Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines: Unpacking

Asia-Pacic Social Science Review 20(4) 2020, pp. 88–99

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines:

Unpacking the Links

Ronald U. Mendoza,

Miann S. Banaag,

Joshua D. Hiwatig,

Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco,

and Jurel K. Yap

Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines

Asian Institute of Management, Philippines

*[email protected]

Abstract: This paper reviews the empirical evidence linking political dynasties in the Philippines to the imposition of

term limits under the 1987 Constitution. It nds evidence that political clans have found a way around this Constitutional

constraint by elding more family members in power—giving rise to more fat political dynasties. Hence, we carefully argue

that the introduction of term limits—combined with the failure to introduce other ancillary reforms (notably an anti-dynasty

law)—may have brought about instead some unintended consequences. So, it is not term limits per se that created fat political

dynasties. We further argue that it is a non sequitur to argue that dynasties will be curbed by removing term limits. This is

particularly true given fat political clans are already prevalent, and removing term limits will secure the political foothold

of many already fat political dynasties. To illustrate their expansion, we use network analysis and illustrations of power

concentration over time in particular jurisdictions. We conclude that real reforms should be focused not on removing term

limits, but on further strengthening those reforms that should have accompanied it, including enhancing competition in the

political sphere, such as by supplying alternative leaders, strengthening political parties, and regulating political dynasties.

Keywords: political dynasty, poverty, network analysis, term limits, Philippines

In a senatorial debate in February 2019, Governor

(and now Senator) Imee Marcos—a member of the

Marcos political clan from Ilocos Norte—stated

that she favors removing term limits (Buan, 2019).

She argued that the introduction of term limits by

the 1987 Constitution did not effectively dismantle

political dynasties; instead, it caused dynasties to

proliferate, and that it is only necessary to remove

term limits to end dynasties in the country. Perhaps

the House of Representatives was like-minded

when they developed the draft federal charter

through the Resolution of Both Houses (RBH)

15, which included a provision removing the term

limits of legislators (Cepeda, 2018). Could it be

that the creation of term limits created the political

dynasties? Will removing term limits then abolish

these dynasties?

89Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Political families have learned to evade term

limits by helping family members get elected to

public office. Moreover, it is clear from the empirical

evidence that longer terms for entrenched political

clans do not necessarily produce strong development

outcomes. Literature suggests that politicians enjoy

more time for reform with longer terms, but if they

become too powerful, it puts their jurisdiction at

risk of abuse of power and uncompetitive elections.

Based on our review of related literature, entrenched

political dynasties with long terms are associated with

poor development outcomes (Mendoza and Yusingco,

2019).

In this study, we explain the links between term

limits and dynasties, showing how political dynasties

have expanded over time, and providing an evidence-

based assessment of the possible drivers to this. The

latter includes, but is not limited to, the imposition of

political term limits under the Philippine Constitution.

Specifically, the objectives of the study are:

1. to estimate the growth of political dynasties

over time using a unique political dynasties

dataset;

2. to illustrate the expansion of fat dynasties in

Samar using network analysis; and

3. to demonstrate other cases of power concentration

over time in particular jurisdictions using

illustrations of clan dominance.

Combining the evidence on the abovementioned

points, we also argue that it is a non-sequitur to argue

that dynasties will be curbed by removing term limits.

This is particularly true given fat political clans are

already prevalent. Simply removing term limits at

this point will secure the political foothold of many

already fat political dynasties. Real reforms should

be focused not on removing term limits, but on

further strengthening those reforms that should have

accompanied it, including enhancing competition in

the political sphere, such as by supplying alternative

leaders, strengthening political parties, and regulating

political dynasties.

The study is structured as follows. In the literature

review, we discuss current evidence on political

dynasties and their effects on development and

briefly review the original motivation for creating

term limits under the 1987 Freedom Constitution.

In the data and results section, we illustrate the

extent to which political dynasties have entrenched

themselves in the Philippine political landscape,

as well as evidence on the expansion of dynasties

over time using network analysis for two dynastic

families in Samar, and other case studies. The final

section summarizes the results and arguments of

the study.

