in Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2
provide strong evidence that forced open-seat races constitute critical junctures in which women
are disproportionately more likely to access political oce. However, not all women benefit from
term-limits: relatives of the term-limited incumbent are substantially more likely to win in forced
open-seat races.
7
4 The Gender Nature of Dynastic Politics and Term Limits
So far we’ve shown that term limits led to an increase in female political representation in mayoral
positions and that most of these women “succeeded” their term-limited relatives in oce. This
suggests that a key factor behind the rise of female mayors in the Philippines is related to political
successions and the response of term-limited incumbents when faced with the constraint imposed
7
The fact that voters often vote for and elect female relatives of term-limited incumbents is consistent with the
argument of Dolan (2014) that traditional political forces (such as membership in the incumbent dynasty) are often a
more important determinant of voter behavior than a candidate’s gender.
11
by term limits on their political careers. In this section, we explore two plausible explanations for
the role of term limits in the increase in the probability of female relatives of the incumbent running
for oce. We focus on the likelihood of running for oce, rather than on the likelihood of winning,
since incumbents only have full control on whether a relative runs for oce (not on whether they
actually win). Moreover, recall from Section 2.1 that the increase in female representation in forced
open-seat races is mostly driven by the higher likelihood of women running for oce, rather than
of women winning conditional on running.
Specifically, the share of female relatives running for oce is the product of i) the likelihood of
incumbent relatives running for oce and ii) the gender composition of these incumbent relatives.
Let Prob(FemRel) be the probability that a female relative of the incumbent runs for mayor. We can
use the following identity to illustrate the point:
Prob(FemRel) = Prob(Rel) × Prob(Fem|Rel)
where Prob(Rel) is the probability that a relative of the incumbent runs for mayor and
Prob(Fem|Rel) is the probability that, conditional on a relative of the incumbent running, the rel-
ative is female. In what follows, we will explore quantitatively the significance of each of these
components in explaining the change in the share of female relatives running in forced open-seat
races.
4.1 Term Limits and the Likelihood of Dynastic Successions
Based on the above expression, a first explanation behind the rise of female relatives running for
oce is that, as shown in Panel A of Table 2, term limits are associated with an increase in the
likelihood of incumbent relatives running for oce (an increase in the likelihood of dynastic suc-
cessions). As documented by Querubin (2012), this reflects the adaptive strategies of term-limited
incumbents who want to continue their political careers and preserve their political power. In a
context like the Philippines, where incumbents enjoy a very large electoral advantage (Querubin,
2016), it is essential to prevent opponents from gaining access to oce in forced open-seat races.
Given the weakness of political parties in the Philippines (Montinola, 1999) and the importance of
families in politics, term-limited incumbents often attempt to maintain political control by having
a relative run to replace them. Moreover, as mentioned above, previous studies have documented
12
the importance of political dynasties as a vehicle for women’s access to oce both for executive
positions and for legislatures in other developed and developing countries (Dal Bo, Dal Bo and
Snyder, 2009; Jalalzai, 2013; Chandra, 2016; Folke, Rickne and Smith, 2016; Smith and Martin, 2017;
van Coppenolle, 2017; Jalalzai and Rincker, 2018). In our setting, during 1988-1995, prior to any
binding term-limits, the female share amongst candidates related to the incumbent (Prob(Fem|Rel))
was 0.15. Can the increase in the likelihood of dynastic candidates running for oce (documented
in Panel A of Table 2) explain the increased probability of female relatives running and the ensuing
rise in female political representation? Specifically, what would be the predicted change in the
likelihood of female relatives running for mayor (Prob(FemRel)) if we held the female share of dy-
nastic successions constant at 0.15, but account for the increased likelihood of incumbent relatives
running for oce?
