of industrial activity in the Ruhr but also that the
finances of the Government must have been sub-
jected to intense strain as a result of the policy of
lending monetary aid to those engaged in passive
resistance. Cut off from its principal industrial and
mining center, deprived of
its coal supply and
forced to import large quantities of fuels from for-
eign countries, Germany experienced increasing
difficulty in replenishing its supplies of the necessi-
ties of life, of coal and of raw materials, and in keep-
ing its industrial machinery in operation. In fact,
German economic activity collapsed visibly during
the summer of 1923
under the heavy weight of the
burdens imposed upon it.15
The occupation of the Ruhr had a disastrous ef-
fect also upon the mark currency. In November and
December 1922 between 7,000 and 8,ooo marks
exchanged generally for one dollar. Beginning in
January 1923, however, the price of the dollar rose
so swiftly that at the end of that month 50,000
marks were paid for one dollar. The Reichsbank's
attempt to support the mark exchange was success-
15
Much
valuable information concerning the Ruhr occupation is con-
tained in the publication of the Statistisches Reichsamt, Wirtschaft und
Statistik, Vols.
4
and 5
(Berlin, 1923, 1924, 1925). See also Ludwig
Elster, ed.,
Volkswirtschaflliche Chronik für das Jahr
(Gustav
Fischer, Jena, 1924); Guy Creer, The Ruhr-Lorraine Industrial Prob-
lern
(Macmillan, 1925); Henri Lichtenberger, The Ruhr Conflict (Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1923);
Ernst
Schultze, ed., Ruhrbesetzung und Weltwirtschaft (Gloeckner, Leipzig,
1927).
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