Literature Review

Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Political dynasties have existed even before the

introduction of term limits (Simbulan, 1965, 2005;

Sidel, 1997). However, new political dynasties

emerged, and many old political dynasties re-emerged

during the post-Marcos era (Teehankee, 2001). Here,

the imposed term limits might have encouraged the rise

of dynasties by forcing entrenched politicians to give

up their positions once they exhaust their three terms.

Nonetheless, these politicians circumvented term limits

by passing on or exchanging positions with family

members, which is made easier due to the absence of an

anti-dynasty law and strong institutions and conditions

to create a pipeline of alternative leaders. This practice

among politicians has been exercised even before the

introduction of term limits, and further aggravated by

the deficiencies of other reforms needed to form new

or alternative leaders.

Studies of political dynasties in the Philippines

provide evidence not only on how political dynasties

self-perpetuate and undermine the quality of democracy

but also on how persistence could be linked to deeper

poverty and underdevelopment (Mendoza et al., 2016;

Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013). Lifting term limits

with dynasties in power will be tantamount to giving

them even more control of their positions over longer

periods of time.

Mendoza et al. (2016) defined “dynastic share”

as the proportion of positions occupied by dynastic

politicians (as measured by surname) in the same

province for the past four electoral terms. They used

a regression model to show evidence that dynasties

have a worsening effect on poverty in provinces,

especially outside Luzon. Mendoza et al. (2019)

distinguished between “fat” and “thin” dynasties, and

showed evidence for the increasing trend of fat dynasty

share since the 1987 constitution. “Fat dynasty share”

is the proportion of elected officials in a province

who have relatives simultaneously holding positions,

R.U. Mendoza, M.S. Banaag, J.D. Hiwatig, M.H. Yusingco, & J.K. Yap

whereas “thin dynasty share” is the proportion of

elected officials in a province who follow each other

sequentially in office.

A previous study by Labonne et al. (2019) described

how political clans manage to prolong their political

influence by deploying women members of the family

into public office to keep the power within the clan.

Meanwhile, Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre (2013) found that

Philippine provinces that are dominated by political

clans are linked to poorer development outcomes,

such as a lower number of barangay health stations,

less newly asphalted roads, more crime, less full

employment, and a lower Good Governance Index.

Intuitively, these suggest that leadership under political

dynasties that circumvent term limits by passing on

positions to family members while growing in number

as time goes by generally fails to reduce poverty and

development outcomes as effectively if otherwise.

The rise of fat dynasties can be associated not only

with worsening poverty but also with bad governance.

Some studies confirm that the persistence of political

dynasties is associated with rent-seeking, corruption,

and the promotion of self-serving policies (Hutchcroft

& Rocamora, 2003; McCoy, 2009).

Other factors beyond term limits may have also

shaped the political landscape. For instance, the

incumbency advantage could have spillover effects

when relatives run for other elected offices. Querubin

(2012) found empirical evidence to this effect by

running a regression using the difference in difference

estimation to test whether relatives of incumbents who

run for office have higher vote shares compared to

other candidates. (Put differently, Querubin wanted

to test whether having a relative in office translated

into an advantage in the polls.) The empirical results

revealed that under a term-limited environment, the

electoral advantage of an incumbent’s relatives when

running for office is higher. This enabled political clans

to expand their political control over local jurisdictions

further.

Querubin (2012) noted that the expansion of

political dynasties “…cannot be solely attributed

to the introduction of term limits. Changes in

incumbency advantage could occur for a variety of

reasons including an increase in the penetration of

television and other forms of media that give greater

exposure to incumbents” (p. 11). The shift could also

be explained by changes introduced by the Local

Government Code (1991), which granted more

power to local governments, particularly for raising

their own revenues. Finally, after 1987, members of

Congress had access to pork-barrel allocations such

as the Countrywide Development Fund (created in

1990) and the Priority Development Assistance Fund

(created in 2000) that may have been used strategically

by incumbents to increase their re-election chances.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the

growth of dynasties cannot be attributed solely to the

implementation of term limits itself. Term limits may

have been too weak to withstand the adaptive behavior

of political clans. However, it is the entire political

structure—no anti-dynasty law, weak political parties,

and an underdeveloped economy rife with patron-client

relationships—as well as the absence of ancillary

political reforms that probably provided over-all fertile

ground for political dynasties to proliferate. The term

limit was only one of many factors to consider in this

environment.