Recall from Table 2, Panel A, Column 4, that forced open-seat races are associated with an
increase of 46 percentage points (0.46) in the probability of an incumbent relative running for
oce. Thus, Prob(FemRel) = 0.46 × 0.15 = 0.069. Contrasting this number with the estimated
dierence-in-dierence coecient in Column 2 of Table 2 Panel B, we can see that the change in
the likelihood of dynastic successions can account for 29% of the 24 percentage increase in the
probability of female relatives of the incumbent running for oce (0.069/0.24=0.29). This suggests
that the increase in the number of “dynastic successions” following term-limits, holding everything
else constant, plays an important role, but leaves 71% of the estimated change in the likelihood of
female relatives running for oce unexplained.
4.2 Term Limits and the Gender Composition of Dynastic Successions
This brings us to our second explanation: the change in the gender composition of dynastic
successions. Remember that the share of female relatives running for oce (conditional on a
relative running for oce) is 0.15 during the baseline period (1988-1995), prior to any binding term
limits. This share increases to 0.45 in forced open-seat races. This observed dierence roughly
coincides with the dierence-in-dierence estimate reported in Column 2, Panel B of Table 2. In
other words, the share of female relatives diers substantially in dynastic successions following
binding term limits compared to other dynastic successions (that occur due to dierent causes
such as death or retirement, for example). Why do term limits change the gender composition of
13
dynastic successions? We investigate two plausible explanations rooted in the design of the term
limits policy in the Philippines.
4.2.1 Age Profile of Term-Limited Incumbents and Availability of Eligible Male Relatives
A first explanation is related to the fact that term-limits force incumbents out of oce after three
terms. As a consequence, strong incumbents are forced to exit their positions at a younger age, on
average, compared to strong incumbents in standard (non-forced) succession decisions that do not
follow binding term-limits. We argue that the younger age of the exiting incumbent can generate
large dierences in the gender composition of political successions in line with what we observe in
our setting. This is because the term-limited incumbent is less likely to have children (in particular
sons) of eligible age (which in the Philippines is 21) compared to other successions, and hence he
may resort to his wife to succeed him in oce. This argument is better exemplified by the story
of one prominent political family in the Philippines. Jejomar Binay was elected mayor of Makati
in 1988. He was re-elected in both 1992 and 1995 and thus was term-limited in 1998 at age 55. At
that time, Jejomar did not have any sons of eligible age. His kids were Nancy (25, female), Abby
(23, female), Jun (20, male), Marita (19, female) and Joanna (10, female). Elenita, his wife, ran and
was elected for the position but did not run in 2001. She was replaced by her husband who was
again re-elected in 2004 and 2007. In 2010, when he became term-limited again, his son Jun (now
of eligible age) ran and was elected.
Next, we use a simple quantitative simulation to show that, even in a world with a strong male
preference in dynastic succession decisions, this channel can generate changes in the share of female
candidates similar in magnitude to the ones observed in the data, under plausible assumptions.
To that end, suppose that incumbents prefer a male succession: the exiting incumbent chooses an
eligible male successor as long as there is one available, otherwise he chooses amongst the potential
set of eligibile female successors (consisting of the wife and daughters). Consider first a standard
succession in which a male politician voluntarily retires or dies. In this case, such politician is
likely to be of older age and succeeded by one of his children. Fertility data for wealthy Filipino
couples in the 70s suggests an average of 3 children per family, which given a gender ratio of
50%, would imply a share of male relatives in this succession of around 87.5%.
8
Interestingly, this
8
The estimates for the number of children per family comes from Table 5 in Hirschman and Guest (1990). In 1975-79,
14
unconstrained male biased scenario is close to what we observe in non-term-limited successions
where the share of women related to the incumbent is around 15%.
As mentioned above, dynastic successions following term limits dier from standard succes-
sions as they likely aect politicians at a younger age. As a consequence, their children might not be
old enough to run for oce and thus, their wives may become important (or the only) contenders
in the succession. As politicians get older, they become more likely to have older children who
can run to replace them. To illustrate this point, assume the same male-bias applies to dynastic
successions following binding term limits. In other words, term-limited incumbents select an
eligible male relative when available, otherwise they select their wives or eligible daughters. In
order to account for the fact that sons may not yet be of eligible age, we introduce parameters p
1
,
p
2
and p
3
, as the probability that, respectively, the first, second and third child is eligible to run.
