Character of Debts Chapter 23
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the property belong to the wife's separate estate. If the method of acquiring during marriage be different, then the
property falls without the class of separate estate of the wife, as fixed by the Constitution.”).
As a general rule, the Texas Supreme Court has attempted to defend the constitutionally defined categories of
separate property from any attempt by the legislature to expand or diminish them. Arnold, 273 S.W. at 802 (discussing
the rule of implied exclusion, used when interpreting constitutions and statutes, and stating “Hence, when the
Constitution says that as to property, not owned or claimed by the wife at marriage, it becomes her separate property
when acquired in one of three specified modes, the Legislature is prohibited from saying that property acquired after
marriage in some other mode may also become the wife's separate property.”).
However, judicial decisions have further refined and given substance to the basic definition of separate property.
For example, income from separate property becomes community property. See, e.g., De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co.,
23 Tex. 25, 29 (1859)(“The law, therefore, conclusively presumes that whatever is acquired, except by gift, devise or
descent, or by the exchange of one kind of property for another kind, is acquired by their mutual industry. If a crop is
made by the labor of the wife's slaves on the wife's land, it is community property, because the law presumes that the
husband's skill or care contributed to its production; or, that he, in some other way, contributed to the common
acquisitions.”). Likewise, “mutations” or changes in the form of separate property (i.e., an exchange of property for
some other property) retains the original separate-property status. See, e.g., Dixon v. Sanderson, 10 S.W. 535, 536
(Tex. 1888) (stating that “[p]roperty purchased with money, the separate property of husband or wife, or taken in
exchange for the separate property of either, becomes the separate property of the person whose money purchases or
whose property is given in exchange....”); Arnold, 273 S.W. at 803 (stating that “property remains separate through all
mutations and changes”). Only on rare occasion has the Texas Supreme Court had to ignore the rule of implied
exclusion and go outside the constitution to determine that a class of property was separate. See e.g., Graham v.
Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972)(holding that recoveries for personal injury incurred during marriage are separate
property since personal injuries are personal to the person regardless of the constitution’s more limited definition of
separate property).
Before leaving the topic of marital property characterization, there are several threshold points that need to be
made before moving on to the topic of marital liabilities—points that are always assumed by family lawyers but
probably never discussed often enough.
First, the Texas Constitution speaks in terms of “property” when it discusses characterization. It does not speak
in terms of “estates,” “debts,” or “liabilities,” terms which family and probate lawyers discuss often in cases dealing
with marital dissolution. Simply put, the concept of characterization laid out in the Texas Constitution relates to
“property,” not “liability.” The only whiff of terms like “debt” or “liability” is found in the clause which references
“creditors” and states “provided that person about to marry and spouses, without the intention to defraud creditors, may
by written instrument from time to time partition between themselves all or part of their property . . ..” See Tex. Const.
art. XVI, §15. More will be said about this provision later in this paper, but for the moment it is important to note that
the concept of characterization is focused on property, not debt or liability.
Second, the term “property” has been interpreted so that it extends to every species of valuable right and interest.
Womack v. Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307, 308 (1943); Ocie Speer, Law of Marital Rights in Texas 436
(1929); 1 Edwin S. Oakes, Speer's Marital Rights in Texas 508 (4th ed. 1961). In Graham, the Texas Supreme Court
stated “[i]n using the word ‘property,’ the framers of the constitution apparently had in mind property which could be
given, bought and sold, and passed by will or by inheritance.” Id., 488 S.W.2d at 395. The foregoing definition surely
includes debts which are owed to persons about to marry and spouses, but what about debts owed by persons about to
marry or spouses to other people? Are such things “property” within the meaning of the Texas Constitution? If so,
can they be characterized, how are they characterized, and does characterization affect who is liable? These questions,
and many others, will be explored further, below, but for now it is important to note that whether “debt” can be
characterized as community or separate is an important issue.
Third, the Texas Constitution discusses the concept of character only in relation to person who are about to marry
and spouses. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, §15. Before a marriage takes place, a person owns property with no character.
See Tex. Const. art. XVI, §15. After a marriage takes place, a person owns community, separate, or mixed property.
Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 574, 342 S.W.2d 565, 567-58 (1961)(separate or community); Gleich v. Bongio, 128
Tex. 606, 610, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937)(mixed). Upon divorce, the divorce court divides the
parties’ community property, typically awarding it as the “sole and separate property” of each spouse or, if any former
community property was not divided by the divorce court, then the ex-spouses own such property as tenants in
common. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 (just and right division); See e.g., Workings v. Workings, 700 S.W.2d 251, 253