Fat dynasties are already entrenched—removing

term limits merely strengthens their position even

more. Querubin (2012) succinctly described the

adaptability of political clans, even under term limits:

…large cohorts of dynastic incumbents enter

office after 1998 when the first cohort of

incumbents became term limited. However,

this positive effect also captures the fact that

open-seat races following a term-limited

incumbent are often won by members of other

established dynasties not necessarily related to

the previous incumbent. In sum, term limits have

not changed the dynastic nature of politics in the

Philippines and have, if anything, exacerbated

it by providing incentives for incumbents to use

their relatives as a “survival strategy” when term

limits bind. (p. 26)

Why Term Limits?

The link between imposing term limits for elected

officials and political dynasties was thoroughly

discussed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Commissioner Jose Nolledo, one of the main

proponents of imposing political term limits, noted the

dynastic advantage that incumbents could propagate:

In the Philippines, I think it is known to everyone

that a person runs for governor; he becomes a

91Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

governor for one term; he is allowed two re-

elections under our concept. Then he runs for

re-election; he wins. The third time, he runs for

re-election and he wins and he is now prohibited

from running again until a lapse of another

election period. What does he do? Because he is

old already and decrepit, he asks his son to run

for governor. In the meantime, he holds public

office while the campaign is going on. He has

control; he has already institutionalized himself.

His son will inherit the position of governor, in

effect, and then this will go to the grandson, et

cetera. The others who do not have the political

advantage in the sense that they have no control

of government facilities will be denied the right

to run for public office. Younger ones, perhaps

more intelligent ones, the poorer ones, can no

longer climb the political ladder because of

political dynasty. It seems to me that the public

office becomes inherited. Our government

becomes monarchical in character and no longer

constitutional. (Constitutional Commission of

1986, 1986, p. 731)

More importantly, Commissioner Nolledo also

noted his strong support for an anti-dynasty clause in

the Constitution, saying that political dynasty in the

Philippines has become a social malady, which turned

political positions as an object of family inheritance

and inevitably resulted in political families building

their own little monarchies, while young, talented but

poor candidates are placed at a disadvantaged position

to run for public office (Constitutional Commission of

1986, 1986). Even back then, the intention of some of

the reformists was to create a package of reforms that

would help to institutionalize a more competitive and

level playing field for the country’s political system.

Correspondingly, Commissioner Edmundo G.

Garcia passionately argued that the proclivity of local

politicos to consolidate political power necessitate, at

the very least, the imposition of term limits:

I know that some of us here have been in politics

for a long time and I do not wish to offend

them. But I simply think that there should be

no special caste of professional politicians. It

should not be a life-time profession or a career,

but rather an opportunity for public service to

be broadened to as great number of people and

there should be no effort to accumulate power.

Accumulation of power, at one time, really

brings about the desire to accumulate more, and

rather than providing a structure or a setup which

strengthens this trend, the alternative must be

to provide structural safeguards for this kind

of practice. Therefore, I would not subscribe

to more than one re-election for Senators and

more than two re-elections for Representatives

or local officials. (Constitutional Commission

of 1986, 1986, p. 219)

Notably, for the members of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, the discourse on the link between the

imposition of term limits for elected office and the

domination of dynasties in the political system lies dead

center in the constitutional design of re-establishing

republican democracy in the country. Indeed, some

members even challenged the incorporation of an

anti-political dynasty ethos in the charter. The late

Commissioner Blas F. Ople, for example, cautioned

that any prohibition against running for public office

might impinge on the right of suffrage:

What I feel is an inner demand for logic and

rationality so that this provision can be actually

attached to some principles of equity without

doing violence to the freedom of choice of the

voters because they are entitled to as broad

freedom of choice as the environment can

provide and if they want somebody to run for

office even if he is closely related to someone

in office, do we have the right to curtail

the freedom of the voters? (Constitutional

Commission of 1986, 1986, p. 762)

Furthermore, Commissioner Christian S. Monsod

argued that adding another hurdle for those aspiring

for elected office contradicts the very idea of people

power and can even be seen as unconstitutional:

I just want to say that here we are in this

assembly, extolling people power and saying

that the people have a new consciousness

and yet not trusting that they will make the

right choice. We want to put a section on

political dynasty on the assumption that there

will be violations of the Electoral Code, that

people in power will use their office to elect

R.U. Mendoza, M.S. Banaag, J.D. Hiwatig, M.H. Yusingco, & J.K. Yap

their children. We cannot assume that certain

sections of this Constitution will be violated

and then try to cover and compensate for them

in another section. We have in this Constitution

qualifications of those who seek elective office.