Thus, the share of potential male successors becomes: p
1
1/2 + p2 1/4 + p
3
1/8.
9
Using statistics
on the age distribution of fathers from Ocial Vital Statistics of the Philippines at the end of the
70s, we can estimate p
1
, p
2
and p
3
for dierent age values of the term-limited politician, given a
representative politician with three kids and an age dierence of two years between the kids.
10
We
can then simulate the probability of having a male relative of eligible age for incumbents aged 45
to 64 years old. Figure 3 shows the simulated (predicted) share of male relatives running in our
sample. As the age of the term-limited incumbent increases, the share of male relatives running
converges towards the share in other non-term-limited successions. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on the age of incumbents in our sample. However, assuming that politicians are uniformly
distributed between 45 - 64 years old at the moment of first becoming term-limited, the probability
of having an eligible male relative would be, on average, 54% which coincides with the actual
(observed) fraction of male relatives running for oce in term-limited successions.
11
the Total Fertility Rate of women with at least some College education (as a proxy for wealth) was 3.08. 87.5% comes
from the probability of having at least one son, conditional on having three children: i.e., 1 (1/2)
3
.
9
The formula comes from the probability of having a first son weighted by the probability of the first son being of
eligible age (p
1
1/2), the probability of having a middle son weighted by the probability that the middle son is of eligible
age (p
2
1/4), and the probability of having a third son weighted by the probability that the third son is of age (p
3
1/8).
10
See https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/1978%20Vital%20Statistics%20Report.pdf accessed on
September 5, 2019.
11
These numbers would be in line with mayors being first elected when they are 35 – 45 years old, which is consistent
15
Figure 3: Simulation probability of having a male relative running
It is worth emphasizing the importance of wives for this channel, which is a by-product of
the high share of male incumbents in the Philippines. For example, close to 92% of term-limited
incumbents in 1998 were men. This high share of male politicians elected in unconstrained races
is necessary for term-limits to generate a discrete jump in the gender composition of dynastic
successions. Had the majority of term-limited incumbents in 1998 been female, then term-limits
would have increased the likelihood of having male mayors, since term-limited female incumbents
would have had eligible male relatives (their husbands) available for the succession.
4.2.2 Women as Benchwarmers
For our second explanation behind the change in the gender composition of dynastic successions,
recall from Section 2 that term limits in the Philippines impose a short-term constraint on the
incumbent, forcing the politician out of oce for only one term. This contrasts with other standard
dynastic successions (following retirement or death) where the incumbent’s exit is more permanent.
Thus, since term limits generate only a short-run (i.e. one term) constraint on the incumbent, those
interested in running again after one term may be more likely to appoint a female relative in oce
with statistics for other countries.
16
to serve as benchwarmers. This is a Filipino expression for incumbent relatives who serve for only
one term after the forced open-seat race, and retire immediately after to allow their relative to run
again (Coronel et al., 2004). Elenita, the wife of Jejomar Binay, is an example of a benchwarmer.
We argue that female relatives might be more attractive than male relatives as benchwarmers due
a number of reasons. First, consider a term-limited incumbent who wants to remain influential
during his term out of oce and to run again immediately after. Given gender norms in the
Philippines, women may be more willing to comply with the relatives’ directives while in oce
and to retire immediately after to allow his return. Similarly, in a context where the careers of
men are perceived as more important than those of women, short-term distortions on the life (and
career) of the female relatives might be perceived as less costly. For example, according to the
2009 Labor Force Survey, female labor force participation is 19 percentage points lower for women
than for men (gap amongst those with college education is similar). Moreover, 60% of Filipino
respondents in the 6
th
wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014) agree that whenever jobs are
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. Finally, 56.4% of respondents agree with
the statement that “men make better political leaders than women do” (fraction who agree amongst
male respondents is 63.7%). This is also consistent with findings by Fox and Lawless (2014) and
Lawless and Fox (2005) that women are significantly less likely than men to demonstrate ambition
to run for elective oce. If incumbents are interested in returning to oce after one term, they
may prefer to select female relatives who will be less inclined to remain in oce and continue a
political career of their own.
