the independence of the elected representatives. The pressure of the realities in parliament to
form groupings of MPs should suffice to guarantee for the maintenance of parties under
normal circumstances. The limitation of the number of terms of office for those who are
determined to stay in politics seriously diminishes their level of independence.
54. Term-limits finally increase the influence of lobby groups and legislative staff, thus
contributing to a migration of power from elected representatives to non-elected officials, which
risks negatively impacting voters’ ability to hold representatives accountable.
55. On balance, therefore, the Venice Commission does not recommend the introduction of term-
limits for MPs, although it recognises that it is up to each constitutional or legal system to decide
on their opportunity in light of the prevailing particular circumstances and of the will of the
population.
56. The Commission is also of the view, for the reasons sets out above, that if term limits are to
be introduced for a legislative body, they should be less strict than those that apply to an executive
body.
57. Further, the very limited state practice (see paras. 5, 6 and 7 above) suggests that at least
two consecutive terms should be allowed. This appears to be a mitigation of the adverse effects
of term limits indicated above, and would preserve in particular the need for accountability
towards the electorate. It would also be more respectful of the principle of proportionality in the
interference with the rights to vote and be elected.
58. The Commission is of the view that guaranteeing continuity in a functioning democracy also
requires that the rule should be applied in a manner allowing for gradual renewal of the MPs.
Staggering the departures would also mitigate the adverse effects of having too many novice
legislators at the same time in terms of influence of lobbyists and parliamentary staff.
59. The Commission has reached similar conclusions as regards representatives elected at the
sub-national and local level, who like national MPs exercise a representative mandate and form
part of a collegiate body.
60. By contrast, the position of a directly elected regional president or governor and of a directly
elected mayor may be more comparable to that of a president in a presidential system, to the
extent that the incumbent could abuse of his or her office in order to distort the electoral
competition and the equality of opportunity of all candidates, and also to concentrate powers to
an excessive extent. These risks prevail over the advantages of accountability and competence
incentives. The check on their powers exercised by the sub-national or municipal councils might
not be sufficient. For this reason, the imposition of term limits on directly elected sub-national or
local executive officials could appear more justifiable. Comparative law supports this conclusion.
61. The position of governors, regional presidents and mayors who are indirectly elected by the
sub-national or municipal councils respectively is, however, different, and is more similar to that
of a Prime Minister in a parliamentary system. They are accountable before the relevant
representative body and need to have the latter’s continued confidence. The threat of great
accruals of power and of interference with equality of opportunity in elections is far less significant.
For this reason, in the Commission’s view, imposing term limits on them does not seem justified.