We are adding in this section a disqualification

to those who may aspire after public office, and,

in effect, amending the various provisions in this

Constitution, which enumerate the qualifications

and disqualifications of the law. (Constitutional

Commission of 1986, 1986, p. 93)

The 1986 Constitutional Commission had a

robust and meaningful debate about term limits and

the need to regulate political dynasties. The end

result of these debates has not been satisfactory,

to say the least. The 1987 Constitution eventually

featured a provision that clearly reflected the desire

to provide equal access to public office for all

Filipinos but left it to Congress to operationalize

this prescription. Article II, Section 26 states, “The

State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities

for public service and prohibit political dynasties as

may be defined by law.”

Pertinently, lawmakers have failed to enact a law

regulating political dynasties in the country despite the

clear mandate to do so under the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, the proliferation of political dynasties

should not be seen as an unexpected consequence.

We note here as well that political dynasty is not a

phenomenon unique to the Philippines. A cause for

alarm, though, is the observation raised in a Sydney

Morning Herald piece in 2012 describing some of the

more “established” traditional political families in the

country as “dynasty in steroids” (Dent, 2012).

It is clear from these excerpts that even before the

ratification of the 1987 Constitution, political dynasties

and monopoly of power, among other issues and

reforms surrounding political reforms, were already

a major concern for reformists. Worth noting that

the bourgeoning of political dynasties in the country

happened under a regime with term limits. Hence, taking

out term limits will make Commissioner Nolledo’s fear

about political dynasties reaching undemocratic and

unconstitutional levels a dead certainty given that

the appetite for power of traditional political families

has not been tamed by the 1987 Constitution. The

imposition of term limits was a vital mechanism to

check the growth of what Commissioner Garcia called

a “special caste of professional politicians” (Garcia,

1986, p. 219). Clearly, it was not enough.

In sum, the entrenchment of political dynasties can

be traced at least as far back as the American colonial

regime in 1946 (Purdey et al., 2016). Moreover, the

privatization of public resources brought about by

capitalism led to the emergence of oligarchs who have

accumulated significant wealth and power, whereas

masses of people were left susceptible to clientelism

to survive. Some of these oligarchs eventually rose

as leaders of communities, and patronage politics

became the key driver to the rise of powerful political

clans (e.g., Manacsa & Tan, 2005; Rocamora, 1998;

Simbulan, 1965, 2005; Teehankee, 2001).

Undoubtedly, term limits, among other reforms,

were introduced to increase competition in the political

system and help prevent the over-concentration of

political power in the hands of a few. Nevertheless,

although members of the Philippine Constitutional

Commission of 1986 had varying and opposing views

about the provision of term limits, the main intention of

the clause was to be part of a bigger reform architecture

that would level the political playing field and help to

ensure a more competitive political system by limiting

the tendencies of local politicians to over-concentrate

political power.

Given that the Philippines has a very dynastic

democracy, and in the absence of other political

reforms, politicians found strategic means to

circumvent the rule by running for another public

office or by fielding their relatives to maintain

political control after they have reached their term

limit. Querubin (2012) emphasized that reforms that

do not alter the underlying source and cause of political

power might not be able to bring substantial changes

in the political landscape effectively. Moreover,

reforms that lack strong enabling supplementary laws

will not be able to withstand the skillful strategies

of entrenched politicians. We review some of the

empirical evidence in the next section.

Results

Growth of Political Dynasties

Over the years, political dynasties appear to have

grown not simply in number (more political clans) but

also in heft (many clans have expanded by fielding

more family members). An analysis of the growth

of political dynasties shows that across various local

93Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

government positions, more and more politicians are

members of prominent or rising political clans.

For instance, drawing on a comprehensive dataset

spanning 1988 to 2019 of Philippine local elections,

evidence shows how governors who have at least one

relative in office (considered as fat dynasties) grew

by around 39 percentage points from 41% in 1988 to

80% in 2019 (Figure 1). Vice-Governors’ fat dynasty

share had increased from 18% in 1988 to 68% in 2019.