In line with this explanation, we find that female mayors who replaced their term-limited
relative are more likely to be one-termers – that is, to exit after serving only one term than other
mayors. In particular 57.7% of women who replaced their term-limited relative serve for only one
term. This is higher than the share of one-termers amongst non-dynastic women (44.5%) or men
(38%) elected in forced open-seat races. It is also higher than the share of one-termers amongst
women elected in non-forced open-seat races (37%).
12
Female mayors who replaced their term-
limited relative are also three times more likely to be benchwarmers than their male counterparts
(that is, to retire after one term in order to allow the previously term-limited incumbent to return
12
These dierences in the share of one-termers between female relatives of the incumbent elected in forced open-seat
races and other mayors are statistically significant at the 1% level
17
to oce). While only 10% of male relatives are benchwarmers, the corresponding figure for female
relatives is 31%. As a consequence, male relatives of the incumbent serve on average a larger
number of terms (2.23) than female relatives (1.81). This may also explain the small coecient on
the one and two period lags of the term-limit dummy reported in Figure 2. The high prevalence
of benchwarmers amongst dynastic women is in line with the eect of term-limits on female
representation being short-lived.
The benchwarmer eect and the lower average number of terms served by female politicians
elected in forced open-seat races, point at two important forces behind the steady increase in the
share of municipalities with a female mayor in the Philippines in the last 30 years. While there is
an increase in the number of female mayors accessing oce during forced open-seat races, there
is a decrease in the average number of terms these women stay in power (as well as an increase
in the number of one-termers), compared to other races. In other words, while following binding
term limits a larger number of municipalities experience a female mayor, these female mayors are
on average less likely to be re-elected. These two forces, the number of forced open-seat races and
the share of women exiting after one term, generates a delicate balance of inflows and outflows
that translate into the observed increase in the share of municipalities with a female mayor. For
example, the number of female mayors in 1995 was 147 and it increased to 237 in 1998. This net
increase in 90 female mayors consists of 170 new female mayors (of which 133 were elected in forced
open-seat races ) and 80 outgoing female mayors who either did not run or were not re-elected.
A similar pattern can be observed in 2001: out of the 237 female mayors, 94 decided not to run,
while 40 were term-limited (for an outflow of 134 female mayors). Importantly, 59 out of the 94
female mayors who decided to not run another term, were relatives of the term-limited incumbent
in 1998 and served for only one term. Despite the higher share of female mayor outflows in 2001
(40% or 94 out of 237) than in 1998 (23% or 30/133) there was still a net increase in the total number
of female mayors to 246 due to the inflow of 143 new female mayors (83 of them elected in forced
open-seat races). The key observation is that absent the benchwarmer eect (or higher likelihood of
one-termers amongst female relatives of term-limited incumbents), the net increase in the number
of municipalities with a female mayor would have been much larger.
