7
Blue Planet II but there is little reason to believe that the marine pollution shown in that documentary - which
was mostly filmed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans - would be alleviated by a bottle deposit scheme in Britain.
Interestingly, ocean pollution is barely mentioned in DEFRA’s impact assessment and the government has
made no attempt to estimate what effect, if any, a DRS would have on this well-publicised problem. Instead,
the impact assessment focuses on littering in Britain and this is where the impact assessment finds the greatest
benefits. As mentioned above, DEFRA estimates that litter collection costs will fall by £50 million, but this is
small beer compared to its valuation of the psychological benefits of people seeing less litter.
Based on a 2011 study which found that people would be willing to pay an extra £47.40 in council tax to
achieve a one point reduction in litter, DEFRA estimates that a DRS would produce the equivalent of £986
million in intangible benefits. This valuation of the ‘disamenity of litter’ represents 90 per cent of the total
economic benefit DEFRA claims for the policy. Without it, the economic case for a DRS disappears.
Discussion
DEFRA’s impact assessment acknowledges that the 'potential cost to consumers for the time required to return
drinks containers to [reverse vending machines] or manual take-back points’ is a ‘key non-monetised cost’ and
yet it makes no attempt to put a value on it. It is likely to be huge. I have been unable to find reliable estimates
of how much time is required of shoppers to make the system work but, for the purpose of illustration, if each
household in the UK spends just five minutes a week moving, storing and reclaiming the deposits from their
beverage containers, the economic cost would equate to £1,687 million per annum (based on the median
hourly income of £14.31).
This sum comfortably outstrips the less tangible benefit of £986 million for the ‘disamenity of litter’, and there
are two reasons to believe that the £986 million figure is an overestimate. Firstly, the study from which it is
derived is based on stated preferences, which are notoriously unreliable because respondents do not have
skin in the game. They can express a preference for paying higher council tax to support any cause of which
they approve but they do not have to put their hand in their pocket.
Secondly, DEFRA (2019b: 26) assumes that if the DRS leads to a 85 per cent return rate, there will be an 85
per cent reduction in drinks container litter. This is fallacious logic. Containers recovered through kerbside
collection are always going to be more likely to be recycled - and less likely to be littered - than containers
bought ‘on the go’. It is also bad maths. Even if the current rate of ‘on the go’ recycling was the same as the
overall rate (72 per cent), raising it to 85 per cent in no way implies that littering will drop by 85 per cent.
Moreover, if the public truly believed that it is worth spending £986 million to see the volume of litter reduced
by 17 per cent, as DEFRA’s reading of the survey implies, councils could raise taxes and greatly improve their
anti-litter work. Such a sum would more than double the amount spent on litter collection and would,
presumably, result in litter of all kinds being reduced by more than 17 per cent. Therefore, even if we take the
£986 million figure seriously, spending it on a DRS is not the most efficient way to use it if tackling litter is the
objective.
This is not to deny that people object to seeing litter, nor that their lives would be slightly improved if there were
less of it. Many of the costs of littering are intangible and emotional, but they are nonetheless real. But the
costs to consumers of having to cart their empty cans and bottles to a reverse vending machine are equally
real and arguably more tangible. They are certainly easier to quantify. By including an implausibly large figure
for emotional benefits to the public while ignoring the public’s unpaid labour costs, the impact assessment is
skewed towards finding a net benefit. DEFRA’s deposit return scheme is unquestionably loss-making in
financial terms, but it is almost certainly loss-making in broader economic terms too.