Municipal and city officials are not exempt from this

phenomenon. Mayors’ fat dynasty share had grown

steadily from 26% in 1988 to 53% in 2019. Since 1987,

only city and municipal councilors have maintained a

fat dynasty share below 25%. For councilors, the fat

dynasty share had only grown from 18% in 1988 to

23% in 2019.

In 2019, Maguindanao had the highest fat dynasty

share with 51%. Fat dynasty share is highest in

provinces in Ilocos Region, Central Luzon, and

the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (BARMM). Although we concede that the

dataset only covers the post-Marcos era, it is still clear

from this prima facie evidence that dynastic expansion

appears aggressive during this period. The following

specific cases of political families further illustrate the

micro-dynamics of this broader trend.

Clan Networks in Samar

We draw on concepts in network science and

graph theory to illustrate how political clans were able

to circumvent term limits strategically and fielded

other members of the family to key local government

positions. Particularly, we focus on the province of

Samar.

Samar (formerly named Western Samar) is ranked

out of 81 provinces in terms of poverty incidence

among families in 2015. Poverty in Samar (and the

other provinces near it) is heavily defined by its

vulnerability to typhoons and other natural disasters

(Aldaba, 2009). The poverty trend of Samar reveals

worsening conditions from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 5).

In fact, the province is included among those that were

tagged to have the poorest population in the country.

As of 2019, they are 39

out of 81 provinces in terms

of fat dynasty share, with around 22% of positions

occupied by the fat dynastic politicians.

The Tan Family Dynasty of Samar stated in 1998

with Milagrosa Tan, who won a seat as a Provincial

Board Member. Starting 2001, she served 3 consecutive

terms as governor. In her last gubernatorial term in

2007, she involved her daughter Sharee Ann in politics,

who won the Congressional post in the second district

of Samar. After Milagrosas’ 3

term as governor,

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Figure 1

Growth of Fat Dynasties From 1988 to 2019 Across Elected Offices

Clan Networks in Samar

We draw on concepts in network science and graph theory to illustrate how political clans

were able to circumvent term limits strategically and fielded other members of the family to key

local government positions. Particularly, we focus on the province of Samar.

Samar (formerly named Western Samar) is ranked 17

out of 81 provinces in terms of

poverty incidence among families in 2015. Poverty in Samar (and the other provinces near it) is

heavily defined by its vulnerability to typhoons and other natural disasters (Aldaba, 2009). The

poverty trend of Samar reveals worsening conditions from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 5). In fact, the

province is included among those that were tagged to have the poorest population in the country.

As of 2019, they are 39

out of 81 provinces in terms of fat dynasty share, with around 22% of

positions occupied by the fat dynastic politicians.

Figure 1. Growth of Fat Dynasties From 1988 to 2019 Across Elected Ofces

R.U. Mendoza, M.S. Banaag, J.D. Hiwatig, M.H. Yusingco, & J.K. Yap

she won 3 consecutive Congressional posts in the

second district of Samar, while Sharee Ann served 3

consecutive terms as provincial governor from 2010

to 2018. The Tans also successfully recruited Stephen

James, Son of Milagrosa and Sister of Sharee Ann,

for the Vice-Gubernatorial position from 2010 to

2018, which secured them 3 key local executive and

legislative positions (Figure 2).

For the 2019 election, the three won key offices

again when Milagrosa won the Governorship, her son,

neophyte politician Reynolds Michael won the Vice-

Governorship, whereas Stephen James and Sharee

Ann both won seats in the House as representatives

of Districts I and II, respectively. In December 2019,

Michael was sworn as Governor when his mother died

from cardiac arrest (Gabieta, 2019).

The Uys have also had success in securing elected

office, led by Reynaldo Uy, who served as Mayor

of Calbayog City, Samar’s largest city in terms of

population, for three terms, and as Congressman

of its 1st district, for another three terms. In 2011,

while serving again as mayor of Calbayog, he was

assassinated (Bonifacio, 2016), and as of August 2018,

the assailants are still unknown. Other Uy clans have

also come into power. Coefredo Uy, his son Dexter,

and daughter Stephany Uy-Tan have held the mayoral

spot in Samar’s provincial capital, Catbalogan City,

since 2010.

We now use network science to study the

relationships across Western Samar politicians in

the last roughly three decades (from 1988 to 2016).