To sum up, in this section we provide evidence that the age-profile of term-limited incumbents
and the use of benchwarmers by term-limited incumbents interested in returning to oce after one
18
term can help us explain the change in the gender composition of dynastic successions in forced
open-seat races. Returning to our original question, what fraction of the change in the fraction of
women running for oce can be explained by the increase in the fraction of women in dynastic
successions? We conduct a similar exercise to the one reported in Section 4.1, but use the baseline
(1988-1995) fraction of incumbent relatives running (Prob(Rel) = 0.08) and predict the change in the
likelihood of women running for oce, using the change in the fraction of incumbent relatives that
are female: Prob(FemRel) = 0.08 × 0.3 = 0.024. Thus, the change in the female ratio of dynastic
successions by itself can account for about 10% (0.024/0.24) of the change in the likelihood of women
running for oce. This suggests that the interaction of both forces – an increase in the likelihood of
dynastic successions and in the female share of these successions– provides a compelling account
of how term limits led to increased female political representation in the Philippines, as each force
by itself is not enough to explain the jump in the fraction of women running for oce.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that term limits - a widely used institution across several democracies -
can lead to an increase in female representation and explain the dramatic rise of female mayors
in the Philippines. However, we show that in the Philippines this eect was mostly restricted to
female relatives of the incumbent. This finding has potential implications for the extent to which
an increase in female descriptive representation translates into substantive representation or the
empowerment of other women in dynastic contexts. Previous research has shown that women
who were elected to oce via reservations or gender quotas have enacted pro-women policies
and have had demonstration or role model eects on the political participation of other women
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Bhavnani, 2009). However, it is likely that the channel through
which women access oce mediates their impact on other policy or electoral outcomes. Women
elected through the dynastic channel following binding term limits may be unwilling to steer
policy away from their family’s interests and closer to their own preferences (or the preferences
of other women) or may be unable to do so as they are often figureheads or benchwarmers for
their relatives, who constrain their decisions and retain de facto power. As argued by Jalalzai
(2013), women might derive their political identities through their close male relatives and may be
19
expected to further the political goals of the male relatives they succeeded. Similarly, if women are
elected through the dynastic channel, they may not have a mandate that enables (or encourages)
them to prioritize women’s needs and preferences, in contrast to contexts where women are elected
via gender quotas (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Third, the new pool of elected dynastic women
may not be representative of the broader pool of women which may also impact whether their
policy choices will benefit the majority of women. For instance, Clots-Figueras (2011) find that in
India, female legislators of lower castes, but not those of higher castes, are more likely to enact
female-friendly policies. Finally, the fact that dynastic women elected following binding term limits
often serve for only one term, may not only limit their substantive impact on economic policies but
may also attenuate their “role model eect” if other women in society perceive that women, once
in oce, cannot pursue a political career of their own and must retire to promote the career of their
male relatives.
While the evidence presented in this paper is specific to the Philippines, we believe that many of
the insights are relevant for other democracies where term limits are common and where parties are
weak and/or political dynasties play an important role. Moreover, some of the specific channels we
have explored (such as the dierential age profile induced by term limits) likely apply to many other
contexts. Our findings, however, highlight the importance of understanding how the cultural and
social context mediates the eect of widely used political institutions such as term limits. In dynastic
contexts, term limits may, perhaps inadvertently, increase female representation but restrict this
higher access to oce to dynastic women. And this may have important consequences for the role
that these newly elected female politicians can play. As stated by Jalalzai (2013), “in spite of the
rising numbers of women executives, we should question women’s ultimate progress in achieving
powerful positions” (p. 114). Where women’s increased access to elected oce is mainly driven
by family connections, the consequences for substantive representation may be very dierent.
20
References
Arriola, Leonardo R. and Martha C. Johnson. 2014. “Ethnic Politics and Women’s Empowerment
in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets.” American Journal of Political Science
58(2):495–510.
Ashraf, Nava, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn and Alessandra Voena. 2016. Bride Price and Female
Education. Working Paper 22417 National Bureau of Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22417
Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. “Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a
natural experiment in India.” American Political Science Review 103(01):23–35.
Cain, Bruce, John Hanley and Thad Kousser. 2006. Term Limits: A Recipe for More Competition?
Brookings Institution Press pp. 199–221.
Cassan, Guilhem and Lore Vandewalle. 2017. Identities and public policies: Unintended eects
of political reservations for women in India. Technical report Economics Section, The Graduate
Institute of International Studies.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2016. Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian
Politics. In Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics, ed.
Kanchan Chandra. Cambridge University Press pp. 10–50.
Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from
a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” Econometrica 72(5):1409–1443.
Clots-Figueras, Irma. 2011. “Women in politics: Evidence from the Indian States.” Journal of Public
Economics 95(7-8):664 – 690.
Corno, Lucia, Nicole Hildebrandt and Alessandra Voena. 2017. Age of marriage, weather shocks,
and the direction of marriage payments. Technical report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Coronel, Sheila S., Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban and Booma Cruz. 2004. The Rulemakers: How the
wealthy and well-born dominate Congress. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
21
Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne and Pablo Querubin. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral
Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” American Economic Review 107(10):3006–3037.
Dal Bo, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bo and Jason Snyder. 2009. “Political Dynasties.” Review of Economic
Studies 76(1):115–142.
Dolan, Kathleen A. 2014. When Does Gender Matter?: Women Candidates and Gender Stereotypes in
American Elections. Oxford University Press.
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2005. “Women Ministers in Latin
American Government: When, Where, and Why?” American Journal of Political Science 49(4):829–
844.
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2009. “Getting to the Top: Career Paths
of Women in Latin American Cabinets.” Political Research Quarterly 62(4):685–699.
Fafchamps, Marcel and Julien Labonne. 2017. “Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence
from Municipal Elections in the Philippines.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 33(2):268–
300.
Folke, Olle and Johanna Rickne. 2016. “Electoral Competition and Gender Dierences in Political
Careers.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11:59–102.
Folke, Olle, Johanna Rickne and Daniel M. Smith. 2016. “Gender and Dynastic Political Recruitment:
Theory and Evidence”. Working Paper. https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/
files/folkeetal2016.pdf.
Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2014. “Uncovering the Origins of the Gender Gap in
Political Ambition.” American Political Science Review 108(3):499–519.
Franceschet, Susan and Jennifer M Piscopo. 2008. “Gender quotas and women’s substantive
representation: Lessons from Argentina.” Politics & Gender 4(03):393–425.
Hirschman, Charles and Philip Guest. 1990. “The Emerging Demographic Transitions of Southeast
Asia.” Population and Development Review 16(1):121–152.
22
Jalalzai, Farida. 2013. Shattered, Cracked, Or Firmly Intact?: Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling
Worldwide. Oxford University Press, USA.
Jalalzai, Farida and Meg Rincker. 2018. “Blood is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power
Worldwide.” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 43(4):54–72.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform
Worldwide. Oxford University Press.
Lawless, Jennifer L. and Kathryn Pearson. 2008. “The Primary Reason for Women’s Underrepre-
sentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom.” The Journal of Politics 70(1):67–82.
Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox. 2005. It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t Run for Oce.
Cambridge University Press.
McCoy, Alfred. 2009. An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines. In An Anarchy of Families: State & Family in the Philippines, ed. Alfred McCoy. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press pp. 1–32.
Montinola, Gabriella. 1999. “Parties and Accountability in the Philippines.” Journal of Democracy
10(1).
O’Brien, Diana Z. and Johanna Rickne. 2016. “Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Leadership.”
American Political Science Review 110(1):112–126.
Pande, Rohini and Deanna Ford. 2012. “Gender Quotas and Female Leadership”. World Bank
Working Paper. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9120.
Querubin, Pablo. 2012. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynas-
ties in the Philippines”. Technical report. https://sites.google.com/site/pabloquerubin/
research/Querubin_Term_Limits.pdf.
Querubin, Pablo. 2016. “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines.” Quarterly
Journal of Political Science 11(2):151–181.
23
Robinson, Amanda Lea and Jessica Gottlieb. 2019. “How to Close the Gender Gap in Political
Participation: Lessons from Matrilineal Societies in Africa.” British Journal of Political Science
pp. 1–25.
Rosen, Jennifer. 2013. “The Eects of Political Institutions on Women’s Political Representation: A
Comparative Analysis of 168 Countries from 1992 to 2010.” Political Research Quarterly 66(2):306–
321.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2011. “Women Who Win: Social Backgrounds, Paths to Power, and
Political Ambition in Latin American Legislatures.” Politics and Gender 7(1):1–33.
Smith, Daniel M. and Shane Martin. 2017. “Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Minis-
ters.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(1):131–165.
van Coppenolle, Brenda. 2017. “Political Dynasties in the UK House of Commons: The Null Eect
of Narrow Electoral Selection.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 42:449–475.
24