Through this analysis, we assess if the theoretical

central nodes played important roles in the actual

political scene in the province. Similar to the method

used in the nascent literature on political dynasties,

the full name forms the basis of the relationship

between nodes in our network representation. Each

politician (or node) represents one unique full name.

Two persons are connected to each other (an edge)

if they share the same surname or middle name.

Members of specific political families or clans with

the same surname are expected to be fully connected

to each other within that clan, but we expect to see

links between two or more different political clans

with similar middle names.

We use two common measures in network analysis:

degree centrality and betweenness centrality. The

degree centrality of a node is equal to the sum of family

members from families that share their middle and

surnames. Nodes with the highest degree centrality

values are also known as hubs, as they have direct

contact with a large number of nodes in the network,

and is an indicator of intermarriages between clans.

Betweenness centrality measures the number of times a

node lies in the shortest path between two other nodes.

Nodes with high betweenness centrality serve as a

bridge between two nodes and have the most control

in information flowing around the network (Borgatti

et al., 2018). Our analysis aims to shed light on what

role these central nodes played, and the motivation as

Figure 2. Full House for the Tan and Uy Political Clans of Western Samar

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Full House for the Tan and Uy Political Clans of Western Samar

We now use network science to study the relationships across Western Samar politicians

in the last roughly three decades (from 1988 to 2016). Through this analysis, we assess if the

theoretical central nodes played important roles in the actual political scene in the province.

Similar to the method used in the nascent literature on political dynasties, the full name forms the

basis of the relationship between nodes in our network representation. Each politician (or node)

represents one unique full name. Two persons are connected to each other (an edge) if they share

the same surname or middle name. Members of specific political families or clans with the same

surname are expected to be fully connected to each other within that clan, but we expect to see

links between two or more different political clans with similar middle names.

We use two common measures in network analysis: degree centrality and betweenness

centrality. The degree centrality of a node is equal to the sum of family members from families

that share their middle and surnames. Nodes with the highest degree centrality values are also

95Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

to why certain families are relatively better connected

or not.

The connection between the Uys and Tans persists

due to the presence of leaders like Coefredo and

Stephany in the network. The marriage of Stephen

James Tan and Stephany Uy in July 2006 allows the

connection between the Tans and Uys to persist in

the network. Through key informant interviews, we

confirmed that after marriage, the Tans encouraged

Stephany and her father, Coefredo Uy, to continue

running for office in Catbalogan City for them to

control the city. Coefredo started his career as mayor of

Catbalogan in 2004, whereas Stephany first became a

city councilor in 2010 before she became the mayor of

the same city in 2013. This marriage allowed the Tans

to connect to the Uys through Stephany and Coefredo.

Figure 3 shows how the Uy clan is connected to the

Tan clan. The red nodes are the Tans (together with

Stephany and Coefredo), whereas the white nodes are

the Uys. They are connected to 25 other politicians

through their familial links.

Figure 3. Network Representation of Western Samar (Focused on Tans and Uys) in 2010.

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Figure 3

Network Representation of Western Samar (Focused on Tans and Uys) in 2010.

Figure 4

Family Network of Politicians in Samar Elected From 1988 to 2016.

Figure 4. Family Network of Politicians in Samar Elected From 1988 to 2016.

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Figure 3

Network Representation of Western Samar (Focused on Tans and Uys) in 2010.

Figure 4

Family Network of Politicians in Samar Elected From 1988 to 2016.

R.U. Mendoza, M.S. Banaag, J.D. Hiwatig, M.H. Yusingco, & J.K. Yap

Let us look at the network as a whole by connecting

politicians elected from 1988 up to 2016 (Figure 4).

The size of the node corresponds to its betweenness

centrality value. A few nodes in the central cluster seem

to have relatively higher betweenness centrality value

than the rest of the nodes, meaning they lie in a place

where most nodes should first pass them to connect

to another node.

In our network, most nodes or politicians need to

pass through them to connect with the other nodes.

Theoretically, and drawing on network science

literature, removing them from the network will

affect how information flows and might even hinder

some families from connecting with each other. We

hypothesize that these clan members are among the

better connected, given their connections with a much

larger set of well-positioned clans and politicians.

Perhaps in situations of potential conflict, they are in

a position to play a special “bridging role” by being

able to reach out to multiple clans, given their links

to them.

This analysis offers preliminary but very rich

insights into the growth of political networks in the

Philippine province of Samar. Given the weak political

party system in the Philippines, combined with the

dominance of family-centric alliance-building, it is

difficult to imagine strong policy reform agendas

emerging from these types of alliances. Yet, alliances

are being built in the Philippines, and it is critical

to understand how these evolve over time. Their

relative stability also challenges the contemporary

understanding of the Philippines and its nascent

democratic political institutions.

Other Dominant Clans

Aside from the Uys and Tans of Samar, other

political clans have also exhibited dynastic tendencies

since the ratification of the 1987 constitution. We study

some of them in this section.

The Dimaporo Clan of Lanao del Norte won the

Gubernatorial post for 9 consecutive elections, which

is almost equals to the entire period since the 1987

constitution. In fact, they have been in power for over

60 years. The Patriarch, Mohammad Ali, was a known

ally of the Marcos clan. He served as a congressman

of Lanao del Sur from 1966 to 1972 and of Lanao

del Norte from 1987–1992. Abdullah, Imelda, and

Khalid Dimaporo successfully circumvented term

limits by each taking 3 terms as governor, while they

continued to expand their political influence through

other political offices. In 2019, the Dimaporos once

again claimed the Governorship and two Congressional

positions in Lanao del Norte. In 2013, Abdullah (was

then elected as a congressman) faced lawsuits, one

for graft and another for malversation, which are both

linked with the P728 million fertilizer fund scam at the

time. We see in Figure 5 that it is not totally surprising

that poverty has remained virtually unchanged in this

province (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2019; Social

Watch Philippines, 2007).

Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Aside from the Uys and Tans of Samar, other political clans have also exhibited dynastic

tendencies since the ratification of the 1987 constitution. We study some of them in this section.

The Dimaporo Clan of Lanao del Norte won the Gubernatorial post for 9 consecutive

elections, which is almost equals the entire period since the 1987 constitution. In fact, they have

been in power for over 60 years. The Patriarch, Mohammad Ali, was a known ally of the Marcos

clan. He served as a congressman of Lanao del Sur from 1966 to 1972 and of Lanao del Norte

from 1987–1992. Abdullah, Imelda, and Khalid Dimaporo successfully circumvented term limits

by each taking 3 terms as governor, while they continued to expand their political influence

through other political offices. In 2019, the Dimaporos once again claimed the Governorship and

two Congressional positions in Lanao del Norte. In 2013, Abdullah (was then elected as a

congressman) faced lawsuits, one for graft and another for malversation, which are both linked

with the P728 million fertilizer fund scam at the time. We see in Figure 5 that it is not totally

surprising that poverty has remained virtually unchanged in this province (Philippine Statistics

Authority, 2019; Social Watch Philippines, 2007).

Figure 5

Poverty Trend in Lanao del Norte and Samar

40.71

46.24

49.06

44.26

45.9

40.37

42.5

50.03

46.92

2003 2006 2009 2012 2015

Samar Lanao Del Norte

Figure 5. Poverty Trend in Lanao del Norte and Samar

97Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Camarines Norte is a representative case where

rivaling political families duel each other for power.

The Villafuerte clan was unsuccessfully challenged

by the Andaya Clan for the provinces’ top executive

positions in the recent 2019 elections. The father-son-

grandson tandem of Luis Sr., Luis Jr., and Miguel have

been congressmen in Camarines Norte’s first district

for almost three decades.

Meanwhile, the Marcos clan of Ilocos Norte is

among the most controversial political dynasties in the

country. After being exiled during the People Power

Revolution in the late 1980s, the clan was able to

return to politics in the 1990s. For the 2019 election,

three generations (Imee, her son Matthew, and Cecilia,

widower of former Provincial Board Member Mariano

II) of the Marcoses secured key strategic positions

locally (Governor, Vice Governor) in Ilocos Norte, as

well as the national arena (Senator).

The Dimaporos, Tans, Andayas, Villafuertes, and

Marcoses are only some examples of many fat dynasties

that have adapted to the term limits and found ways

to circumvent them by fielding more family members

to compete for elective positions. It is tempting to

conclude that term limits caused these adjustments and

the subsequent rise of fat dynasties. This is what some

politicians appear to readily acknowledge. According

to them, this leads to the conclusion that removing

term limits may undo this dynastic expansion. There

are several ways to refute this weak argument, once

we turn to the evidence and history.

Discussion

This paper reviews the empirical evidence linking

political dynasties to the imposition of term limits

under the 1987 Constitution. Evidence has shown

that political families have circumvented term limits

by strategically deploying more clanmates in elected

positions, increasing the number of fat dynasties in the

country over time. This was largely possible because

other reforms that were meant to be implemented

along with political term limits (e.g., anti-dynasty

law, political party reforms, and so forth) were not

successfully implemented since the 1987 Constitution

was crafted. Plainly put, and contrary to the claim of

some politicians, the introduction of term limits was

not able to meet its avowed objective of promoting

more democratic political competition because of the

failure to introduce other ancillary reforms (notably an

anti-dynasty law) mandated by the charter. We argue in

this paper that it is not term limits per se that created fat

political dynasties. Furthermore, arguing that dynasties

will be curbed by removing term limits is clearly not

supported by both evidence and common sense.

First, our earlier review of the history behind term

limits clearly emphasizes how this reform was meant

to be part of a package of reforms that could level the

playing field in the political sphere. An enabling law for

the anti-dynasty clause in the Philippine Constitution

would have complemented term limits, and arguably,

the results would have been different. The absence

of this enabling law left the door wide open for

political dynasties to adapt to the term-limited political

environment by gaming it. Their expansion—both

over time and within jurisdictions—was not possible

to stop with a regulation on term limits alone. Hence,

we argue here that term limits per se did not cause the

proliferation of political dynasties. Rather, the absence

of other reforms that could have complemented term

limits likely also played a role.

In the data and results section, we were able to show

evidence on the scale of local elected positions that fat

dynasties have more and more been entrenched in the

political landscape since the 1987 constitution. We then

used network analysis to gather rich insights on the

major political families in Samar, which emphasized

connectedness and “bridging roles” of certain family

members in building strong political clans. We then

showed other examples of fat dynasties (Dimaporos,

Andayas, Villafuertes, and Marcoses) that have found

ways to evade term limits.

Therefore, reformists should focus not on removing

term limits, but on further strengthening those reforms

that should have accompanied it—including enhancing

competition in the political sphere and regulating

political dynasties.

Supplying alternative leaders and strengthening

political parties is also key in political reform towards

reversing the dynastic nature of Philippine politics.

Quimpo (2007) explained that political party reform

would be a long, gradual process that requires new,

reform-minded political parties to be built upon

members that do not engage in patrimonialism. Perhaps

victories of those so-called “giant-slayers” in 2019

(Esguerra, 2019), such as of Vico Sotto unseating

the Eusebios as Mayor of Pasig City or Kaka Bag-ao

defeating the Ecleos for the Gubernatorial seat in the

Dinagat Islands for the first time since its founding,

R.U. Mendoza, M.S. Banaag, J.D. Hiwatig, M.H. Yusingco, & J.K. Yap

can remind us that alternative politicians can emerge by

engaging with sectors and communities, emphasizing

government transparency, and prioritizing essential

and achievable reforms (Sabillo, 2019).

Furthermore, developing and strengthening the

alternative leadership pipeline could be possible by

tapping into youth leadership, such as those who serve

in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK). Republic Act

No. 10742 (2016) actually includes an anti-dynasty

component, which prevents dynastic links among

SK officials up to the 2

degree of consanguinity.

By building on this pool of youth leaders, it may be

possible to encourage a supply of non-dynastic leaders

starting with SK to start competing for higher office.

In addition, promoting a more inclusive economy

that reduces poverty and vulnerability may also

ultimately build a strong citizenry less susceptible to

traditional politics (e.g., vote-buying), and begin to

debilitate longstanding patron-client relationships that

tend to reinforce dynastic leadership in the country.

Perhaps only under such a comprehensive reform

agenda will we be able to change the dynastic nature

of politics in the Philippines—principally by reshaping

the underlying power structures that support it.

Acknowledgment

This study was funded by the Ateneo de Manila

University.

Declaration of ownership

This report is our original work.

Conflict of interest

None.

Ethical clearance

This study was approved by the Ateneo de Manila

University.

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